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PRELIMINARY MENORANDUM 
Conference of March 17, 1978 
List 1, Sheet 3 
No. 77-1105 
HERBERT (asserted libelee) 
v. 
Cert. to CA 2 (Kaufman, Oakes (cone.), 
Neskill (dissenting)y-
LANDO & WALLACE (reporters) Fed/Civil Timely (90th day on 
Sunday) --
1. Summary. Does the First Amendment extend a privilege 
against disclosure of a reporter's editorial decisions and 
.. 
frame of mind when sought by a defamation plaintiff under a 
~ 
New York Times standard? 
2. Facts. ~lonel Anthony Herbert was relieved of his 
command in Viet Nam after criticizing his superiors for insensi-
( 
-2-
tivity to atrocities committed against Viet Cong prisoners. 
The Army claimed his removal was due to a poor efficiency 
report filed by his superior, a Colonel Franklin whom Herbert ' 
accused of having been told about the atrocities and doing 
nothing. Colonel Franklin denied having been told. Colonel 
\
Herbert's military record prior to this time was unblemished 
and distinguished. 
Following his removal, several news stories were run about ,........_.... __ _ 
Herbert. The Army developed the evidence against the superiors 
charged by Herbert, but found no basis for any charges. The 
tide of news stories then turned against Herbert, with the 
insinuation growing that Herbert had manufactured the atrocities 
story in order to cover for his own dismissal. Barry Lando, 
a CBS news producer, had previously run a news story emphasizing 
Herbert's side of the story; in 1972, he began to dig into the 
evidence on the other perspective. He interviewed Herbert and 
his two superior officers, and several others including a 
Captain in Herbert's command upon whom Herbert had relied for 
verification, and some of the soldiers who served under Herbert. 
! 
Lando used as part of his outline for research the book written 
by .Herber:t about his Viet Nam experiences, "Sqldier." 
... '--I:'"ando, in cooperation with Mike Wallace of CBS 1 "60 Minutes", 
----------------------------------------~---put together a special show of "60 Minutes" entitled "The Selling of 
Colonel Herbert." The show aired on February 4, 1973. Its 
conclusion was that Herbert had not been a good officer, had 
( -3-
himself been capable of cruelty, and had developed this story 
of covering up atrocities as an excuse for his r~moval from 
command. Herbert's reputation was damaged, and the sales 
of his book suffered, for which he sued Lando, Wallace, and 
CBS (also Atlantic Monthly on the basis of a subsequent article 
based on Lando's research, but Atlantic Monthly is not in the 
present case). Suit was brought in federal district court in 
New York under diversity jurisdiction. 
In developing his case, Herbert recognizes that he is subject 
to the New York Times and St. Amant standard. He commenced extensive 
discovery against Lando, Wallace, and CBS, and received a wealth 
of background material used by the newsmen in their research. 
He also sought information about Lando and Wallace ,.s frame of 
mind, recognizing that he had to prove that the falsities they 
broadcast were either known to be false, or were matters about 
which the newsmen were recklessly unconcerned. CA 2 phrases the 
_ /f.r? ,~bc::r-r 's 
five areas ofJinquiry along these lines as follows: 
l\ l)Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations 
regarding people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, 
in connection with the '60 Minutes' segment and the Atlantic 
Monthly article; 
2) Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by 
interviewees and his state of mind with respect to the 
veracity of persons interviewed; 
3) The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that 
he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of persons, 




4) Conversations between Lando and Wallace about 
matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast 
publication; and 
5) Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision 
!I 
to include or exclude certain material. 
(App. of petition at 20a). 
The cert. petition adds some specificity to these inquiries. 
Colonel Franklin had admitted that a second interview had taken 
/1 It' 
place with Lando, at which he stated that he often tuned out 
when Colonel Herbert talked to him. A Captain Donovan ·had 
told Lando in two sworn statements that Herbert had reported 
the war crimes to brigade headquarters. Captain Hill had 
also sworn that Herbert made such a report, and added that he 
thought the report was made to Franklin. Mike Wallace stated 
on the program that "none [of the men who served with Herbert] 
was certain that he actually reported [the February 14th killings]." 
(petn. at 10). The purpose of discovery, Herbert argued to the 
District Court, was to find out why Lando and Wallace made no 
mention of these sources that corroborated his story, and also 
to find out the extent of research Lando conducted along lines that 
might have been favorable to Herbert. 
The District Court granted the discovery order, but certified 
the question for interlocutory appeal. 
3. Opinion below (1 concurrence, 1 dissent). CA 2 reversed, 





Judge Kaufman wrote for the court. He said that there had been 
much discovery of information already provided, and that the 
instant inquiries were directed only to the reporters' state 
of mind. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 655, 681 (1972), was 
relied on for the proposition that "without some protection for 
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 
New York Time3 v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was premised on 
the recog~ition that a free press required restrictions on 
interference in the form of private law suits against newsmen, 
even if this meant that falsehoods would occasionally be 
published. The standard of knowing falsity or reckless disregard 
could be proven by circumstantial evidence; it was necessary to 
the preservation of press freedom as recognized in New York Times 
and Branzburg that the thought processes of newsmen not be opened 
up to compulsory disclosure. Subsequent case law in Columbia 
Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (19 : 
and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), 
has recognized that the editorial policy of a newspaper cannot 
be interfered with; and from that it follows that editorial 
decisions on what leads to pursue, and what slant a story should 
take, must also be free from inspection. Judge Kaufman's opinion 
continually returns to the argument that newsmen's conversations 
around the copy desk would necessarily be more stilted and less 
free-wheeling (with concomitant damage to the First Amendment 




be discoverable by a private party plaintiff. 
\ 
Judge Oakes' concurrence recognizes that the decision 
"breaks new ground" in First Amendment law. He is aware that • 
in some cases, the power of newspapers results in an unfairness 
if sources are not revealed in private litigation, citing 
------------------------------------------Car~y v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(MacKinnon, J., 
concurring), but concludes that inspection into thought 
,....__,.,.,. ___. ------ --
processes (as opposed to sources) would weaken the foundations 
of the entire free press. Much of Judge Oakes' opinion is ---
based on an ddress by Hr. Justice Stewar"!)at Yale Law School, 
"Or of the Press," 26 Hastings L.J. 631 (1975), in which freedom 
of the press is recognized as involving more than mere freedom 
of speech. The s~parate protection afforded by the First Amendme nt 
for the press must mean, at the least, that editorial choices 
cannot be pried into at the whim of a private plaintiff. 
Judge Meskill's dissent agrees that allowing the di scovery 
sought here will result in a chill of some kinds of editorial 
function. That is a correct result, he maintains, because 
the type of editorial function that will be chilled should be 
chilled; namely, the calculation of how to present a malicious 
libel. Branzburg offers no support to the majority; the dictum -
quoted by Judge Kaufman does not refute the fact that the Court 
held disclosure of sources was required in the criminal context. 
And the Branzburg Court explicitly fore s aw some of the problems 
c) $)t'(tll.)1 c t 
now presented--wher7[a "proper editorial function" might resist 





line-drawing by denying a privilege, and the CA 2 should have 
done the same in this case. 
4. Contentions. The petition hammers away at the difference 
' -
between inquiries into frame of mind, and interference with 
---------------------------------editorial judgements or obtaining sources. Only the newsman 
----------------------------------------is involved when an inquiry into frameof mind is made; there 
is no threat that a source of information will dry up upon 
disclosure. Petitioner emphasizes that a reckless or calculated 
falsehood is not entitled to First Amendment protection, and that 
this Court held so in Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
No chill will result, except of malicious thought processes. 
New York Times will protect from liability any evidence of 
mere negligence. Branzburg has been stood on its head by CA 2; 
it holds that some editorial processes must yield to other 
legitimate policies. Petitioner continually stresses that the 
scope of his questions is limited; he merely wants to know why 
Lando and Wallace chose not to include segments of testimony 
supporting his view, why they mentioned a first interview with 
Colonel Franklin but not a second which greatly weakened his 
denial of Herbert's charge, and why they spent so much investigative 
effort disproving Herbert and so little checking into his support. 
Petitioner's final argument is that CA 2 has now announced a rule 
of great uncertainty; no one knows what is meant by "editorial 
process" and it is now impossible to predict what editorial 





The response spends most of its effort on a ripeness 
argument. The case is presently on interlocutory appeal. 
It is more than possible that Herbert will be able to prove 
his case of malice on the basis of circumstantial evidence 
already made avail.1ble to him. The mere fact that Herbert's 
side of the story was not pursued, and that favorable references 
in interviews were excised, could prove a case of knowing 
falsehood or reckless disregard. 
Further, Herbert's theory is closer to equal time than 
to a ban on falsehood; he alleges mostly that CBS only presented --one side, not that what was presented was in itself inaccurate. 
A test of editorial privilege should await a more conventional 
plaintiff's theory. And finally, there are no other circuits 
that have ruled on this question. Proper exercise of this 
Court's certiorari discretion should require a development of 
this question among the circuits. 
5. Discussion. The question presented is one of great 
importance. New York Times restricted libel plaintiffs to cases 
of malice, and St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), held 
that proof in such cases had to incorporate a demonstration of 
subjective state of mind. Those are awfully strong restrictions 
against a libelee. To impose the further rule that no discovery 
.-. ---
directed to the editorial process will be permitted would preclude 
entirely any libel action by a public figure in a great number of 
cases. 
CA 2 has not produced a compelling opinion. The stretch 
( -9-
( 
from Miami Herald and CBS, which struck down government 
compulsions that certain material be carried, to the conclusion 
that no discovery be permitted into how an editorial choice is made 
of what material will be carried, requires a crucial intermediate 
st~p. That step is the premise that mere disclosure of editorial 
choice processes will chill those functions so severely that 
it would be tantamount to telling newspapers and television 
stations what to print and broadcast. That additional premise 
is not compellingly valid on its face, and might well be 
demonstrated fals~ it is disclosed that Lando and Wallace 
carried on a conversation in which they said there was no more 
news value in defending Herbert, and that they ought to dig 
instead for evidence condemning him, the respondents argue that 
further freedom of discussion around editorial tables would 
be chilled. That is a deceptive argument, since it incorporates 
two quite different theories. The first is that proof o f such 
a conversation would demonstrate wanton disregard of the truth, 
resulting in a judgment for plaintiff, and a chill stemming from 
the damages assessed. The second is that the mere disclosure 
of the conversation will chill free editorial discussions in 
the future. The first argument is invalid. Judge Meskill's 
dissent was addressed to th~ notion, and he quite correctly 
concludes that no chill results unless there is proof of wanton 
disregard of truth or of actual malice. Chilling in those cases 






severe blow already in Branzburg. The~ying up of news sources 
is demonstrably a more likely outcome from disclosure (or the 
Hli?.. ol ry 1 YI<J u jJ of 
mere potential of disclosure) tha~editor~al discussions. But 
even if such discussions are inhibited, there are competing 
interests; one of the most important of wh~ch (though perhaps 
not as important as enforcement of the criminal law), is the 
protection of victims of libel. Respondents have not proven 
that this chill will result; they rely instead on the more 
obvious outcome of the first kind of chill detailed above. 
Once the two arguments are separated, however, it is apparent 
that respondents have a difficult task to demonstrate 1) that 
such a chill is an actual liklihood, and 2) that if it occurs, 
' 
it outweighs the private libelee's rights. 
The ripeness of the case, however, is in serious question. 
"'-as ,..-. ... 
In a matter of this importance, it should not be necessary to 
wait for a conflict among the circu:its, but in this very case, 
the trial has yet to go forward. It is quite clear that 
Herbert already has on hand a large amount of information showing 
what CBS, Lando, and Wallace were intending. If he prevails, 
not only will the case be moot, but it could be a useful indication 
that other cases of New York Times libel can be proven without 
discovery of editorial decision-making. For that reason, I 
recommend against a grant of cert. at this time. 
2/28/78 Campbell Op. in petn. 
There is a response. 
.. 
\..IUUI(, • • ,,,, • • o • • • • • • • • • • • 
Argued .... ............... , 19 .. . 
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underlying many of this Court's First Amendment decisions. 
Briefly summarizing the facts, Herbert came to national 
attention as the result of his charges that the Army had tried to 
thwart his efforts to deter war crimes committed by soldiers in 
the field in Viet Nam. When this affair surfaced in 1971, 
Herbert received substantial favorable publicity. In February 
1973, however, CBS broadcast a program narrated by respondent 
Mike Wallace suggesting that Herbert had lied about his efforts 
to bring his complaints to the Army's attention and that Herbert 
himself had committed or condoned various brutal acts against 
Vietnamese captives. Respondent Lando, the producer of the 
program, subsequently wrote an article for Atlantic Monthly 
repeating the attacks on Herbert. Pretrial discovery turned up 
evidence indicating that CBS chose not to broadcast certain 
material that supported Herbert's version of the facts, and tha 
--------Lando and Wallace had made statements to representatives of the 
Pentagon suggesting they had entered into the project with the 
intent to "debunk" Herbert. 
In the course of a deposition, counsel for Herbert 
sought to inquire into the basis for various editorial decisions 
made by Lando in the course of his work on the program. When 
Lando declined to answer these questions, counsel moved for a 
Rule 37 order to compel response. The district court concluded 
that answers to the questions were relevant to the issue of 
Lando's awareness of the likelihood that the broadcast and 
subsequent article conveyed false information, the predicate for 
~ "':' 
3. 
recovery under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 




therefore were proper and required a response. The court 
declined to recognize the privilege asserted by Lando and 
the motion to compel. In light of the First Amendment 
implications of the question and a finding that appellate 
resolution of the matter would advance~he litigation by aiding 
discovery, however, the court certified an interlocutory appeal 
of the order under § 1292(b). 
A divided court of appeals reversed. 568 F.2d 974 (2d 
Cir. 1977). According to Judge Kaufman, this Court 
"has repeatedly recognized the essentially tripartite 
aspect of the press's work and function in: (1) 
acquiring information, (2) 'processing' that 
information and (3) disseminating the information." 
Id. at 976. Citing Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 
u.s. 241 (1974), and CB~ v. Democratic National Committee, 412 
u.s. 94 (1973), as authority for the proposition that the First 
,. 
Amendment protects the editorial, "information processing" 
function of the press from government regulation, Judge Kaufman 
concluded that this protection extended to compelled disclosure 
I 
"of how a journalist formulated his judgments on what to print or 
not to print." Judge Kaufman recognized that this limitation 
interfered with a public person's right to recovery damages for 
defamation upon proof of actual 
1. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
Herbert concedes that he is a "public figure" for 
purposes of applying Sullivan's "actual malice" 
requirement. 
malice, but reasoned that as the privilege was only a procedural 
restriction and did not alter the substantive standard for 
recovery, it did not conflict with Sullivan.2 
Jurisdiction 
Although the issue is not briefed, and as far as I can 
tell was not even argued before the court of appeals, I raise as 
a preliminary matter the question of jurisdiction. Section 
1292(b) permits a district court to certify an order presenting 
"a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion" when "an immediate appeal from 
the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation." The district court reasoned that the "controlling 
2. The o inion of Jud e Oakes is noteworthy 
in two respec s. It places particu ar empha sis on what 
is perceived as special protection accorded the press 
under the First Amendment, citing as authority Justice 
Stewart's article, "Or of the Press," 26 Hastings L.J. 
631 (1975), and treats the "prior restraint" doctrine 
stemming from Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 u.s. 
697 (1931) , as-a-function olel of the free press and 
~ot th~ee~e~ch _gua~nte~ o the 1rs en ment. 
Secona , 1t aescr iEes~compe i1ed disclosure relating to 
the editorial process as a form of prior restraint, 
inasmuch as "meddling with press freedoms after the 
printing or programming has occurred operates as a 7 7 
'prior restraint' on future editorial decisions by · 
virtue [of] the chilling effect created by that 
interference." 568 F.2d at 990 n.21. 
Jud e Meskill's dissent states its basic premise as 
follows: v1ously, sue a review has a 'chilling' or 
4. 
deterrent effect. It is supposed to. The publication 
of lies should be discouraged." Id. at 995. He also 
points out with respect to Judge Oakes' position that 
"[i]f we distinguish between institutional and personal 
rights to liberty of the press and place the former in a 
preferred position, then we necessarily place the latter 
in a subordinate position." Id. at 997. 
5. 
question" test was met here because the issue presented had 
intrinsic importance in light of the First Amendment 
repercussions. This seems to me dubious, as I had thought the c:=.. - ~ _.... .., 
degree to which a question was "controlling" depended on its 
relation to the merits of the particular case, not on its general 
societal importance. This reservation may be quibbling, but I 
have greater doubts about the degree to which an appeal of a 
discovery order ever can "materially advance the ultimate 
termination of the litigation." Of course every erroneous ruling 
may invite reversal on appeal, thus protracting the litigation, 
but this is true of many orders. And delaying the litigation 
during an appeal, which is the inevitable consequence of 
certification, runs contrary to the purpose of § 1292(b). 
On balance, it seems to me desirable to resolve the 
merits of this case rather than take a too strict view of § 
1292(b). Although one could be forgiven for suspecting that the 
district court and the court of appeals here have been more 
interested in getting their views on this concededly important 
issue onto the record than in helping these parties resolve their 
differences in a timely fashion, this kind of abuse, if it even 
is one, must be rare. The courts of appeals always have the 
option of declining a§ 1292(b) appeal, and this mechanism alone 
seems a sufficient check on most temptations to pass the buck on 
hard questions. I raise the issue now only out of an excess of 
caution, as a decision on the merits of this case undoubtedly 
will stand as approving sub silentio the expansive interpretation 
of § 1292(b) adopted below. 
6. 
First Amendment Protection of the Press 
Whether or not the "press" enjoys special protection 
under the First Amendment, a variety of problems with which this 
Court has wrestled seem to occur most often in the context of the - ., 
/1 \\ 
publication process. For purposes of analysis I have divided the 
~
cases dealing with these problems into three categories: 
(_/) 
governmental constraints on the c9ntent_ of publications~ 
governmental constraints on the(?bollection of information for 
b 
. . . l3) . f pu l1cat1on~ and governmental constra1nts on the select1on o 
information for publication. These categories are equivalent to 
those used by the court below. 
1. Constraints on Content 
In discussing the extent of First Amendment protection 
against government control over the content of published matter, 
\\ 
it is important to distinguish between~forms of regulation. The 
First Amendment is implicated most clearly where the government 
seeks to prevent a publication from ever reaching its audience. 
In Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 u.s. 697 (1931), the 
leading case in the development of modern prior restraint 
doctrine, Minnesota sought to enjoin further publication of a 
"malicious, scandalous, and defamatory newspaper." Chief Justice 
Hughes, writing for the majority, ruled that the injunction fell 
within the core area of state activity that the First Amendment 
was designed to limit. The history of the struggle for liberty 
of the press in England and this country and consistent 
interpretation of the Constitution since its adoption reinforced 
. •. 
7. 
the proposition that "In determining the extent of the 
constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not 
universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the 
guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication." Id. 
at 713. Those instances where prior restraints existed 
represented "exceptional cases" that illustrated the general 
rule. Malicious and libelous attacks on public officials did not 
fall into such an exception. 
"The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by 
miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the 
less necessary the immunity of the press from previous 
restraint in dealing with official misconduct. 
Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is 
the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional 
privilege." 
Id. at 720. The publishers of libels against public officials 
must be free to broadcast their charges without state 
interference, subject to a subsequent accounting for those 
statements that the stat:rc~to have been wrongful. 
~ 
After Near the concept that the First Amendment bore 
down most heavily when a prior restraint on communication was 
involved became a commonplace in constitutional interpretation. 
See, e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 
415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 u.s. 58, 70 
(1963). A recent illustration of this principle at work is New 
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 u.s. 713 (1971), the 
"Pentagon Papers" case. The government argued that continued 
publication of excerpts from stolen government documents would 
present a "grave and irreparable danger" to the nation's 
8. 
interests in the prosecution of the Vietnam war. The Court 
refused to permit an injunction to issue but split on the grounds 
for decision. Justices Black and Douglas stated that no prior 
restraint on publication ever could satisfy the First Amendment. , 
Justice Brennan indicated he would sustain a prior restraint only 
upon "governmental allegation and proof that publication must 
inevitably, and immediately cause the occurence of an event 
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea." 
Id. at 726-27. Justices Stewart, White, and Marshall chose a 
narrower ground, ruling that Congress had not provided for an 
injunctive procedure to guard against publications of this type 
but had enacted criminal penalties for publications that 
endangered the national security. They therefore were reluctant 
to imply a right to equitable relief in the face of this apparent 
election of remedies by Congress. Justices Stewart and White 
emphasized, however, that criminal penalties quite properly could 
be applied to conduct of the nature engaged in by the Times and 
Post, and Justice Marshall seemed to make the same point, albeit 
more obliquely. The Chief Justice and Justices Harlan and 
Blackmun would have sustained either an injunction or subsequent 
penalties. 
Although the special circumstances of New York Times Co. 
and the fact that each Justice wrote a separate opinion make it 
difficult to generalize about that decision, it seems clear that 
a majority of the Court reaffirmed Near in two important 
respects. First, before the government can seek through 
injunction, censorship, or other prior restraint to bar a 
9. 
publication from reaching the public it must establish that a 
grave danger to the nation's interests would occur immediately as 
the result of the dissemination of the publication. Second, a 
publication which cannot be subjected to prior restraiQt 
----------~---------------------~--------~------------------
nonetheless may be regulated through appropriate subsequent 
penalties. ----
These principles are not inconsistent; rather they 
reflect a qalculated balance of First Amendment and governmen~-.;d -
interests. Although both prior restraints and subsequent ~ 
punishment diminish the amount of information that reaches t  
~ 
public, it seems reasonable to believe that subsequent punishment 
reduces the flow of information to a lesser degree. Further, 
because prior restraints constrict speech on the basis of 
assumptions about what effect the speech will have, while 
subsequent punishment cannot be levied until the assumed danger 
has been realized and its effect manifested, one also might 
believe that subsequent restraints are more accurate in 
distinguishing genuinely undesirable speech from that which only 
seems threatening. Finally, when only subsequent punishment is 
permitted, the decision whether to publish is left to the 
publisher enabling the person or entity with an interest in 
disseminating the speech to assess for itself whether the risks 
attendant to publication are acceptable. This feature is 
consistent with the emphasis on individual responsibility and 
self reliance that underlies our system of government. 
The constraints on subsequent punishment of various 
10. 
kinds of publications are quite different, and vary according to 
the nature of the speech being regulated. See, ·e.g., Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Association, 46 U.S.L.W. 4511 (May 30, 
1978) (commercial speech); Miller v. California, 413 u.s. 15 
(1973) (obscene speech). In the area of defamation, the 
boundaries of appropriate subsequent relief are defined by New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964), and Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 u.s. 323 (1974). Sullivan involved a 
defamation suit against a newspaper and four individuals brought 
by a state official. This Court reversed a judgment against the 
newspaper, holding that a rule of strict liability for all untrue 
defamatory statements concerning public officials violated the 
First Amendment. In order to protect the "profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open" that represented "the 
central meaning of the First Amendment," greater protection was 
required for the accused defamer than a defense of truth. Two 
reasons were advanced for immunizing from civil liability false 
and defamatory speech concerning public officials: "[a]llowance 
of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the 
defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be 
deterred;" and "[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a 
valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about 
'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, 







The Sullivan Court did not immunize all defamatory 
speech about public officials, however, although Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Goldberg supported that position in separate 
opinions. Instead the Court ruled that a public official could 
,, 
II 
recover upon proof "with convincing clarity" of actual malice, 
defined as knowled e that the defamatory statement was false or 
of whether it was false or not. Upon an 
independent review of the record, the Court determined that such 
a showing had not been made and reversed the judgment. 
Sullivan was followed by Curtis Publishing Co. v. ~utts, 
388 u.s. 130 (1967), and Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 
29 (1971), both of which were decided without any opinion 
obtaining the support of the majority of the Court. In Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., supra, a majority position finally developed 
to define the extent of First Amendment protection of defamatory 
speech in situations not covered by Sullivan. Gertz reaffirmed 
the holding of Butts that the Sullivan actual malice requirement 
applied when a "public figure" as well as a "public official" 
sought to recover for damage to reputation, but it rejected the ~-~ 
position of the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom that actual ~--,_ 
malice also was required when the injury occurred as the result 
of discussion of a "public issue". Instead, the Court held that 
"so long as they do not impose liability without fault, 
the States may define for themselves the appropriate 
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of 
defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." 




Unlike Sullivan, which assumed a state interest in 
protection of reputation without discussing its aspects, Gertz 
was explicit in describing the balancing process that an 
application of First Amendment protection to defamation entails. , 
Your opinion for the Court began by describing the First 
Amendment interests at stake: 
"Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a 
false idea. However pernicious an op1nion may seem, we 
depend tor its correction not on the conscience of 
judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false 
s_tatements of fa q_,t. Neither t'he '"IntentiOnal l i e nor the 
careless error materially advances society's interest in 
'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate on public 
issues ••.. They belong to that category of utterances 
which 'are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
mo r a 1 i t y • ' " 
Id. at 339-40 (citations omitted). Juxtaposed against these 
values was "the legitimate state interest underlying the law of ,..., 
libel" embodied in "compensation of individuals for the harm 
inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood." Id. at 341. The 
[
holding in Gertz, as that in Sullivan, represented an 
accomodation of these competing values. 
-:6-c••!S=~ ~ .J.!:P ··~~"' 
The net result of ~ear, New York TTrnes, -sullivan, and 
Gertz is a set of fairly well defined limits on the power of 
states to regulate published speech according to its defamatory 
cont~n t. 
~.,.----
Injunctions, censorship, and other forms of control 
advance of publication for all practical purposes are never 
allowed. Once a defamatory publication has been made, however, 
13. 
the states may protect individuals who have been harmed thereby 
through compensation for damages, as long as certain constraints 
are observed. In the case of public figure plaintiffs, a showing 
of "actual malice" must be made through "clearly convincing" 
evidence; with private plaintiffs, a showing of negligence is 
enough. 
l L ,, 
2. Constraints on the Collection of Information 
Quite a different balance has been struck with regard to 
governmental interference with the collection of information by 
individuals. As a theoretical matter, the right to inform 
oneself is an important aspect of the freedom of communication 
protected by the First Amendment: "[P]ublic debate must not only 
be unfettered; it must also be informed." Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co., 417 u.s. 843, 862-63 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
The assertion of this right, however, involves practical problems 
not presented by the right not to be constrained in what one 
says. The gathering of information can involve intrusion on both 
the private affairs of individual citizens and the functions of 
government. At some point intrusion becomes interference. 
Further, the nature of newsgathering involves active conduct, 
making it much harder to make the distinction between speech and 
action that has been an important, although not determinative, -----
factor in other First Amendment contexts. Indeed, almost any ---------
action might be justified as an attempt to obtain experience. 
These considerations have led the Court to take a rather chary 
approach to the extension of First Amendment protection to 
information gathering. 
14. 
In several cases persons have attempted to use the right 
to gather information as a sword to obtain access to protected or 
concealed material. In every instance a majority of the Court 
has rebuffed these attempts, although you have written two ~ 
dissents and joined in another which would have accorded some ~ 
~ First Amendment protection to this activity. In Zemel v. Rusk,~~ 
381 U.S. 1 (1965), the Court rejected an attack on a government ~ iO 
. 
ban on travel to Cuba. The Court recognized that the collection~~~ 
of information was implicated but did not regard this interest as 
therefore paramount. 
"We must agree that the Secretary's refusal to validate 
passports for Cuba renders less than wholly free the 
flow of information concerning that country. While we 
further agree that this is a factor to be considered in 
determining whether appellant has been denied due 
process of law, we cannot accept the contention of 
appellant that it is a First Amendment right which is 
involved. For to the extent that the Secretary's 
refusal to validate passports for Cuba acts as an 
inhibition (and it would be unrealistic to assume that 
it does not), it is an inhibition of action. There are 
few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by 
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. 
For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into 
the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities 
to gather information he might find relavant to his 
opinion of the way the country is being run, but that 
does not make entry into the White House a First 
Amendment right. The right to speak and publish does 
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather 
information." 
Id. at 16-17. 
Zemel did not hold, however, that all gathering of 
information lost First Amendment protection because it involved 
action; rather, the Court ruled that conduct otherwise properly 




regulation because it involved information gathering. But this 
distinction has been blurred by three more recent decisions, in 
each of which you dissented. In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 
(1974), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S 843 (1974), the 
Court struck down assertions of the right to collect information 
by news organizations rather than private citizens. The Court 
upheld bans on prearranged inmate interviews with the press as a 
legitimate exercise of the government's power to maintain order 
and discipline in prisons. Because the bans did not deny to the 
press information available to the general public, they did not 
bridge the protections accorded that institution under the First 
Amendment. 
~s~ 
In dissent, you argued that the majority had disregarded 
A 
the function of the press as agent for the public at large and 
that function's implication of First Amendment concerns 
encompassing the receipt of information and ideas. 
"An informed public depends on accurate and effective 
reporting by the news media. No individual can obtain 
for himself the information needed for the intelligent 
discharge of his political responsibilities. For most 
citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with 
newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking 
out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the 
public at large. It is the means by which the people 
receive that free flow of information and ideas 
essential to intelligent self-government. By enabling 
the public to assert meaningful control over the 
political process, the press performs a crucial function 
in effecting the societal purpose of the First Amendment. 
417 u.s. at 863. Rather than use nondiscrimination as a 
talisman, you would have inquired further into the extent that j restrictions on the press would interfere with public access to 
information about prisons. 
·. 
16. 
The Court grappled with these problems again this past 
Term in~ouchins v. KQED, 46 U.S.L.W. 4830 (Jun. 26, 1978). The 
Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist and White argued that 
"Neither the First Amendment nor Fourteenth Amendment 
mandates a right of access to government information or 
sources of information within the government's control. 
Under our holdings in Pell v. Procunier, supra, and 
Saxbe v. Washington Post, supra, until the political 
branches decree otherwise, as they are free to do, the 
media has no [special right] of access to the Alamedia 
County Jail different from or greater than that accorded 
the public generally." 
Id. at 4833. In particular these Justices took exception to the 
idea that the press was the appropriate agent for asserting the 
public's right to receive information. 
Id. 
"Editors and newsmen who inspect a jail may decide to 
publish or not to publish what information they acquire . 
• . • Public bodies and public officers, on the other 
hand, may be coerced by public opinion to disclose what 
they might prefer to conceal. No comparable pressures 
are available to anyone to compel publications by the 
media of what they might prefer not to make 
known." 
(citations omitted) .3 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart conceded that 
"terms of access that are reasonably imposed on 
individual members of the public may, if they impede 
effective reporting without sufficient justification, be 
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to 
convey to the general public what the visitors see." 
3. I find it difficult to understand this argument. 
Although editors are free from government compulsion to 
publish particular information, certainly the 
competitive nature of the news business as well as 
general pressure to attract readership would provide 
substantial pressure to publish. And I cannot fathom 
how public pressure can be brought to bear on the 
government to disclose particular information unless the 
public already is informed in some fashion, presumably 
by the press. 
17. 
Id. at 4834 (emphasis supplied). He voted to reverse the 
injunction, however, on the ground that the injunction gave the 
press access to sources of information not available to the 
public. 
a'~ 
The dissent, which you joined, argued that the question 
" presented was not whether the press had a special right of 
access, but whether the record provided a basis for ordering some 
form of public access to the jail. Arguing that the severe 
limitations on outgoing information that prevailed at that jail, 
when considered from the perspective of the special public 
interest in information about prisons, required some form of 
judicial intervention, the dissent reasoned that it was entirely 
appropriate for the court to limit its relief to the plaintiffs 
in that case, who happened to be members of the press. The 
dissent, in other words, would have upheld the injunction not on 
the basis of the special status of the press but because the 
limitation of relief to the press fell within the lower court's 
discretion. 
Although the right to gather information has not fared ( 
well when presented to the Court in the form of a sword, it has 
not done much better when raised as a shield. In Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 u.s. 665 (1972), the Court ruled that a newsman's 
interest in protecting the confidentiality of his sources, 
although entitled to some protection under the First Amendment, 
was o~tweighed by a grand jury's need to acquire information in 
the investigation of a crime. In a concurrence, you pointed out 
18. 
that a newsman could seek to quash a subpeona that intruded too 
heavily into his information gathering operations and that in 
such a hearing a court could balance the First Amendment and 
investigatory interests implicated. This past Term, the Court in 
Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 46 U.S.L.W. 4546 (May 31, 1978), 
rejected a similar claim of privilege against searches conducted 
pursuant to warrants obtained through an ex parte process. The 
majority opinion expressly rejected as insufficient the claim 
that "the processing of news and its dissemination will be 
chilled by the prospects that searches will disclose internal 
editorial deliberations." Id. at 4550. It was enough that "the 
courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude 
when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the 
search." Id. at 4550-51. In a concurring opinion, you commented 
that, 
Id. at 
"If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled 
to a special procedure, not available to others, when 
government authorities required evidence in its 
possession, one would have expected the terms of the 
Fourth Amendment to reflect that belief." 
4552. ~u reaffirmed, however, that "a magistrate asked 
to issue a warrant for the search of press offices can and should 
take cognizance of the independent values protected by the First 
II Id. 
the regulation of content cases, the information 
cases have not produced clear guidelines and a 
consensus on the interests involved. Disagreement as to whether 
' •' 
' 
as an institution enjoys special rights and privileges 
19. 
has obscured analysis of both the personal and public interests 
in the collection of information. Your opinions have emphasized 
that the press does have a special role to play when it acts as a - ...........____ - --
means of fulfilling the right to receive information. Other 
Justices have not focused as clearly on the societal interest on 
the flow of information. To oversimplify things a bit, the Chief 
Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist seemed to have taken the 
position that the right to collect information is of interest 
primarily to the institutional press and because the press does 
not have any special privileges under the First Amendment, the 
right to collect information enjoys little if any constitutional 
protection. Because Justice Stewart has his own understanding of 
the Press Clause, he would allow the press (but not others) to 
use the First Amendment as a shield against governmental 
interference with information gathering ~t would not allow the 
First Amendment to be used as a sword to aid the press in the 
collection of information. Although it would not be inconsistent 
with Justice Stewart's position to recognize a societal interest 
in the collection of information, which the press as well as 
individuals could vindicate, his vote in KQED would suggest he 
has a contrary view. Justice Stevens appears to believe in a 
right to collect information where prisons are concerned, but it 
is not clear to me what position he would take in other contexts. 
3. 
~ ~ 
Constraints on the Selection of Information for Publication 
Crucial to the analysis of the court below was the 




information. According to the majority, the press does not 
1\ 
simply transmit what information it gathers to the public: It 
first must pick and choose what information to publish. This 
20. 
selective or "editorial" process, it was reasoned, is an inherent , 
function of the press, as recognized in CBS v. Democratic 
National Committee, 412 u.s. 94 (1973), and Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 u.s. 241 (1974): therefore 
government interference with it was impermissible. 
Although some language in CBS and Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. is not inconsistent with the analysis of the court 
below, neither of those decisions supports the result. CBS 
~ . d h .  ~volve t e quest1on of whether the First Amendment mandated a 
~right of access to the broadcast media by persons alleged to have 
'----- 6 #fY been the subject of biased coverage. The Court rejected the 
claim, although it was split as to whether the result should rest 
on state action or First Amendment grounds. Tornillo presented 
the right of access issue more starkly. A Florida statute 
required newspapers to print responses to editorial attacks on 
political candidates. The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous 
Court, analyzed the case as presenting a variation on tradition 
prior restraint themes: 
"Appellee's argument that the Florida statute does not 
amount to a restriction of appellant's right to speak 
because "the statute in question here has not prevented 
the Miami Herald from saying anything it wished" begs 
the core question. Compelling editors or publishers to 
publish that which "'reason' tells them should not be 
published" is what is at issue in this case. The 
Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense 
as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to 
21. 
publish specified matter. Governmental restraint on 
publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional 
patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on 
governmental powers .... The Florida statute exacts a 
penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper. The 
first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled 
printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in 
printing and composing time and materials and in taking 
up space that could be devoted to other material the 
newspaper may have preferred to print." 
418 u.s. at 256 (citation omitted). 
The Chief Justice followed up on this discussion with 
the remarks on which the decision below appears to hinge: 
"Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs 
to comply with a compulsory access law and would not be 
forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the 
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear 
the barriers of the First Amendment because of its 
intrusion into the function of editors. A newspaper is 
more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, 
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go 
into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to 
limitations on the size and content of ' the paper, and 
treatment of public issues and public officials--
whether fair or unfair-- constitute the exercise of 
editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be 
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial 
process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment 
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this 
time." 
Id. at 258. In noting that the editing process was intrins_ic t?;_ . . A D 
~~~~ 
the publication function of the press, the Chief Justice appeared 
"' to imply that no government interference with the editorial 
process was permissible.4 
4. The Chief Justice also quoted language in Pittsburgh 
Press Co. v. Human Relations Commission, 413 U.S. 376 
(1973), appearing to imply the same rule: 
"Nor, a fortiori, does our decision authorize any 
restriction whatever, whether of content or layout, 
22. 
Although the implication is there to be found, and 
indeed was seized on by the court below, I doubt that the Court ~~ ---------------- ,~ 
meant to free the editorial function from all forms of government 
intrusion~ornillo, ~d Pittsbu~ess ;.;ch ~volv;d an 
attempt to dictate the content of a publication in advance. As 
such, these cases fell within the scope of established prior 
restraint doctrine, although the form of the restraint was 
somewhat novel. None of these decisions involved the imposition 
of subsequent penalties on the publisher for the harmful 
consequences of the exercise of his judgment. As discussed 
above, the distinction between prior restraint and subsequent 
punishment has been crucial in cases involving the regulation of 
the content of publications.5 
[4. cont.] on stories or commentary originated by 
Pittsburgh Press, its columnists, or its 
contributors. On the contrary, we reaffirm 
unequivocally the protection afforded to editorial 
judgment and to the free expression of views on these 
and other issues, however controversial." 
418 U.S. at 255, quoting 413 u.s. at 391. 
5. One might argue that the distinction is without a 
difference inasmuch as prior restraints can be enforced 
only by subsequent punishment. This argument overlooks 
the fact that subsequent punishment for violation of a 
prior restraint is imposed upon proof of a publication 
only, while other forms of subsequent punishment require 
proof that the publication caused some kind of harm the 
state is entitled to prevent. Thus Judge Oakes' 
argument that compelled disclosure is a prior restraint 
of subsequent deliberations not only flies in the face 
of the distinctions made in Near and Sullivan, but seems 
entirely illogical as well. ~he would use the term, 
any restraint is a prior restraint; so used, the term 
loses any meaning and ceases to aid analysis. 
/~ ..,_ ~ ~ "YZAJ teA 9'-0 
"~·'. ~~~~ut 23. c 
At first blush, these "editorial process" cases strike~' 
merely applying traditional right to publish doctrine to ~ 
facts, not as carving out a separate "right to edit" 
entitled to First Amendment protection. Editing is an essential ~ 
of communication, if not expression. One wishing to -
information to influence another ordinarily will exercise 
some care in the choice of words. The only thing different about 
newspapers and the broadcast media is that they have separate 
persons who perform the editing function. The press has no 
monoply on editing, and I would think the protection afforded 
that process would be the same no matter who or what is asserting 
that right. Further, I would think the scope of protection would 
be derived from principles governing the regulation of the 
I '' content of speech. Certainly the extent of protection would not 
~
be greater for editing than for the final product. It would seem 
to follow that a form of governmental intrusion that is 
~ ___, 
- rr --n-
permissible with regard to content, namely the deterrence of 
malicious falsehoods about public figures through civil - -- ._. 
liability, also would be allowed with regard to editing. Indeed, - ::::::-
I would think the very choice of "knowing or reckless disregard" 
as the key issue directly focuses the instrusion on matters of 
editorial choice.6 
6. The attempt of the court below to treat the 
privilege it created as a "procedural" limitation on the 
defamation action rather than as a "substantive" change 
in the standard of recovery for defamation seems to me 
spurious. This case provides an excellent example of 
how the substance/procedure distinction can hinder 
rather than help analysis. Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
24. 
Others, including the court below, have analyzed the 
editorial process differently, however. Emphasis has been placed 
on the press as an enterprise enjoying special constitutional 
protection separate from and independent of that accorded 
communication. Although the result below does not follow 
automatically from this premise, the progression is simple: 1) 
the press enjoys an independent constitutional status: 2) 
editing is an essential function of the press: 3) editing 
enjoys independent constitutional protection. Respondents make a 
similar argument by stressing the quasi-governmental role of the 
press under the Constitution and then making a claim for the kind 
of governmental privilege recognized in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974). A more sophisticated version of this 
analysis would start with the presumption that the press 
ordinarily should enjoy the same degree of protection as the 
general public, but would require special privileges for the 
press when: 
"(1) ... enforcement of a neutral restriction will 
compromise the press's editorial freedom: (2) ... 
less preferential means are available to protect the 
press's editorial freedom: and (3) ... the desired 
accomodation will neither threaten the editorial freedom 
of the press nor subject the press to governmental 
York, 326 u.s. 99 (1945). The privilege asserted by 
respondents would prevent petitioner from obtaining what 
may be the best evidence available on the issue of 
malice, on which the outcome of his suit turns. The 
burden of establishing a malicious state of mind is hard 
enough, but doing so when the defendant is free to shut 
off as much inquiry into his thought processes as he 
chooses would seem impossible. If the majority in 
Sullivan had intended completely to disable public 
figures from vindicating their reputation through a 
defamation suit, Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg 
would not have had to write their concurrences. 
25. 
influence or coercion." 
Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 Va. L. Rev. 731, 
770(1977): cf. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 
635-36 (1975). It is by this analysis that one arrives at 
Justice Stewart's position of treating the right to gather 
information as a press "shield", Zurcher, Branzburg, but not as a 
"sword", KQED, Pell, Saxbe. Accepting this framework, one might 
sustain the "editorial process" privilege because: 1) permitting 
the usual amount of extensive discovery will compromise editorial 
freedom by exposing the give-and-take of the press room to the 
chilling glare of public scrutiny: 2) nothing less than a full 
privilege can forestall this evil: and 3) permitting the 
privilege will not in any way make the press beholden to the 
government for special favors that could be withdrawn. See 
Bezanson, supra, at 766. 
~: Several objections can be raised to this interpretation 
of t~Press Clause. To begin with~t has been conceded 
generally that the Framers did not intend to establish any 
separate rights for the institutional press not derived from the 
Speech Clause. L. Levy, Legacy of Suppression: Freedom of -
Speech and Press in Early American History 174 (1963): Lange, 
The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 77, 88-99 
(1975): Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does 
It Add to Freedom of Speech? 26 Hastings L.J. 639, 640-41 
(1975) . Furthe~he past decisions of this Court do not support 
the interpretation advanced by this school. Tornillo, the 
26. 
bulwark of this interpretation, can be understood best as a 
"prior restraint on content" case.? KQEQ_, Pell, and §_axbe 
expressly declined to accord special status to the press, as did 
Branzburg and Zurcher. 
Supporters of special institutional status for the press 
claim the defamation cases as support for their thesis, but these 
cases can be made to fit the interpretation only through gross 
distortion of their holdings. Justice Stewart has argued, 
"Officials within the three governmental branches are, 
for all practical purposes, immune from libel and 
slander suits for statements that they make in the line 
of duty. This immunity, which has both constitutional 
and common law origins, aims to insure bold and vigorous 
prosecution of the public's business. The same basic 
reasoning applies to the press. By contrast, the Court 
has never suggested that the constitutional right of 
free speech gives an individual any immunity from 
liability for either libel or slander." 
Stewart, supra, at 635. Similarly, Gertz's requirement that 
defamation liability to private persons be predicated on at least 
negligence has been described as applying only to the press, the 
explanation being that the pressure imposed by press deadlines 
require a degree of solicitude not necessary for individual 
speakers. Bezanson, supra, at 747. A closer look at Sullivan 
and Gertz, however, belies both these assertions. To begin with, 
~four of the successful petitioners in Sullivan were individuals, 
7. The Chief Justice, who authored Tornillo, has stated 
more recently that "[t]he Court has not yet squarely 
resolved whether the Press Clause confers upon the 
'institutional press' any freedom from government 
restraint not enjoyed by all others." First National 
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371, 4380 (Apr. 
26, 1978) (concurring opinion). 
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although concededly ones who had employed a newspaper as a means 
of publishing their defamation. And Gertz quite carefully 
avoided any intimations one way or the other as to the standard 
applicable to individual defendants; rather the Court resolved 
only the case before it, which happened to involve a publisher. 
Perhaps more important, the analysis employed in both Sullivan 
and Gertz involved a balancing of the constitutional importance 
of the speech involved and the particular state interest in 
vindicating an individual's reputation. The status of the press 
did not enter into this equation, and I can find nothing in 
either opinion that indicates that it should. Your opinion in 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 46 U.S.L.W. 4371 (Apr. 
26, 1978), indicates that the nature of the speech and not the 
status of the speaker is the important factor in determining the 
scope of First Amendment protection. See also Eaton, The 
American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1349, 1416-18 
(1975). 
On a more fundamental level, advocates of the special 
status of the press have not responded, at least to my 
satisfaction, to the arguments made by the Chief Justice in his 
concurrence in First National Bank of Boston. First, as he 
pointed out, 
I "[T]here is no fundamental distinction between expression and dissemination. The liberty encompassed by the Press Clause, although complementary to and a 
natural extension of Speech Clause liberty, merited 
special mention simply because it had been more often 
the object of official restraints." 
Id. at 4380.8 Although a vigorous press facilitates the values 
guarded by the First Amendment, it cannot be said that the 
Constitution thereby regards the well-being of the press as an 
end in itself, always to be promoted at the exp~of other 
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values of constitutional significance. Second, the Chief Justice 
pointed out that as a practical matter it is impossible~o 
identify what is and is not the "institutional press". As the 
-- --- 7 
Court observed in Branzburg, 
"Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right' 
which 'is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. 
It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets .... 
The press in its historic connotation comprehends every 
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.' .•• The informative function 
8. Although this statement implies that no functional 
distinction can be made between the press and others, 
thereby ignoring the role for the press you perceived in 
Saxbe and Pell as an age~t fulfilling the public's right . 
to receive informatio~ do not understand your / lP~ ~ 
position in those cases as asserting a special ~~ 
insfitut1onar status for the press akin to what is 
in~ nere. Ratner I understand your position as 
being in agreement with the Chief Justice's where, as in 
this case, the public's right to receive information, to 
the extent it is implicated at all, cuts against the 
respondents' claim of privilege. I would regard your 
statement in First National Bank of Boston, that "[t]he 
press cases emphasize the special and constitutionally 
recognized role of. that institution in informing and 
educating the public, offering criticism, and providing 
a forum for discussion and debate," id. at 4376, as 
consistent with this analysis. --
I similarly would regard Justice Blackmun's 
observation in Bigelow v. Virgina, 421 U.S. 809, 828 
(1975), that "The strength of appellant's interest was 
augmented by the fact that the statute was applied 
againshhim as publisher and editor of a newspaper, not 
against the advertiser or a referral agency or a 
practitioner. The prosecution thus incurred more 
serious First Amendment overtones." Bigelow was 
grounded on the right of the public to receive 
information, in relation to which a newspaper does have 
a special function. 
asserted by representatives of the organized press in 
the present cases is also performed by lecturers, 
political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, 
and dramatists." 
408 u.s. at 704-05 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 u.s. 444, 
450,452 (1938) (Hughes, C.J.)) (citations omitted). The special 
privileges which advocates of the Stewart position would bestow 
upon the press could not be cabined except through the most 
arbitrary and invidious distinctions among publications. 
29. 
As a final point, I must express my agreement with Judge 
Meskill's argument that by according the press special status, 
the decision below runs the risk of depreciating the First 
Amendment rights of individuals. In this case, the individual 
rights implicated include not only Herbert's interest in 
redeeming his reputation, but the public's interest in knowing 
how much it can rely on this particular medium as a source of 
information. Cf. Van Alstyne, The Hazards to the Press of 
Claiming a "Preferred Position," 28 Hastings L.J. 761, 767-68 
(1977). The press here is asserting a right to deny the public 
information of substantial importance. At best there is a 
.... ----- _, 
conflict in First Amendment values here, and this conflict 
further weakens the claim of the press. 
A Caveat 
On the whole it appears to me that petitioner has the 
stronger case, and that the scope of discovery as to editor's 
thought, conclusions, and opinions should be governed by the same 
standard of relevancy as is used generally in discovery. This 
does not mean, however, that the procedures for this kind of 
•' . . 
30. 
discovery need be exactly the same. The fact that First 
Amendment interests are implicated here should obligate the 
district court to exercise the same kind of sensitivity in 
compelling discovery as was indicated in Branzburg and Zurcher. 
The prospect of every person who imagines his dignity to be 
wounded raking prominent editors over the coals in grueling 
depositions is not an attractive one. Several steps can be taken 
to avoid this abuse. To begin with, a court might postpone 
compulsion of this kind of discovery until it becomes clear that 
a plaintiff both has at least a colorable ground for recovery and 
needs "editorial process" information to substantiate further his 
claim of malice. Clearly unmeritorious suits can be disposed of 
through summary judgment without resort to "editorial process" 
discovery. See Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 409 u.s. 1125 (1973): Washington Post Co. 
v. Keough, 365 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
1011 (1967). Second, a court might exercise tighter control over 
such discovery than in the usual case, importing more meaning 
into the relevance requirement than normal practice might 
indicate. The court below appears to have made a special effort 
to get plaintiff to narrow the scope of his inquiries, and has 
waited to compel discovery until the state of the evidence has 
established at least some indication of bias and disregard for 
the truth on the part of defendants. These examples of restraint 





August 21, 1978 
MEMORANDUM 
No. 77-1105, Herbert v. Lando, Wallace 
and CBS, Inc. 
Paul 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
This memorandum is for the clerk who has the 
above case for a summer memorandum. 
Over the past weekend, I read with some care the 
opinions of the CA2 judges: Chief Judge Kaufman, who an-
nounced the judgment; Judge Oakes, concurring; and Judge 
Meskill, dissenting. I also took a superficial look at the 
briefs. 
As Judge Oakes states, "this case breaks new ground 
in an area of utmost importance." I am far from being per-
suaded that the CA2 majority acted consistently with precedent 
or good judgment. I do not find either the opinion of Judge 
Kaufman or of Judge Oakes persuasive. Nor am I entirely con-
tent with the dissent by Judge Meskill, although I believe 
his views are more compatible with my understanding of 
Sullivan, Miami Herald, and other relevant decisions. 
't 
No. 77-1105 2. 
The amicus brief filed by the American Newspaper 
Publishers Association suggests that "resolution of the 
constitutional issue could have been avoided had the court 
focused specifically on the scope of discovery issues" (p.3). 
This was my own reaction to CA2's opinions before reading 
this amicus brief. As presently advised, I see no reason 
to create and resolve a new constitutional issue when I 
would have thought that questions of this kind could and 
should be decided on a case by case basis under the discovery 
rules. The American Newspaper Publishers agree, however, with 
the judgment of CA2 on the theory that the district court 
struck the wrong balance between "the public interest in pre-
serving the confidentiality of opinion matter against the 
discovering party's need for the information." 
The opinions below do not identify specific ques-
tions. Rather, Judge Kaufman states that there were "a small 
number of questions relating to [Lando's] beliefs, opinions, 
intent and conclusions in preparing the program." He then 
stated that these "assertedly objectionable inquiries can 
be grouped into five categories" (see p.l9a, 20a of petition). 
As the categories are rather general, I think it is 
necessary to look at the questions themselves (said to be only 
a "small number"). I would examine with special care the 
No. 77-1105 3. 
questions that fall into categories two and three. The is-
sue, under Sullivan, is whether the defendants acted with 
actual malice -- that is, with knowing or reckless disregard 
of the truth. Here, categories two and three refer to Lando's 
"conclusions" (opinion or judgment) concerning the "veracity 
of persons interviewed." Certainly he could have been asked 
whether he believed in the truth and accuracy of what was 
told him by his sources. If he answered in the affirmative 
(as presumably he would) , surely cross-examination could probe 
his reasons for accepting as true what had been told him by 
people whom he interviewed. If a reporter simply accepted 
whatever was told him without considering and verifying the 
veracity of the informer (e.g., opportunity for observation, 
consistency with other evidence, etc.) a jury would be en-
titled to find there had been "reckless disregard of the 
truth." 
After listing the five categories of questionable 
inquiries (Pet.l9a, 20a), Judge Kaufman characterized them 
as "discovery of the editorial process." Once this imprecise 
characterization was adopted and applied sweepingly to all 
five broad categories of questions, it became fairly easy 
for the two majority opinions to view with horror this probing 
into "the journalistic state of mind:" 
No. 77-1105 
Herbert wishes to probe further and 
inquire into Lando's thoughts, opinions 
and conclusions. The answers he seeks 
strike to the heart of the vital human 
component of the editorial process. 
Faced with the possibility of such an 
inquisition, reporters and journalists 
would be reluctant to express their 
doubt. Indeed, they would be chilled 
in the very process of thought. 
(Petition, 22a.) 
4. 
The holding of CA2 was that this probing consti-
tuted an "invasion [of] First Amendment rights." 
As indicated above, I am not presently inclined to 
extend Sullivan or to view this case as presenting a consti-
tutional question. But this is my first impression, and I 
reserve final decision until I know a good deal more about 
the case and have the benefit of my clerk's careful 
consideration and views. 
Perhaps I should add that I am well aware from my 
own experience and observation that the discovery rules are 
customarily abused, sometimes quite flagrantly. I do not 
think district courts exercise adequate control, perhaps be-
cause they are so pressed. I am not, therefore, an advocate 
of unlimited discovery. In this case, my guess is that the 
DC was inclined to be too liberal, and that some questions 
were improper. But if the full sweep of CA2's decision were 
No. 77-1105 5. 
to become the law, public figures could forget about resort 
to the law of libel. 
L.F.P . 
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SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
DATE: November 1, 1978 
I had not responded to the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association brief in my earlier memorandum, as I should have. I 
have gone back to the opinions of the lower courts and the 
appendix, with the contentions of that brief in mind. 
Unfortunately, the appendix does not contain examples of the 
questions Lando and CBS refused to answer. The following 
excerpts from a letter to counsel for Lando contains the most 
detailed summary I can find of the questions Lando refused to 
answer: 
" ( 1 ) questions concerning matters wh,ich Barry 
Lando proposed or discussed including in, or 
excluding from, the "60 Minutes" segment on Col. 
Herbert; 
"(2) questions concerning Lando's belief or intent 
as a basis for including in, or excluding from, the 
"60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic article 
reference to specific matters, facts and events; 
"(3) questions concerning matters which Lando 
considered, or was interested in, mentioning on the 
"60 Minutes" segment; 
"(6) questions concerning Lando's opinions and 
conclusions concerning the truth and accuracy of 
persons interviewed, appear1ng on or referred to in 
connection with the "60 Minutes" segment or the 
Atlantic Monthly article; 
"(7) questions concerning conclusions reached by 
Lando about specific events referring or related to 
the "60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic Monthly 
article; 
"(8) questions concerning the basis for Lando's 
conclusions regarding people or leads to be 
pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with 
the "60 Minutes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly 
article; •••• " App. at 130a-131a. 
~. 
As far as I can tell, Lando made no concessions in any of these 
areas, and the above list accurately describes the scope of the 
controversy between these parties. 
appears 
I note two things about these questions. First, it 
thatl)hey inclu~~d--i-n-~ry into ~do's b~lief as to the 
veracity of matters that were broadcast. See especially category 
(6). Even his counsel conceded at oral ~ument that such 
matters should not be privileged. Secon~all the questions 
except those in category (1) relate to Lando's personal thoughts 
and beliefs, and not to conversations or other interchange with 
fellow journalists. Most of these questions, it would appear, do 
not involve the "free flow of ideas" or "give-and-take in the 
J. 
newsroom." Rather, they pry into Lando's personal beliefs about 
the content of his publications. 
The cases to which the Publishers Association refers are 
not fully apposite here. Those decisions for the most part 
involved discussion or reporting of some sort, communicative 
processes that conceivably might be discouraged by undue 
scrutiny. Here, in contrast, most of the questions appear to 
relate to Lando's own impressions. Lando will continue to have 
thoughts and impressions no matter how much inquiry he is forced 
to endure. As a result, the rationale that supported recognition 
of a limited privilege in those cases (most of which involved a 
variant of executive privilege) does not apply here. 
I 
The one category of questons that inquire into something 
'' .... 
other than Lando's personal thoughts involves discussions between 
1/ 
Lando and Wallace about matters to be included or excluded in 
,, w~ 
their show. He r be b t and Lando were involved in the production of 
the program and their conversations presumably related to how it 
was put together. To the extent these conversations covered 
matters of balance and impact, I suppose they would be irrelevant 
to Herbert's case. If one confessed to the other his serious 
doubts about the veracity of something in the program, however, I 
would think that confession should and would be discoverable. I 
suppose the best analogy might be to the attorney-client 
privilege which, as I understand it, may not be used as a cloak 
behind which illegal activity may be carried out. 
For these reasons, and those discussed in my previous 
memo, I do not think this case properly presents a question of 
-----------------~-----------------------------~ 
.... 
privilege. To the extent the court below believed the First 
Amendment required journalists to be free not ~o answer questions 
of the sort posed here, regardless of relevancy to disputed 
issues of fact, I believe it erred. To this extent, I believe ' 
the court below should be reversed. That is only the beginning, 
however. The court below, without creating a special privilege 
for the journalistic profession, could have~ demanded both a 
substantial showing of releva~ as a prerequisite to compelling 
------~~-----------------------~ 
a response to the questions, ~d efforts to avoid the 
confrontation altogether. To take the latter first, the district 
court, as Justice Brennan seemed to suggest at oral argument, 
coould have entertained summary judgment on the issue of truth, 
thereby precluding inquiry into malice. Of course, some of the 
blame for what may have been an unnecessary constitutional 
adjudication must rest with Lando, who seems to have been eager 
to reach the privilege issue. 
As for relevance, it is impossible to make any firm 
~ statement without having the exact questions available. If you 
would like me to look into the depositions to see what was 
objected to, I would be happy to do so. If the generic 
descriptions of the questions contained in the appendix and lower 
court opinions are at all accurate, however, it would seem 
( 
Herbert ~stabl~hed substantial relevan~s to at least_:ome 
of the questions. If some of the statements in the program were -
false, and if some of the statements Lando excluded were true, ~ 
Herbert is entitled to know why Lando included the former and not 
the latter. Lando might give self-serving or evasive answers, 
5. 
but such responses will have significant impeaching value for 
Herbert. To the extent malice remains in the case, I think 
Lando's thought processes generally would be discoverable even 
under a relevance standard with some backbone. 
If I am correct that at least some of Herbert's 
questions may not constitute an abuse of discovery, then the .. ~ 
privilege issue must be reached. To this extent I disagree with 
-------~------------------the Publishers Association, which seems to believe that the 
decision below can be sustained on discovery grounds. Although 
the district court believed it was constrained to apply an 
"almost anyth~ng" standard on discovery, it also stated that, "The 
" 
publisher's opinions and conclusions with respect to veracity, 
reliability, and the preference of one source of information over 
another are cJearly relevant." Pet. App. 65a. If this 
observation was correct, I would think the decision of the court 
below would have to be reversed at least in part. ~ 
,/ 
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November 11, 1978 
No. 77-1105 Herbert v. Lando ~ 
CA 2 identified three categories o~ernmental 
constraints on the press: (1) collection of information: 
(2) content, or what is published: and (3) the editing 
process (prepublication). 
This case does not involve "collection". Nor does 
~. 
it involve prior restraint. •· 
It is concerned, I think, with both the editing 
and the ultimate content of a publication. Although CA2 ---- , ... 
views these two as separate processes, and creates a new 
privilege for what it calls the editing process, I view them 
as one in the same analytically. 
Sullivan dealt strictly with content: a false 
publication, and no question was raised as to the editing 
process that produced it. 
The principles governing possible liability should 
be the same for "content" and "editing", as the former is 
usually the product of the latter. Raw information is 
seldom published without going through the editing process. 
While no prior restraint is permissible, Sullivan -
and its progeny - establish that if a publication with 




in a libel suit if actual malice is shown- i.e., if the 
untruth was published knowingly or in reckless disregard of 
its truth. 
CA2 held that the civil remedy available for the 
publication is not available with respect to the editing. 
As to the latter, CA2 established what in effect appears to 
be an absolute privilege. 
But, as noted above, editing without publication 
needs no privilege. There simply is no injury. A cause of 
action arises only where there has been a publication, and 
whether the aggrieved party is entitled to recover depends 
upon proof of falsity and malice. 
Proof of malice often would be impossible if no 
inquiry could be made into the editing process: whether the 
author or editor knew or should have known of the falsity, 
and this involves a host of subsidiary inquiries in a case 
such as this one. What was the basis for believing that the 
information published was truthful? What was the basis for 
excluding favorable information? What were the sources? 
What investigation was made to verify the credibility or 
reliability of sources? 
* * * 
I would hold, for the reasons indicated briefly 
above, that there is no special or separate privilege for 
the editing process. The case is here on an interlocutory 
2. 
-
appeal. It should be reversed and remanded. 
The opinion, in addition, to holding there is no 
special privilege, should make clear that in essence, this 
is a discovery case - with the DC proceeding under Rule 26 
and a motion under 26(c) to limit discovery. 
As is true generally with respect to discovery, 
the issue is relevancy. The opinion should give some 
guidance as to types of questions (discussed above) that do 
relate to relevant material and some that do not. Also, the 
fact that there are First Amendment interests should be 
taken into consideration by the DC in making sure that 
discovery inquiries in fact are relevant to real issues in 
the case. In a sense, there will be discovery questions 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
Justice White's opinion focuses almost exclusively on 
the editorial process privilege created by the court below. It 
ends up pretty much in the same position as Judge Meskill's 
dissent in the court below: The line of questioning at issue 
here should be treated as just another discovery request and 
should be bounded only by the usual Hickman v. Taylor standards 
of relevance, etc. At the end, however, he does indicate that 
the district court has the authority to control discovery more 
forcefully than it has done here, but he gives no guidance as to 
how this authority should be exercised in this particular 
context. 
I think you can join Justice White's opinion, inasmuch 
as you agree with its basic conclusion that there is no editorial 
process privilege as such. The problems that you may have with 
the opinion involve what it does not say, rather than what it 
says. I think two things could be done to improve it. On paqes 
4-5, in the statement of facts, I think more could be said to 
show how respondents put their eqgs all in one basket-- that 
they opposed the motion to compel a response solely on the 
2. 
grounds of the asserted privilege, and not because of relevance, ---
burdensomeness, or ripeness. (I think the record will support 
r-- _ .... """"-. ___....,_,__. "" ...,._.,. """"' "" 
this assertion, or at least that respondents did not seriously 
contend the responses were irrelevant or burdensome). By 
focusing on the narrowness of the question presented, I think the 
opinion would better justify its failure to address other issues 
that might be in this case. Second, on pages 25-26 Justice White 
has stricken out a paragraph indicating that district courts 
should be sensitive to First Amendment concerns in this area. ------~ -
This paragraph looks like a teaser to me: It almost appears as 
if he left it in this form to give you something to bite into. 
Whatever his intentions, I would recommend that you urge Justice 
White to leave in this paragraph. 
I think, with the above modifications, you would be 
happy to join the opinion. I also think that you might want to 
write separately to elaborate on what steps a conscientious 
district judge can and should take to avoid unnecessarily 
intrusive discovery in this area. Although Justice White 
probably is justified in regarding the question presented in this 
case as very narrow-- whether an absolute editorial process 
privilege exists or not-- someone should address the other issue 
implicit in this case, namely what should the courts do short of 
creating a privilege. I would be happy to get cracking on such a 
concurrence • 
. ... . 
lfp/ss 2/7/79 Rider A, p. 13 (Lando) 
It is not improper, of course, to urge the abandonment 
or modification of existing constitutional 
interpretation, and notable developments in First 
Amendment jurisprudence have evolved from just such 
submissions. But rarely has the Court abandoned or 
modified major constitutional doctrine that has been 
reiterated and reaffirmed with the constancy that we 
have adhered to New York Times. As noted above, our 
decision in that case effected a major change in the 
standards applicable to civil libel actions. In the 
succeeding 15 years the Court repeatedly has 
acknowledged or reaffirmed that case as prescribing the 
applicable First Amendment standard in a defamation 
~,W•4~ - , suit by a public figure. St. Amant, Gertz, and most 
~ 
recently in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 u.s. 448, 455-
457 (1976). In the two most recent cases, Gertz and 
Firestone, the Court reiterated its conviction - one 
reflected in the law of defamation of all of the states -
~ 
that the individual's interest in his reputation is of 
1\ 
basic concern. We thus are being asked to modify 
substantially constitutional doctrine that, until the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in this case, was 
/...~~~I 
thought to ~ carefully considered and firmly 
~ 
established. Moreover, it was widely perceived as 
2. 
First Amendment doctrine essentially protective of 
press freedom. 
February 7, 1979 
77-1105 Herbert v. Lando 
Dear Byron: 
I have read with interest your tvped draft of 
1/30/79, and think I will have no difficulty in joining it. 
As I went along, I noted in pencil an occasional 
editin~ change - though none of any consequence. See pages 
12, 15, 16 and 24. On p~ge 13, I dictated a rider (attached) 
that is more form than substanc~. I do not urge any of it 
on you. 
I think your disposition of th~ constitutional 
privilege issue is thorough and convincing. I was 
particularly impressed by your use of Butts, Walker and Hill 
in footnote 6. 
As you anticipated, my only serious question is 
whether the opinion should address more fully what may be 
called the •aiscovery issue•, or whether it should be 
limited substantially to decininq the constitutional 
privilege issu~ - as you have writtPn it. I enclose a 
memorandum to my file dated November 11, 1978 (althouqh I 
believe I actually wrote it on November 1) that summarized 
my thinking about the case at that tim~. You will note that 
I thought - and arn inclined still to think - that the case 
should be remanded. I appreciate that it would be difficult 
to give the DC much guidance with respect to discovery, but 
I may see if something along this line can be written. I 
would expand somewhat upon your paragraph at the bottom of 
page 25, instead of striking it. If I write, I would concur 
in your opinion and simply move briefly into the discovery 
problem. 
Thank you for the opportunity of reviewing your 
draft, which I think is exceptionally well done. 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
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• • 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:ffi 
No. 77- llOS 
~~ 
~f7 
v. United States Court of Ap- ~ ~ "" 
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, ) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Barry Lando et al. peals for the Second Circuit. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither 
the Federal 110r a State Government may make any law 
"abridging the freedom of speech. or of the press .... " The 
question here is whether those Amendments should be con-
strued to provide further protection for the press when sued 
for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More 
specifically, we are urged to hold for the first time that when 
a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging 
falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff 's reputation, 
the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial proc-
esses of those responsible for the publication, even though 
the inquiry would produce evidence material to the proof of a 
critical element of his cause of action. 
I 
P etitioner, Anthony Herbert. is a retired Army officer who 
had extended war-timE' service in Vietnam and who received 
widespread media attention in 1969- 1970 when he accused his 
superior officers of covering up reports of atrocities and other 
war crimes. Three years later, on February 4, 1973. respond-
ent Columbia Broadcasting System. Inc. (CBS) . broadcast a 
report on petitioner and his accusations. The program was 
produced and edited by respondent Barry Lando and was 
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a related article in Atlantic Monthly magazine. Herbert then 
sued Lando, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for defama-
tion in Federal District Court, basing jurisdiction on diversity 
of citizenship. In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the 
program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as 
a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges to 
excuse his relief from command, and requested substantial 
damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value 
of a book he had just published recounting his experiences. 
Although his cause of action arose under New York State 
defamation law, Herbert conceded that because he was a 
"public figure" the First and Fourteenth Amendments pre-
cluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published 
damaging falsehoods "with 'actual malice'-that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not." This was the holding of New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964), with 
respect to alleged libels of public officials, and extended to 
"public figures" by Curt·is Publish·ing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 
130 (1967). 1 Under this rule, absent kuowing falsehood, lia-
bility requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that is, 
that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U.S. 727, 731 (1968). Such "subjective awareness of probable 
falsity, " Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 6 
( 197 4), may be found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt 
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." 
St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, at 732. 
In preparing to prove his case in light of these require-
ments, Herbert deposed Lando at length and sought an order 
to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response 
was refused on the ground that the First Amendment pro-
tected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who 
1 Criminal libel prm,;ecutions are Oiubjf•ct to the same con~titutional limi-
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edit, produce or publish, and into the editorial process.2 
Applying the standard of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b), which 
permits discovery of any matter "relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action" if it would either be 
admissible in evidence or "appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," the District 
Court ruled that because the defendant's state of mind was of 
"central importance" to the case. it was obvious that the 
questions were relevant and "entirely appropriate to Herbert's 
efforts to discover whether Lando had any reason to doubt the 
veracity of certain of his sources, or, equally significant, to 
prefer the veracity of one source over another." 73 F. R. D. 
387, 395, 396 ( SDNY 1 977). The District Court rejected the 
claim of constitutional privilege because it found nothing in 
the First Amendment or the relevant cases to permit or 
require it to increase the weight of the injured plaintiff's 
already heavy burden of proof by in effect creating barriers 
"behind which malicious publication may go undetected and 
unpublished." I d., at 394. The case was then certified for 
an interlocutory appeal under 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the 
Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case.3 
2 The Circuit Court summarized the objectionable inquirie~ as follows: 
'' 1. Lando's conclusions during his research and inve~tigation regarding· 
people or lt>ads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with 
the 60 Minute;; segment and the Atlantic Monthly article; 
"2. Lando'~> conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his 
state of mind with respect to the veracity of pero;ons interviewed; 
"3. The basis for conclusions where Lando te~tified that he did reach a: 
conclusion with respect to persons, information or events; 
"4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matter~ to be in-
cluded or excluded from the broadcast publication; and, 
" 5. Lando's intentions a~ maniff'sted by the decision to include or ex-
clude material." Herbert v. Lando, 568 F. 2d 974, 983 (CA2 1977). 
8 Respondents ' Petition for Leavl." to Appeal from an Interlocutory 
Order, which was granted, ~tated the is~ue on appeal as follows: 
''What effect should be given to the Fir~t Amendment protection of the 
pres~ with reo;pect to its exerrisf' of editorial judgment in pretrial discovery 
.;. 
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A divided panel reversed the District Court. 568 F. ~d 974 
(CA2 1977). Two judges, \niting separate but ~verl~ppi1~g 
opinions, concluded that the First Amendment lent sufficient 
protection to thE' editorial Pfocesses to protect Lando fron~ 
inquiry about his thoughts: opit1ious. and conclusions with 
respect to the material gathered by him and about his conver-
sations with his editorial colleagues. The privilege not to 
answer was held to be absolute. We granted certiorari because 
of the importance of the issue involved. 435 U.S. 922 (1978). 
We have concluded that the Court of Appeals misconstrued 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and accordingly re-
verse its judgment. 
II 
Civ1l and criminal liability for defamation was well estab-
lished i11 the common law when the First Amendment w~ 
adopted, and there is no indicati9n that the Framers intended 
to abolish such liability. rntil New York Times the prevail, 
ing jurisprudence was that "libelo.us utterances [are not] 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech .... " 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250. 266 (1952); see also 
Roth v. United St(l.tes, 354 U. S. 476, 482-483 (1957); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942); 
Xea1' v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707-708 (1931). The 
accepted view was that neither civil nor criminal liability for 
defamatory publications abridge freedom of speech or freedom 
of the press. and a majority of jurisdictions made publisher~ 
liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of 
their in tent.~ New York Times and Butts effected major 
111 a libl'l ca::;c governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 
254 ( 19li4) '?" 
1 See, 1'. g., Re::;tatrment of Torts § 580 (1939); Pedrick, Freedom of 
thr Pre,;::; and tlw Law of Lilwl: The :Vlodern Rrvitied Tran~lation, 49 
Corn . L. Rrv . 581, 5R:{-584 (1904); Notr, Drvrlopmrnt::; in the Law-
DefamatiOn, 69 Harv . L. Rev . 875, 902-910 (1956) . In Peck v. Chicago 
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·chauges in the standards applicable to civil libel actions. 
Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for 
defamation must prove knowing and reckless falsehood in order 
to establish liability. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
the Court held that nonpublic figures must demonstrate some 
fault on the defendant's part and, at least where knowing or 
reckless untruth is not shown, some proof of actual injury to 
the plaintiff before liability may be imposed and damages 
awarded. 
These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the 
common law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First 
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of 
press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that 
liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing 
of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood. 
Give11 the required proof, however. damages liability for 
defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom 
of the press. 
Nor did these cases suggest any First Amendment restric-
tion on the sources from which the plaintifJ could obtain the 
necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause 
of actwn. On the contrary, New York Times and its progeny 
made 1t essential to proving liability that plaintiffs focus on 
the prPvaihng view of stnct liability in thP coursp of reviewing a libel 
Judgment renderPd in a federal diversity of citizPnship action: 
"There was ::;ome suggestion that the dPfendant published the portrait by 
mistakr, and without knowledgr that it was the plaintiff's portrait or waH 
not what it purported to be. But thr fact, if it was orw, was no Pxcnse. 
If the Jlnblication was librllous the dPfendant took thP risk. A:s was said 
of ::;urh matters by Lord ;\Jansfield. 'WhatC'vcr a man publislws lw pub-
hshe:; at his peril. ' The Kiug v. Wvvdfall, Lofft 776, 7151. . . . The rea-
son Js plau1. A libel rs harmful on it::< facr. If a man sees fit to punish 
mamfestly hurtful statements conrerning an individual, without othC'r 
.JUstificatwn than ex1;;ts for an advertisement or a p1ece of news, thC' 
usual prmr1plrs of tort will make him liable, if the statement~ are fal~e 
0r arr true of someone else " 
J..,t 
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the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. To be 
liable, the alleged defamer of public officials or of public 
figures must know or suspect that his publication is false. In 
other cases proof of some kind of fault, negligence perhaps," 
is essential to recovery. Inevitably. unless liability is to be 
completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes of 
the alleged defamer would be open to examination. 
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that although 
proof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of 
objectivf' circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be 
inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defend-
ants whether they knew or suspected that their damaging 
publication was in error. In Butts, for example. it is evident 
from the record that the editorial process had been subjected 
to close examination and that direct as well as indirect evi-
dence was relied on to prove that the defendant magazine 
had acted with actual malice. The damages verdict was 
sustained without any suggestion that plaintiff's proof had 
trenched upon forbidden areas.6 
" The dt>finitiou of fault was to be tlw re;;pmn>ibility of state laws. Gertz 
v. Robert Welch , Inc .. 418 V . S. :323, 347 (1974) . 
u Srr :388 lJ. S., at 156-159, wherP 2\fr. Justice Harlan, writing for the 
Court, rPviewrrl thr record under thP ~iandard lw prrferrrd to apply to 
publi(• figure:;, and upheld the verdict for tlw plaintiff. Chief .Justice 
Warren independently reviewPd tht> record under tl1e "actual malice" 
standard of New York 7'£mes and abo concluded in hi;,; concurring opinion 
that the verdict should be upht>ld. !d. , at 168-170. The evidence relied 
on and Httmmarized in both opinion:; imludrd substantial am011nts of testi-
mony that would fall within tlw editorial process privilegE' a~ defined by 
respondent~ . Thf' record before t hr Court included drpo;,;itions by the 
.aut hor of the defamatory articlf' , an individual paid to a&;ist thf' author 
in prf'paration, the Sports Editor of ThE' Saturda~· Evening Po,;t , and both 
it:; Managing Editor and Editor-m-Chif'f. The:;e df'po~itions revf'aled The 
Saturday Ewning Post 's motive:s in publi:;hing the story (Record 706-
717) , sourceR (Rf'cord 364, 662-664, 719-720, 729), conversationH among 
the editors and author corH'f'rning the rf'search and dE-velopment of thP-
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Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means 
a recent development arising from New York Times and 
similar cases. Rather, it is deeply rooted in the common-law 
rule, predating the First Amendment, that a showing of 
malice on the part of the defendant permitted plaintiffs to 
recover punitive or enhanced damages.7 In Butts, the Court 
should be intPrviewed and what ~hould be inve::;tigated (Record 666-
667, 699-700, 7:34-7:36, 772-774), conclu~ions tlH to the importance and 
veracit~· of sources and information )H'f'HE'nted in the article (Record 720, 
732-7:35. 737, i71-772, 776), and conclusions about the impact that pub-
li~hing the article would have 011 the subject (Record 714-716, 770). 
JUH'J'ICE BRENNAN, writing for him;;elf and MR . .JuwrrcE WHITE, also 
thought thr rvidence of record ::;ufficient to sati:sfy the New York 7'imeiS 
malice l'tandard. It i!:l quite unlikrl~· tha,t tlw Court would have arrived 
at the rl'~ult it did had it believed that inquiry into the editorial proces::;es 
was con;;t it ut ionally f orlHdden. 
The Comt Pngaged m ;;imilar analysis of the record in rever8ing the 
judgments entE•red in a compamon casr to Butts, Associated Press v. 
Walker, :~88 U. S., at 158-159; id .. at 165 (Warren, C . .J., concurring); 
nnd in Time Y. Hill. 385 U.S. 374, :391-394 (1967). In Hill, the record 
included the rdited drafts of the al!rgedly libelous article and a examina-
tion and eros~-examiuation of the author. During that examination, the· 
writPr explained in detail thr preparation of tlw article, his thonght:s, con-
cluHion~. am! belief::; regardmg the material, and a line-by-line analysis of 
the artiele with explanation~ of how and why addition::; and deletion~ were 
madr to the vanous draft8. As in Butts. the editorial proce~:~8 wa::; the· 
focm; of much of the rvidencr, and dirPct inquiry was made into the state 
of mind of the media dPfendants. Yet the Court rai;;ed no qur;;tion as to· 
the proprirty of tllf' proof. 
7 A. Hanson, Libel and Related Tort;;~ 163 (1969); Notr, Developments 
hi thr Lnw-Defamation, supra. at 9:38; 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and SlnndPr 
§ 352 (1970); 50 C . .T . S. Libel and Slander§ 260 (1955). 
The He~tatPment originall~· provided in a sepamte section for the award 
of punitivr damage~ for maliciou~ dPfamations. RestatemPnt of Torts 
§ 10(i8 (Tent. Draft 13, 19;36) : 
;,On<' who i;:; liable for harm to another's rrputation cau::;ed by the pub-
lication of a libel or slander i~ nbo liab!P for punitive damages if the 
defamatory matter was published with knowledge of ito; fabity or if it was· 
pti;bh~hed in rPckJe~s .indifferencr to it~ truth or fall;ity or sol(']y for the· 
·~ .. : 
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affirmed the substantial award of punitive damages which in 
Georgia were conditioned upon a showing of "wanton or reck-
less indifference of culpable negligence" or "ill will. spite, 
hatred and an intent to injure." 388 U. S., at 165-166. 
Neither Mr. Justice Harlan. id., at 156-162 . ~ nor Chief .Justice 
Warren, concurring, id., at 165-168, raised any questioll as to 
the propriety of having the award turn on such a showing or 
as to the propriety of the underlying evidence, which plainly 
included direct evidence going to the state of mind of the 
publisher and its responsible agents.9 
Furthermore, long before Sullivan was decided, certain 
qualified privileges had developed to protect a publisher from 
liability for libel unless the publication was made with 
malice.10 Malice was defined in numerous ways, but in gen-
purpo:;e of cau~ing harm to the plaintiff's reputation or other legally pro-
tected interf:'St." 
The provision was later omitted with the explanation that recovrry of 
pnnitiv<• damagrs would be drtrnninrd by thr rules in thr Re;;tatrment 
with re:;pect to damages in genrral. Re::;tatPment of Tort~ § 106S (.Pro-
po:;ed Final Draft 3, 1937) . 
Gertz v. Robert Welch , Inc .. supra. at 350, limitPd the entitiPment to 
punitive damagE's but such damagr~ are :stiU awardable upon a showing of 
knowing or reckJp;;~ falsehood . 
8 As Mr. Ju:stice Harlan noted, tlw jur~· had been in~tructed in con-
sidering punitive damagel:i to as::;es,; •'thr rrliability, the naturP of tlu.'· 
:sources of the plamtiff's information , its acceptance or rejection of the 
sources, its rare in ch<>cking upon as::;ertion:s." 3H8 U.S., at 156 (emphasis 
added) . The Justicr found nothing umi::;::; either with the in:;truction or 
the re::mlt the jury rpachE'd und<>r it . ~IH. Jus'l'I<"E BRENNAN, di,;,;pnting· 
in thE' B·utts case, id., at 172-174, analyz<'d the in;;tructions diffPrPntly but 
nused no ljUE'~tion as to thE' con~titutiouality of turning the award of Pit her 
compen:;ator~· or punitive damage~ upon direct a~ well a;; circnm;;tantial 
evidence going io the mPntal state of tlw dC'fPndant. 
n SrP n. 6, supra. 
10 See Nalle v. Oyster. 2:30 U. S. 165, 179-180 (191:3); WhiteY. Nicholls , 
3 How. 266, 2H6-292 ( 1845) ; T. l'luckiwtt , A Couci~<' Hi:;tory of t hC' 
Common Law 502 (5th <'d . 195G); HaiiPu, Charaetpr of BeliPf Nf'ct';;H<uy 
(Qr the Conditional Privi!Pgc iu DPfamatiou, 25 fll L. ReY. 865 {19~1) .. 
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era] depended upon a showing that the defendant acted with 
improper motive.11 This showing in turn hinged upon the 
intent or purpose with which the publication was made, the 
In White Y. Nichulls, supra. at 290-291, the Court Hurveyed the common 
law and summarized the privilege aR follows: 
"We have tim:; taken a view of the authorities which treat of tlw doc-
trines of ::;lander and librl, and havr ronsidrred tho::;e authoritie::; particu-
larly with rrference to t hl' di:;tinetion the~· establish, brtween ordinary 
in::;tances of slander, written and unwritten, and tho::;e which have bel'n 
;:;tyled, privileged communications; the IWCuliar character of which is said 
to l'xempt thl'rn from inferl'nrPs which thE' law ha<' creatPd with re::;pect 
to those case::; that do not partake of that character. Our Pxamination, 
extl'ndl'd as it rna~· "rPm to have bel'n. ha:; been called for by the im-
portance of a ,;ubJert rno;;t intimatply connected with thP right:; and happi-
ne:;:; of mdividual::;, as 1t IS with thr qtuPt and good ordrr of soci<'ty. The 
mvp;;tJgation ha::; conductrd us to thr following conclusion:;, which WP 
propound n" the law applicablr thl'reto. 1. That evl'ry publication, either 
b~· writmg, printing, or picture:;, which charge:; upon or imputrs to any 
prr::;ou that winch render::; him liable to puni;:;hment, or which is calcu-
latPd to mah• h1m infamous, or odious, OJ' ridiculou::;, i;:; prima facie a libel, 
ami imphe:-; malirP in the author and pubh::;her toward::: the per::;on con-
cernmg whom :-;uch publication i:; made. Proof of malice, thl'refore, in 
lhr rmw::: ju:;t dp::;cnbed, cau nev<•r be required of the party complaining 
beyond tlw proof of the publicatiOn it::;e]f: ju;:;tification, excuse, or extenu-
atiOn, 1f r1ther can br ~howu. mu~t prot'<'Pd from the drfendant. 2. That 
tlw clP::;cnption of rases n·cogm~l'd a::: privileged communication::;, must be 
understood a:< l'X<'l'ption~ to thii< rulr, and as being founded upon some 
apparrntly rrrogm::;l'd obligation or mot1vr, legal, moral, or social, which 
may fairly br prPsumrd to hav<' led to thE' publication, and therefore prima 
fane rrltrvPi< tt from that JU~t implication from which the general rule of 
th<· lnw i~ dPduePd. Thr rulr of rvidrnce, Hi< to :;uch ca~:;es, i~ accordingly 
as far rhangrd a::; to impose it 011 thr plant iff to remove thosP presumptions 
f!owlll!!: from the sPeming obhgatiom; and situation::; of the parties, and to 
n•qtur<' of hun to brmg homr to thr dPfrndaut tlw exi~:;tence of malice as 
lhl' tntP mot IV<' of hi::: con duet. Beyond t hts PXtPnt no presumption can 
l)(' p<·rmit!Pd to oprratP. mud1 k"~ bP made to sanctify thP mdulgence of 
mah<·t•, how<'vrr wtckrd. howrvrr <•xprP">S, under thr protection of ll'gal 
forms. Wr ronrludP thpn that maht·<• ma.v he proved, though alleged to 
·have <'XJ::<trd in the prorrechng" hl'forr n court, or lrgislative body, or any 
[ fi'ootuote 11 is on p. 10] 
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belief of the defendant in the truth of his statement, or upon 
the ill will which the defendant might have borne towards the 
defendaut.12 
Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect 
evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant 
and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance 
damages.13 The rules are applicable to the press and to other 
· defendants alike,14 and it is evident that the courts across 
other tribunal or authority, although such court, legislativP body, or othPr 
tribunal, may havr been tlw appropriatr authority for rPdre:ssing the 
grievancP rPJlfPHPntPd to it ; and that proof of rxpress malice in any 
written publication, petition, or proct•eding, addre::;spd to such tribunal, 
will rendPr that publication, petition, or proceeding, libellous in its char-
acter, and actionable, and will subjPct the author and publi:sher thereof 
to all the con::;equpnces of libt>l." 
tl Hal!Pn , sup1'a, at 866-867. In sornP juri::;dictions a dt>fendant for-
feited his privilPgP if he published negllg('J1tly or without probable cause 
to be.lieve tlw :statPment was true. lrl., at 867; sec White v. Nicholls, 
supra, at 291. 
12 SPe, e. g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 45.5 : 
"The exi::;tence of actual malice rna~· bP shown in many ways. As a 
genPral rule, any competent PvJdPnce, E'ithPr dirPct or circumstantial, can 
be resortf•d to, and all thP rPlevant circumstance,; ::;urroundiug the trans-
action may br ::;hown, providPd they arE' not too rPmote, includ,ing threats, 
vrior or subsPqurnt dl'famatiow,;, :;ub,.;cquPnt statemputs of thP defendant., 
eircumstances indicating the cxistf•ncP of rivalry, ill will, or ho~tility between 
tho partie~, facts tpnding to show a reckless cli~rPgard of the plaintiff's 
rights, and, in a11 action against a npw~papPr, cn~tom and usage with 
rPspect to the trPatment of new~ items of the nature of the one under 
consideration. ThP plaintiff may show tl1at thr drfenclant had drawn a 
pistol at the time he 11ttPrPd thP word::; complained of; that defpndant had 
tried to ki:;~ and embrace plaintiff just prior to the defamatory publica-
tion; or 1 hat dt•fendant had failed to makP a proper investigation before 
publication of thr statPmPnt in question. On cros:;-examination the 
dt>fendant may be questioned a~ to his intpnt in making the publication." 
(Footnotes and citations Oimt1 eel.) 
13 E. g., Odger '~ Libel and Slunder ·"271-*288 (lt-Jt Amer. eel. Bigelow 
1884 ; 50 Am. ;Jur. 2cl § 455 ; 53 C . .J. S. § :!1:3. 
J~ Cf. Odgrr':s Libel and SlundC'r 239 (1st Amrr. t'd. BigPluw 1884); 
' . ' 
' . ' 
' J 
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the country have long been accepti11g evidence going to the 
editorial processes of the media without encountering con-
stitutional objections.15 
F. Holt, The Law of Libel 57 (h;t Amer. ed. 1818); Billet v. Times-
Democratic Pub. Co., 107 La. 75,32 So. i7 (1902). 
15 ln scores of libel case~ courts have addre;:;:;ed the general is:;ue of the 
admissibility of evidence that would be excluded under the editorial process 
privilege as:;erted here and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of 
the evidence on behalf of libel plaintiff~. See, e. g., Johnson Pub. Co. v. 
Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 2d 441 (1960) (Editor may be cro:ss-examined 
on meaning mtendrd to bP convryed by pas::;agPs in magazine article); 
Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d 161, 217 P. 687 (1950) (malice may be 
est.abli::;hed by direct proof of the ::;tate of mind of a per~on, or by evidence 
from which its existencE' may br infrrred); Scott v. 'l'imes-Mirmr Co., 181 
Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919) (all relevant circum~:o1:nncrs concerning publica-
tion admissible); Sandora v. Times Co., 113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (1931) 
(all n •lrvant evidrnce includmg direct evldrnce on :;tate of mind or surround-
ing rircurnstancrs-city editor and rrporter called to stand and que::;tioned 
extmsivrly a::-: to motives, circum~tnncPs of publication, and genE-ral prac-
ticeR); Rice v. Simmons, 2 Har. ao9, 31 Am. DPc. 766 (Del. 1837) (where 
qne~tion of mali<'<' in i:::sue, dE-clarations of publishrr at the timE' of publica" 
tJon admis~ible 11:; part of t hP res gestae) ; Western Union 'l'elegraph Co. v. 
Vicker.~. 71 Ga. App. 204, 30 S. E. 2d 440 ( 1944) (all re}pvant evidence 
admii-isible, including direct. evidPnce of ~tate of mind and :;urrounding cir-
eum~tances); Cook v. East 8hore Netl'spapers, 327 Ill. App. 559, 04 N. E. 2d 
751 (1945) (ull rPIPvant cvid('llC<' roncerning circumstaucrs of publications 
admi:-;~ible, including te~timony by rE-porters and rmployePt; of defendant); 
Berger v. Freeman Tribune Co .. 132 Iowa 290, 109 N. W. 784 (1906) (all 
relevant rvidenr<'); Thompson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Ma~s. 176, 181 
N. E. 24n (1932) (only evidence on state of mind of tho~e agents of defend-
ant rntrustcd w1th detrrmining what shall bP published is admi~:sible and 
material) ; Conroy v. Fall River Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 488,28 N. E. 
2d 729 (1940) (any relevant evidence on defendant's malice); Cymwski v. 
Polish American Pub. Co., 196 Mich. 648, 163 N. W. 58 (1917) (testimony 
of individuals who advised reporter to question plaintiff before publishing 
defamatory article was admissible on the i::;sue of malice); Friedell v. 
Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 20:3 N. W . 974 (1925) (any rplevant 
evidmcr admissible) ; Cook v. Globe Printing Co .. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W. 
332 (1910) (evidcncr ~howing that defendant's editorial manager knew an 
important fact to be false admi~Iblr on quP~tioll of malicr); Butler v. 
GarZ.ette Co ., 119 App. D1v. 767, 10-:1 N .. Y .. S. 637 (1907) (any c•videncc· 
77-1105-0PINION 
12 HERBERT v. LANDO 
In the face of this history, old and 11ew, the Court of 
Appeals nevertheless declared that two of this Court's cases 
had announceu unequivocal protection for the editorial proc-
admis~ible to provr actual malicr of defendant); B1iggs v. Byrd, 34 N. C. 
377 (1851) (rxpreH~ malicr may be proved either by dirrct evidence or 
surrounding cirrumstances); McBurney v. Times Publishing Co., 93 R. I. 
:~31, 175 A. :2d 170 ( 1961) (relevant evidence admi;;8ible to rebut te;;timony 
by rrporters and ed1tor;; that they publi;;hed without malicr); Lancour v. 
Herald & Globe Assu .. 112 Vt. 471,28 A. 2d 396 (1942) (any rt•levant evi-
dence on malicP); Farrar v. Tribuue Pub. Co., 358 P. 2d 792 (Wash. 
1961) (nil circumRtanrf'R surroundmg publication rPlPvant and admi;;sible). 
Similarly, the courts have uniformly admittPd o:urh evidence on bPhalf of 
the drfPndant. See, e. g .. Bohan v. Record Pub . ('o ., 1 Cal. App. 429, 82 P. 
5:~4 (1905) (tf'::itimon~· on good faith); Hearne v. De Youny , 119 Cal. 670, 
52 l'. 150 (18911) (tp::;timony on ~ourcPs, precautions taken, and good 
faith) ; Ballinger v. Democrat Co., 2Da Iowa 1095, 212 N . W . 557 (1927) 
(tr:stimony of reportrr and rditor on good faith admi::;::;ible); Snyder v. 
1'ribune Co .. 161 Iowa 671, 14!~ N. W . 519 (1913) (tr::;timony a:; to source 
of infomwtion and good faith of' reporter admissiblr); Courier Journal 
Co. v. Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446 (1911) (trstimony of reporter 
on good faith) ; Conner v. StarHlard P·ub. Co., 183 Ma::;s . 474, 67 N. E. 596 
(1903) (tr~;tnnon~· a>~ to ::;ourcr of information); Davis v. Marxhausen, 103 
Mich. 315, 61 N. W. 504 (1894) (tr::;timony on good faith and proper 
prrranhons takPn beforp publi::;hmg) ; Julian v. K. C. Star Co .. 209 Mo. 35, 
107 S. W. 496 (1907) (tp::;timon~· on thought::; and intrntion~ at the time 
of publication admi~::;iblP); Paxton v. Woodward, :n Mont. 195, 78 P. 215 
(1904) (trstirnony as to motiw, good faith , and source~); Las Vegas Sun, 
Inc. v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 329 P . 2d 867 (1958) (testimony of pub-
li~her on good faith) ; Ltndsey v. Evening Journal Assn., 10 N . .J. Misc. 
1275, 163 A. 245 (1935) (tp;;t nnony on good faith) ; Kahn Y. P&D Co., 169 
App. Div. 580, 155 N. Y. S. 455 (1915) (;;ource) ; Hains Y. New York 
Eveniug Journal, 204 N. Y. S. 7:H (1930) (sourer); Goodrow v. Malone 
Telegram, 235 App. Div . :3, 255 N. Y. S. 812 (19:32) (reportrr 's te::;timony 
aR to sourcP) ; Goodrow v. Press Co., 283 App. D1v. 41 , 251 N. Y. S. 364 
(1931) (defpndant can testify and intruducr rvidPncr on hi::; good faith at 
time of publicatwn) ; Kehoe Y. Neu• York Tribun e, 229 App. Div. 220, 241 
N Y. S. 676 (1930) (te;;timony on good faith admi::;sible to prrvPIJt im-
po::;ltlon of punitive damagp:;); Varvaro v. American Agricu!tu1·ist, 222 App. 
D1v. 213, 225 N. Y. S. 564 (HJ27) (defPndant may te;;tify and introduce 
rvidencf' on lack of malice), Vau Arsdale "· Tone, Inc .. 35 N. Y. S. 2d 
'951, aff 'd, 265 AJ>P. D1v. 919, :m N Y. S. 2cl 41:3 (1942) ; Wezrhbrodt "-
'· 
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ess. In each of these cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting 
System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 
(1973), we invalidated state efforts to pre-empt editorial 
decision by requiring the publication of specified material. 
In Columbia Broadcasting System, it was the requirement 
that a television network air paid political advertisemeuts and 
in Tornillo, a newspaper's obligation to print a political 
candidate's reply to press criticism. Insofar as the laws at 
issue in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting System sought 
to control in advance the content of the publication. they 
were deemed as invalid as were prior efforts to enjoin publica-
tion of specified materials. 111 But holdings that neither the 
State nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or 
must not be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest 
that the editorial process is immune from any inquiry 
whatsoever. 
It is incredible to believe that the Court in Columbia 
Broadcasting System or in Tornillo silently effected a substan-
tial contraction of the rights preserved to defamation plain-
tiffs in Sullivan, Butts, and like cases. Tornillo and Gertz v. 
New York Evening Journal, l1 N. Y. S. 2d 112 (Sup. 1939) (defendant 
may te~tify as to good faith and probable caust>); Cleveland Leader 
Printing Co. v. Nethersole. 84 Ohw St. 118, 95 N. E. 735 (1911) (tes-
timony on good fa1th); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P. 
1079 ( 1914) ( defpndant's te~timony as to lack of malice and source of 
information); Times Pub. Co. v. Ray, 1 S. W. 2d 471, aff'd, 12 S. W. 2d 
105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (te~timony as to lack of malice); Pfister v. 
Milwaukee Free Press Co .. 1:39 Wi~ . 627, 121 N. W. 938 (1909) (testimony 
liS to absence of malice) . 
None of thrse ca::;e,.; as much as suggested that there wert> ~pecial hmits 
apphcable to tlw press on the d1~coverability of such evidence, either 
befon> or during trial. 
UJ As we stated in 'I'ormllo. "no 'government agency-local, ~tate, or 
federal-can leU a newspaper in advance what it can prmt and what it 
cannot.'" /d ., at 225-256, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-
lions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 391 {1973) (ST~>:WAJ{'l', J., dissenting). 
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Robert Welch, Inc., were announced on the same day; and 
although the Court's opinion in Gertz contained au overview 
of recent developments in the relationship between the First 
Amendment and the law of libel, there was no hint that a 
companion case had uarrowed the evidence available to a 
defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to be 
drawn from the Gertz opinion. since it, like prior First Amend-
ment libel cases, recited without criticism the facts of record 
iudicating that the state of mind of the editor had been 
placed at issue. Nor did the Gertz opinion. in requiring proof 
of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant editor 
allCl in forbidding punitive damages absent at least reckless 
disregard of truth or falsity, suggest that the First Amendment 
also foreclosed direct inquiry into these critical elements.17 
In sum. contrary to the views of the Court of Appeals, 
according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a 
media defendant in a libel case is not only not required, 
authorized or presaged by our prior cases. but would tend to 
frustrate the expectations evidenced by the prior opinions of 
this C'ourt. 
III 
It is nevertheless urged by respondents thBt the balance 
struck in New York Times should now be modified to provide 
further protections for the press when sued for circulating 
erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. It 
is not uncommon or improper, of course, to suggest the aban-
donment, modification, or refinement of existing constitutional 
17 Two years later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), there 
was likewise no indication that the plaintiff is ::;ubject to ::;ubstantial e':i-
drntiary re~:~trictiom; m proYmg the defendant'::; fault. As M11 .. JusTICE 
PowELL and MR. Jus'l'ICE STEWAH'r ::;tated in concurrence, the answer to 
thi::; question of culpability " clrprnds upon a carrful consideratiOn of all the 
relevant evidence concerning Time'::; actions priol' to the publication of the 
' mlle~:~tones' article." They suggcstrd that on remand all the eYidence of 
record ~;hould be ron::;idered , which included evidence goirg to thr beliefs 
Qf Ttmr'~ editorial ::;taff. See id , at 467, and 'I. fi . 
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interpretation, and remarkable developments in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence have evolved from just such submissions. 
But the proponents of innovation bear the burden of per-
suasion, and they have not carried it in this case. 
The Court has recently reiterated its conviction, reflected 
in the law of defamation in ail of the States, that the indi-
vidual's interest in his reputation is of basic concern and has 
exhibited its reluctance to interfere with state efforts to 
vindicate that interest. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 
448, 455-457 (1976). Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U. S., at 
348- 349. Here the case for placing beyond reach direct 
evidence of knowing or reckless falsehood, elements critical to 
plaintiffs such as Herbert, is by no means clear and convincing. 
ln the first place, it is plain enough that the suggested privi-
lege for the editorial process would constitute a substantial 
interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff such as 
Herbert to prove his case. As respondents would have it, 
the defemlant's reckless disregard of the truth, a critical 
element, could not be shown by direct evidence through 
inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and conclus;ons of the 
publisher but could be proved only by objective evidence from 
whirh the ultimate fact could be inferred. It may be that 
plaintiffs will rarely be successful in proving awareness of 
falsehood from the mouth of the defendant h{mself, but the 
relevance of answers to such inquiries, which the District 
Comt recognized and the Court of Appeals did not deny, can 
hardly be doubted. To erect au impenetrable barrier to the 
plaint;ff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is a 
matter of some substance, particularly when defendants them-
selves are prone to assert their good-faith belief in the truth 
of their publications, 18 and libel plaintiffs are required to prove 
t" See, e. g., the rasPs collected Ill n. 15, s·upra. in which media defend-
ant~ a~;;"rted, and court~ uphPid, the right to present this type of evidence 
at tnalm orrler to establish good faith and lack of :nalice. 
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knowing or reckless falsehood with "convincing cla;rity." New' 
York Tinws v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at285-286. 
Furthermore, the outer boundaries of the editorial privilege 
now urged are difficult to perceive. The opinions below did 
not state, and responde11ts do not explain. precisely when the 
editorial process begins and when it ends. Moreover. although 
we are told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as 
to what he "knew" and what he had "learned" from his 
interviews. as opposed to what he "believed," it is not at all 
clear why the suggested editorial privilege would not cover 
knowledge as well as belief about the veracity of published 
reports. 1 " It is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted 
by respondents would immunize from inquiry the internal 
communications occurring during the editorial process and 
thus place beyond reach what the defendant participants 
learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversations 
or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues a.re to 
be barred from evidence, would a reporter's admissions made 
to third parties not participating in the editorial process also 
be immune from inquiry? We thus have little doubt that 
Herbert and other defamation plaintiffs have important in-
terests at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted 
privilege. 
Nevertheless, we are urged by respondents to override these 
important interests because requiring disclosure of editorial 
conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the verac-
ity of the material he has gathered will have an intolerable 
10 It waR also ·· ugge~ted at oral argument that 1 he privilege would cover 
questions in the ''why" form . but not of the "who," "what," "when," and 
"where" type. Tr. of Oral Arg., a1 32-34. But it is evident from Lando's 
depo~ition that quest ions soliciting "why" answers relating to the editorial 
prores;: wpre anHwerrd, e. g., Tr. of Deposition 21, L. 7; 1892, L. 18, and 
tha t he refu:;ed to answer other:; that did not fall into this rategory, e. g., 
Tr. of Deposition 666, L. 20; 774, L. 5 ; 877 L. 12; 880, L . 5; 1488, L. 3; 
1893, L. 11 ; sf'e Tr. of Oral Arg., at 46. 
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chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decision-
making. But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of 
damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless false-
hoods, those effects are precisely those that our cases have 
held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Spreading 
false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment 
credentials. 
Realistically, however, some error is inevitable; and the 
difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the C'.JOurt 
in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit 
liability to instances where some degree of culpability is 
present in order to eliminate the risk of self-censorship and 
the suppression of truthful material. Those who publish 
defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability, how-
ever, are subJeCt to liability. the aim being not ouly to com-
pensate for injury but also to deter publication of Ullprotected 
material threatening injury to individual reputation. Per-
mitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by 
direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the 
balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in 
liability for damages which in turn discourages the publica.tion 
of erroneous information known to be false or probably false, 
this is no more than what our cases contemplate and does not 
abridge either freedom of speech or of the press. 
Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the 
suppression not only of information known or strongly sus-
pected to be unreliable but also of truthful information, the 
.issue would be quite different. But as we have said, our cases 
necessarily contemplate examination of the editorial process 
to prove the necessary awareness of probable falsehood, and 
if .indirect proof of th1s element does not stifie truthful pub-
lication and IS consistent with the First Amendment, as 
respondents seem to concede. we do not understand how direct 




HERBERT v. LANDO 
tially more suspect.20 Perhaps such examination will lead to 
liability that would not have been found without it, but this 
does not suggest that the determinations in these instances 
will be inaccurate and will lead to the suppression of protected 
information. On the contrary, direct inquiry from the actors, 
which affords the opportuuity to refute inferences that might 
otherwise be drawn from circumstantial evidence, suggests 
that more accurate results will be obtained by placing all, 
rather than part, of the evidence before the decisiomnaker. 
Suppose, for example, that a reporter has two contradictory 
reports about the plaintiff, oue of which is false and damaging, 
and only the false oue is published. In resolving the issue 
whether the publication was known or suspected to be false, 
it is only common sense to believe that inquiry from the 
publisher, with an opportuuity to explain, will contribute to 
accuracy. If the publication is false but there is an exoner-
ating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this 
effect. 21 Why should not the plaintiff be permitted to inquire 
before trial'? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact had 
serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless, no 
forbidden self-censorship will result from permitting the rele-
vant inquiry. Only k1:owing or reckless error will be discour-
aged; and mlless there is to be an absolute First Amendment 
privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless conduct, which 
respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be 
threatened. 
It is also urged that frank discussion among reporters and 
editors will be dampened and sound editorial ·judgment en~ 
"" Thr kind of qur~tion r<.>~pondrnts ~ePk to avoid an~wrrmg is, by thE>ir 
own ndrru~~ion, the rasiest to answ<.>r. SrP Tr. of Oral Arg., at 31: 
•· · [T]hey are l:'et-up que,hons for our ~Ide. . . . [T]he::;t> are not dif-
hcult que::;twns to answer. ·• 
"' Often it i ~ the librl defendant who fir::;t pre~ents at trial direct evidence 
abou1 the editorial procP s in order to rstabli::;h good faith and lack of 
malice. That wa8 true m Nell' York Times v. Sullivan, sPP, e. g., Record 
· 7.6.:2, m1d m many of tbP ca::w;; <'Ited in n . 15, supm . 
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dangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject to 
inquiry by defamation plaintiffs. 2 ~ We do not doubt the 
direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the 
one hand and sound decisions on the other; but whether or 
not there is liability for the injury. the press has an obvious 
interest in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication 
of false information, and it is not unreasonable to expect 
the media to invoke whatever procedures that may be prac-
ticable and useful to that end. Moreover, given exposure to 
liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even 
more reason to resort to prepublication precautions. such as 
a frank interchange of fact and opinion. Accordingly, we find 
it difficult to believe that error-a voiding procedures will be 
terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for cul-
pable error and because the editorial process will itself be 
examined in the tiny percentage of instances in which error 
is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is there sound reason 
to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial process 
are so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunder-
standing that they should be immune from examination in 
order to avoid erroneous judgments in defamation suits. The 
evidentiary burden Herbert must carry is substantial indeed, 
and we are unconvinced that his chances of winning an 
undeserved verdict are such that an inquiry into what Lando 
learned or said during editorial process must be foreclosed. 
This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges 
have ro constitutional protection from casual inquiry. There 
is 110 law that subjects the editorial process to private or 
official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve 
some general end such as the public interest; and if there 
were, it would not survive constitutioual scrutiny as the First 
2 ~ They invoke cur obseryation m United .States v. Nzxon, 4l!l U. S. 
f-i83 , 705 (1974): "Those who expect pubhc dil:'oemination of their remarks 
may well temprr candor with a concern for appearance and for their own 
intere::-tH to the dctriml;'nt of the derioJcmmaking proceQ~." 
. ,
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Ameuument is presently construeu. No such problem exists 
here, however, where there is a specific claim of injury arising 
from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or 
recklessly false. 
Evidentiary privileges in litigation are uot favoreu,n and 
even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper 
circumstances. The President, for example. does not have an 
absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed 
for a judicial proceeding. United States v. NixCYII, 418 U. S. 
683 (1974). In so holding, we found that although the 
President has a powerful interest in confidentiality of com-
munications between himself allCI his advisers. that interest 
must yield to a demo11strated specific need for evidence. As 
we stated, in referring to existing limited privileges against 
disclosure. " [ w j hatever their origins, these exceptions to the 
demand for every man 's evidence are not lightly created nor 
expansively construed. for they are in uerogation of the search 
for truth." !d., at 710. 
With these considerations in mind. we concluue that the 
present construction of the First Amendment should not be 
modified by creating the evidentiary privilege which the 
respoudents now urge. 
IV 
Although defamation litigation. including suits against the 
press, is an anciellt phenomenon. it is true that our cases from 
X ew York Times to Gertz have considerably changed the 
profile of such cases. In years gone by. plaintiffs made out a 
prima facie case by proving the damaging publication. Truth 
~" SPl' Elki?t8 v. United States, :~04 LT. S. 20fi, 2:H (J\Jf\0) (Frankfmtr1·, 
,J): '·Limitntiom; are proprrl~ · pht<'l'd upon 1 hP O]Wml ion of t lm; grncral 
principll- I of no tPHtimonial pri,·i!Pgel on!~· to tlw vrr~· limited cxtrnt that 
pcrmtttmg a refu~al to te;,;tit\ or (•xclndmg rPIPnlllt rvideneP ha:< a puulie 
good t ran::H·rudinp; thP norma II~· pr!'dominnnt priJl(·iplr of utiliziug all 
ra t10nal UH':tn~ for astC'rtainin!!: truth. " 8<·P al~o R .1. ''' tgmor<', Eviden<'c 
§ 2192 (:YfeXaughtoJJ reY . 19(il) ; 4 Th<• Work~ of .)Nrmy lkuthnm :32J 
'{J. Bowring Pd. 1843) • 
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and privilege were defenses. Intent, motive and malice were 
not necessarily involved except to counter qualified privilege 
or to prove exemplary damages. The plaintiff's burden is 
now considerably expanded. In every or almost every case, 
the plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a 
false publication attended by some degree of culpability on 
the part of the publisher. If plaintiffs in consequence now 
resort to more discovery, it would not be surprising; and it 
would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of 
litigation have escalated and become much more troublesome 
for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is suggested that the 
press needs constitutional protection from these burdens if it 
is to perform its task,"4 which is indispensable in a system 
such as ours. 
Creating a coustitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry 
into the editorial process, however, would not cure this prob-
lem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability 
from defamation would effect this result. and the Court has 
regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the 
First A1pendment. Furthermore, mushrooming litigation 
costs, much of it due to pre-trial discovery, are not peculiar 
to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated ex-
pressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, 
and voices from this Court have joined the chorus. 2 " But 
~~It iH urged that the large costs of defending lawsuits will intimidate 
the pres:; and lead to self-cen8orship, particularly where smaller new::>papers 
nnd hroadca::>ters are 'involved. It i~ noted that Lando's deposition alone 
continued intermittently for over a yrar, filled 26 volume::> containing 
nearly :3,000 pages and 240 Pxhibits. As well a:; out-of-pocket cxpent>es 
of thr deposition, there were ,;ubstantial lrgal frrs, and Lando and his 
associate;; werr diverted from news gat bering and re1x>rtmg for a significant 
amount of timr. 
2 5 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores. 421 U. S. 72:3, 740-741 
(1975) ; ACF lndust1·ies, luc. v. EEOC, - U. S. - (1979) (PowELL, 
S'l'gWAR1' nne! HEHNQUIWr , .1.1., di::>senting from drnial of certiorari); 
Burgrr : Agenda for 2000 A. D. : A Need for Sy::>tematic Anticipation, The 
l'ound ConferencP, 70 F . . R. D . 7o, 9.5-96 ( 197ti) . The Committee on 
I :O,o 
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until and unless there are major changes in the present rules 
of civil procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and 
in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse. 
The Court has more than once declared that the deposition-
discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treat-
ment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the 
litigants in civil trials. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 
114-115 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 501, 507 
( 194 7). But the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of Rule 
1 that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." (Emphasis 
added.) To this end, the requirement of Rule 26 (b) (1) that 
the material sought in discovery be "relevant" should be 
firmly applied, and the district courts should not neglect their 
power to restrict discovery where "justice requires [protection 
for] a party or person from rumoyance, embarrassment, oppres.: 
sion, or undue burden or expense .... " Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
26 (c). With this authority at hand, judges should not 
hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery 
process. 
Whether, as a nonconstitutioual matter, however, the trial 
judge properly applied the rules of discovery was not within 
the boundaries of the question certified under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1292 (b) and accordingly is not before us. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is reversed. 
So ordered. 
Rules of Practice and Procedurr of thP .I udicial ConferencP of tht> Umted 
States ha propost>d amPndment~ to the Federal Hules of Civil Procedure 
designed to ameliorate this problPm. PrPlimina ry Draft of Propo:sed 
Amendments to the Federal Rule:; of C'n:il Procednre (1978) . 
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could accommodate it and provide for a remand, as 
long as the matter remained a discovery issue in-
volving the federal courts rather than a constitu-
tional requirement that state courts must follow. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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'jihtsfringtcn. ~. <!f. 2Llp'!~ 
I 
February 8, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1105 - Herbert v. Lando 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, .1/ ~~ ' 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Just.i.Ge Stewart 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justi.cG Bla:krnun 
v1'1r. Juut .... co PoNGll 
Mr. ,Justice R !hnqLlist 
Mr. Justic.:e St8VG11S 
From: Mr. Justice White 
s fEB 1979 Circulated: ______________ _ 
Recirculated: ____________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 77- llOS 
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner,] On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United Sta.tes Court of Ap-
Barry Lando et al. peals for the Second Circuit. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither 
the Federal nor a State Government may make any law 
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " The 
question here is whether those Amendments should be con-
strued to provide further protection for the press when sued 
for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More 
specifically, we are urged to hold for the first time that when 
a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging 
falsehoods and is sued for injury to the plaintiff's reputation, 
the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the editorial proc" 
esses of those responsible for the publication, even though 
the inquiry would produce evidence material to the proof of a 
critical element of his cause of action. 
I 
Petitioner. Anthony Herbert, is a retired Army officer who 
had extended wa.r-timf' service in Vietnam and who received 
widespread media attention in 1969- 1970 when he accused his 
superior officers of covering up reports of atrocities and other 
war crimes. Three years la.ter. on February 4, 1973, respond-
ent Columbia Broadcasting System. Inc. (CBS), broadcast a 
report ou petitioner and his accusations. The program was 
produced and edited by respondent Barry Lando and was 
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a related article in Atlantic Monthly magazine. Herbert then 
sued Lando, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for defam&.-
tion in Federal District Court, basing jurisdiction on diversity 
of citizenship. In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the 
program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as 
a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges to 
excuse his relief from command, and requested substantial 
damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value 
of a book he had just published recounting his experiences. 
Although his cause of action arose under New York State 
defamation law, Herbert conceded that because he was a 
"public figure" the First and Fourteenth Amendments pre-
cluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published 
damaging falsehoods "with 'actual malice'-that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not." This was the holding of New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964), with 
respect to alleged libels of public officials, and extended to 
"public figures" by Curt·is Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S, 
130 (1967). 1 Under this rule, absent knowing fa.lsehood, lia-
bility requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that is, 
that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U. S. 727, 731 ( 1968). Such "subjective awareness of probable 
falsity ," Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 5 
(1974), may be found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt 
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." 
Bt. A·mant v. Thompson, supra, at 732. 
In preparing to prove his case in light of these require-
ments, Herbert deposed Lando at length and sought an order 
to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response 
was refused on the ground that the First Amendment pro-
tected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who 
1 Criminal libel pro~ecutions are ~ubjert to the same constitutional linu-
tations. Garrison v Louisiana, 375 U.S. ()4 {1964) . 
'• 
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edit, produce or publish, a.nd into the editorial process.2 
Applying the standard of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (b), which 
permits discovery of any matter "relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action" if it would either be 
admissible in evidence or "appears reasonably calculated to 
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," the District 
Court ruled that because the defendant's state of mind was of 
"central importance" to the case. it was obvious that the 
questions were relevant and "entirely appropriate to Herbert's 
efforts to discover whether Lando had any reason to doubt the 
veracity of certain of his sources, or, equally significant, to 
prefer the veracity of one source over another." 73 F. R. D. 
387, 395, 396 (SDNY 1977). The District Court rejected the 
claim of constitutional privilege because it found nothing in 
the First Amendment or the relevant cases to permit or 
require it to increase the weight of the injured plaintiff's 
already heavy burden of proof by in effect creating barriers 
"behind which malicious publication may go undetected a.nd 
unpublished." !d., at 394. The case was then certified for 
an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S. C.§ 1292 (b), and the 
Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case. 3 
2 The Circuit Court summarized the objectionable inquirir:s as follows: 
'' 1. Lando's conclusiOns during his research and investigation regarding-
people or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with 
the 60 Minutes :segment and the Atlantic Monthly article; 
"2. Lando':; conclusions about facts imparted by interviewers and his 
state of mind with respect to the veracity of persons intervit>wed; 
"3. The basi:; for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a: 
conclusion with respect to prrsons, information or events; 
"4. Conver:sations between Lando and Wallace about matters to be in-
cluded or excluded from the broadca:st publication; and, 
"5. Lando's intentions a:; manift>:sted by the decision to include or ex-· 
elude material." Herbert v. Lando, 568 F . 2d 974, 983 (CA2 1977). 
8 Re:spondents' Petition for Leave to Appeal from an Interlocutory 
Order, which was granted, :sta ted the issue on appeal a:; follows: 
" What effect should be given to the Fir:st Amendment protection of the 
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A divided panel reversed the District Court, 56~ F. ~d 97~ 
( CA2 1977). Two judges, writing separate but overlapping 
opinions, concluded that the First Amendment lent sufficient 
J 
protection to the editorial processes to protect La.ndo from 
tnquiry about his thoughts~ 'opii1iolls, and conclusions with 
respect to the material gathered by him and about his conver-
sations with his editorial collea.gues. The privilege not to 
answer was held to be absolute. We granted certiorari because 
of the importance of the issue involved. 435 U.S. 922 (1978); 
We have concluded that the Court of Appeals misconstrued 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and accordingly re.., 
verse its judgment. 
II 
Civil and criminal liability for defamation was well estab~ 
lished in the common law when the First Amendment was 
adopted, and there is no it~dicati~m that the Framers intended 
to abolish such liability. Until New York Times the prevail" 
ing jurisprudence was that "libelous utterances [are not] 
within the area of constitutioilally protected speech .... " 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 (1952); see also 
Roth v. United StfLtes, 354 U. S. 476, 482-483 (1957); 
Chaplinsky v. Neuj Hampshire, 315 U.S. Q.68, 571-572 (194.2); 
Nea1· v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707_:708 (1931). The 
accepted view was that neither civil nor criminal liability for 
defamatory publications abridge freedom of speech or freedoni 
of the press, and a majority of jurisdictions made publishers ' . 
liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of 
their intent. 1 New York Times and Butts effected major 
in a libel ca;;c governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 
254 ( 19(.14) ?" 
4 See, f. g., Re;;tatement. of Torts § 580 (1939); Pedrick, Freedom of 
the PrE's;; and the Law of Lihel: The ModE'rn Revised Tran:;lation, 49 
Corn. L. Rev. 581, 58:3-584 (1964); Note, Developments in the Law-
Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev . 875, 902-910 (1956) . In Peck v. Chicago 
Tribune Co., 214 U. S, 185, 189 (1909) , Mr . .Tu~;ticc Holmes summarized 
.;. 
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'Changes in the standards applicable to civil libel actions. 
Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for 
defamation must prove knowing and reckless falsehood in order 
to establish liability. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
the Court held that nonpublic figures must demonstrate some 
fault on the defendant's part and, at least where knowing or 
reckless untruth is not shown, some proof of actual injury to 
the plaintiff before liability may be imposed and damages 
awarded. 
These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the 
common law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First 
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of 
press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that 
liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing 
of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood. 
Given the required proof, however, damages liability for 
defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom 
of the press. 
Nor did these cases suggest any First Amendment restric-
tion on the sources from which the plaintiff could obtain the 
necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause 
of action. On the contrary, New York Times and its progeny 
made it essential to proving liability that plaintiffs focus on 
the prevailing view of strict liability in the cour~e of reviewing a libel 
judgment rendered in a federal diversity of citizen~hip action: 
"There was ~orne suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by ·· 
mistake, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait or was 
not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, was no excuse. 
If the publication was libellous the defendant took the risk. A:; was said 
of such matters by Lord Mansfield, 'Whatever a man publishes he pub-
lishes at his peril.' The King v. W oodfall, Lofft 776, 781. . . . The rea-
son i~ plain. A libel 1s harmful on its face. If a man sees fit to punish 
manife;;tly hurtful statements concerning an individual, without othl'r 
justificatiOn than ex1sts for an advertisement or a piece of new;;, the 
usual princ1plcs of tort will make him liable, if the statements are false 
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the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. To be 
liable, the alleged defamer of public officials or of public 
:figures must know or suspect that his publication is false. In 
other cases proof of some kind of fault, negligence perhaps/ 
is essential to recovery. Inevitably. unless liability is to be 
completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes of 
the alleged defamer would be open to examination. 
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that a1though 
proof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of 
objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be 
inferred, plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defend-
ants whether they knew or suspected tha.t their damaging 
publication was in error. In Butts, for example, it is evident 
from the record that the editorial process had been subjected 
to close examination and that direct as well as indirect evi-
dence was relied on to prove that the defendant magazine 
had acted with actual malice. The damages verdict was 
sustained without any suggestion that plaintiff's proof had 
trenched upon forbidden areas.0 
5 The definition of fault was to be the respon~ibility of state laws. Ge1·tz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc ., 418 U.S. :32:3, 347 (1974). 
6 See :388 U. S., at 156-159, when• Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the 
Court, reviewed the record under the ~tandard ·he preferred to apply to 
public figures, and upheld the verdict for the plaintiff. Chief Justice 
Warren independently reviewed the record under the "actual malice" 
standard of New York Times and also concluded in his concurring opinion 
that the verdict should be upheld. 1d., at Hi8-170. The evidence relied 
on and ~ummarized in both opinion;; included substantial amottnts of testi-
mony that would fall within the editoria1 process privilege as defined by 
reSJJondent~:~. The record before the Court included depositions by the 
author of the defamatory article, an individual paid to assist the author 
in preparation, the Sports Editor of The Saturda~· Evening Po~t, and both 
·its Managing Editor and Editor-in-Chief. The;;e depo;;itions revealed The 
Saturday Evening Post's motives in publishing the story (Record 706-
717), sources (Record 364, 662-664, 719-720, 729), conversation::; among 
the editors and author concerning the research and development of the 
~ rticle (Rerord 363-367, 721-737), deci~iom; and rea~ons relating to who 
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Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means 
a recent development arising from New York Times and 
similar cases. Rather. it is deeply rooted in the common-law 
rule, predating the First Amendment, that a showing of 
malice on the part of the defendant permitted plaintiffs to 
recover punitive or enhanced damages.7 In Butts, the Court 
should be interviewed and what ~hould be investigated (Record 666-
667, 699-700, 734-736, 772-774), conclu;;ions M;; to the importance and 
veracit~· of sources and information pre8ented in the article (Record 720, 
732-735. 737, 771-772, 776), and conclusions about the impact that pub-
li;;hing the article would have on the subject (Record 714--716, 770). 
Ju;;TICE BHENNAN, writing for himself and Mn . .Tu;;TICE WHrrE, alsa 
thought the rvidence of record ;;ufficient to sati;;fy the New York Times 
malice standard. It is quite unlikely that the Court would have arrived 
at the result it did bad it believed that inquiry into the editorial processes 
was con;;titutionally forbidden . 
The Court engaged in similar analysis of the record in reversing the 
judgments entered in a companion case to Butts, Associated Press v. 
Walke1·, 388 U. S., at 158-159; id., at 165 (Warren, C . .J., concurring); 
and in Time Y. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 391-394 (1967). In Hill, the record 
included the edited drafts of the allegedly libelous article and a examina-
tion and cross-examination of the author. Dming that examination, the· 
writer explained in detail the preparation of the article, his thoughti:l, con-
clu;;ions , and belief;; regarding the material, and a line-by-line analysi;; of 
the !uiicle with explanation;; of how and why additions and deletions wert:> 
madP to the various drafts. As in Butts, the editorial process was the· 
focn;; of much of the evidence, and direct inquiry was made into the state 
of mind of the media defendants . Yet the Court raised no question as to· 
the propriety of the proof. 
7 A. Hanson, Libel and Related Tort;;~ 16:-l (1969); Note, Developments 
hi the Law-Defamation, supm. at 938; 50 Am . .Tur. 2d Libel and Slander 
§ 352 (1970); 50 C. J. S. Libel and Slander § 260 (1955). 
The Re,;tatement originall~· provided in a >~eparnte section for the award· 
of punitiv<' damage~ for maliciou~ defamations. H.e~tatemPnt of Tort:; 
~ 1068 (Trnt . Draft 13, 1936) : 
"One who is liable for harm to another's r<'putation caused by the pub-
Jicatioll of a libel or slander i::; abo liable for punitive damagt:"S if the 
defamatory matter was publi~hed w1th knowledge of its fa.Isity or if it wa8· 
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affirmed the substantial award of punitive damag(;'s which in 
Georgia were conditioned upon a showing of "wanton or reck-
less indifference of culpable llegligence" or "ill will. spite, 
hatred and an intent to injure." 388 U. S., at 165-166. 
Neither Mr. Justice Harlan. id., at 156-162/ nor Chief Justice 
Warren, coucurring, id., at 165-168, raised any question as to 
the propriety of having the award turn on such a showing or 
as to the propriety of the underlying evidence, which plainly 
included direct evidence going to the state of mind of the 
publisher and its responsible agents.0 
Furthermore, long before Sullivan was decided, certain 
qualified privileges had developed to protect a publisher from 
liability for libel unless the publication was made with 
malice.10 Malice was defiued in numerous ways, but in gen-
purpo~e of cau~ing harm to tllP plaintiff 's rt'putatiou or other lPgally pro-
tectPd intere::;t ." 
The provision was later omitted with the rxplanation that recovf'ry of 
punitive damages would be determinrd by thr rules in the He::;tatement 
w1th respect to damages in geurrHl. Re:;tatrment of Tort:; § 106S (Pro-
posed Final Draft 3, 1937) . 
Gertz v. Robert Welch , Inc .. sup'l'a, at 350, limited the entitlement to· 
punitive damage::; but such damage;; are still awardable IIJlon a showing of 
knowing or reckle:;s fal8ehood . 
8 As Mr . .Justice Harlan noted, the jury had been instructrd· in con-
sidering punitivr damagel:l to as:;es::; "the reliability, the naturt• of the· 
sources of the plaintiff's information, its acceptance or rejection of the 
sources. Jt~:> care in chrcking upon assertion~." 31:!8 U.S., at 156 (emphasis 
added) . The Jwstice found nothing amiss either with thr in~:>truction or 
the result the jury reached under it. MR . .TU~:>'l'ICE BRENNAN, di:;~enting· 
in the Butts case, id., at 172-174, analyzed thr in~tructions diffrrently but 
ra1srd no que~tion as to the comstitutionality of turning the award of eithrr 
compen,;atory or punitive damage~ upon direct a:,; well a,; circum;;tantial 
evidence going to the mrntal state of thr defendant. 
~ Ser n. (i, supra. 
10 See Nalle v. Oyste1', 2:30 U.S. 165, 179-180 (191:3); White v. Nicholls, 
;3 How. 266, 286-292 (1845); T. Pluckuett, A Conci~r History of the 
Common Law 502 {5th rd. 1956); Hallrn, Charactrr of Brlief NPce::>&'try· 
(Qr the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 IlL L. Rev. 865 (1981)_ 
. ,• 
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eral depended upon a showing that the defendant acted with 
improper motive.ll This showing in turn hinged upon the 
intent or purpose with which the publication was made, the 
In White v. Nichulls, supra. at 290-291, the Court surveyed the common 
law and summarizrd the privilege as follows: 
"We have thus taken a virw of the authorities which treat of the doc-
trines of slander and libel, and have contSidered those authoritietS particu-
larly with reference to the distinction they establish, between ordinary 
instances of slander, written and unwritten, and those which have been 
styled, privileged communications; the peculiar character of which is said 
to exempt thrm from inferences which tlw law has creatrd with respect 
to those cases that do not partake of that character. Our t>xamination, 
t>xtended a::; it may seem to have bt>rn, has been ca.Jied for by the im-
portancE' of a subject mm;t intimately connected with tht> rights and happi-
ness of individuals, as it is with tht> quiet and good order of society. The 
inve:stigation has conducted us to the following conclusions, which we 
propound as the law applicable thert>to. 1. That every publication, either 
by writing, printing, or pietures, which charges upon or imputes to any 
per!:lon that which renders him liable to punishment, or which is calcu-
lated to make him infamous, or odious, or ridiculous, is prim.a facie a libel, 
nnd implie" malice in tht> nuthor and publio;her towards the person con-
ct>rning whom such publication is made. Proof of malice, tht>refore, in 
the casrl:l just <.lt>scribed, can newr be required of the party complaining 
b!>yond tht> proof of the publication itself: jm;tification, excuse, or extenu-
ation, if t>Jther can be shown. must procrrd from the defendant. 2. That 
the descriptiou of cases recognisrd as privilegt>d communication:;, must be 
tmdt>rstood a~ exceptions to this rule, and as being founded upon somr 
apparently rt>eognised obligation or motive, legal, moral, or social, which 
rnay fairly bt> presumed to havt> led to the publication, and therefore prima 
facie rt>lirvc'S it from that just implication from which the general rule of 
tlw law ~~ deduc<>d. Thr rule of evidf'nce, u~ t.o !:luch cases, is accordingly 
as far chang<>d a~ to impo~e it on the plantiff to remove those presumptions 
flowing from the ~t>eming obligations and !:lituations of the parties, and to 
rrquire of him to bring homr to the defendant the existence of malice a:; 
the true motivP of his conduct. Beyond 1 hi~ extent no presumption can 
be JH'I'lllJtted to oprrate. m11ch le~s br made to sanctify tlw indulgence of 
malice, howPver wicked. howt>ver exprP~~. under tht> protection of legal 
formA . Wt> conclude tht>n that malice may be proved, though alleged to 
have existt>d in the procredings before n court, or ]pgislative body, or any 
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belief of the defendant in the truth of his statement, or upon 
the ill will which the defendant might have borne towards the 
defendant.12 
Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect 
evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant 
and necessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance 
damages.13 The rules are a.pplicable to the press and to other 
· defendants alike,11 and it is evident that the courts across 
other tribunal or authority, although such court, lE-gislative body, or other 
tribunal, may have been the appropriate authority for redressing the 
grievance reprP:sPnted to it; and that proof of exprPSS malice in any 
written publication, petition, or proceeding, addreo;sed to such tribunal, 
will render that publication, petition, or procPeding, libellous in it::; char-
acter, and actionable, and will subject the author and publisher thereof 
to all the con::;equences of libel." 
11 Hallen, supra, at 866-867. In some juri:sdictions a defendant for-
feited his privilege if he published negligently or without probable cause 
Lo believe tlw statement was true. lcl., at 867; see White v. Nicholls, 
supra, at 291. 
12 See, e. g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 455: 
"The exi:stencP of actual malice may be shown in many ways. As a 
genpral rulP, any competent rvidence, either direct or circumstantial, can 
be resorted to, and all thP relevant circumstance;; :mrrounding the trans-
action may be ::;hown, provided they are not too remote, including threats, 
J!rior or subsequrnt drfamations , subsequent statements of the defendant, 
circumstances indicating the existrnce of rivalry, ill will, or ho:stility between 
the parties, fact;; tending to :show a rrckle:ss disregard of the plaintiff's 
right;;, and, in an action against a nPw:spaper, cu;;tom and usage with 
respect to the treatment of news lt{'lns of the nature of the one under 
consideration. The plaintiff may :slww {hat the defendant had drawn a 
pistol at the time he uttered the word;; complained of; that drfPndant had 
tried to kiss and embrace plaintiff just prior to the defamatory publica-
tion; ot· that defPndant had failed to make a proper investigation before 
publication of thP statrment in quPstion. On cros;;-examination the 
defendant may be questioned ws to his intmt in making the publication." 
(Footnotes and citations omitted.) 
18 E. g., OdgPr's Libel and Slander *271-*288 (1st AmPr. ed. Bigelow 
'1S84; 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 455; 53 C . .T. S. § 213. 
H Cf. Odgd~ Libel and Slander 239 (1st Amer, Pd. Bigelow 1884); 
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the country have long been accepting evidence going to the 
editorial processes of the media without encountering con· 
stitutional objections.1 5 
F. Holt, The Law of Libel 57 (1st Amer. ed. 1818); Billft v. Times-
Democratic Pub. Co., 107 La. 75,32 So. i7 (1902) . 
15 In scores of libel case::; courts have addre;;::;pd the gmeral is::;ue of the 
admissibility of evidence that would be excluded under the editorial process 
privilege as::;erted here and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of 
the evidence on bel}alf of libel plaintiffs. See, e. g., Johmon Pub. Co. v . 
.Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 124 So. 2d 441 (1960) (Editor may be cros::;~examined 
on meaning intended to be conveyed by pa::;::;ages in magazine article); 
Freeman v. Mills, 97 Cal. App. 2d 161, 217 P. 687 (1950) (malice may be 
estctblished by direct. proof of the state of mind of a per::;on, or by evidence 
from which its existence may be inferred); Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 
Cal. 345, 184 P. 672 (1919) (all relevant circurn.;,1:ances concerning publica-
tion admissible); Sandora v. Times Co., 113 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (1931) 
(all relevant. evidence including direct evidence on state of mind or surround-
ing circum::;1ances-city editor and reporter called to ::;tand and ·questioned 
exten::;ively a~ to motives, circumstances of publication, and general prac-
tires); Rire v. Simmons, 2 Har. 309, 31 Am. Dec. 766 (Del. 1837) (when~ 
queHtion of muli0e in issue, declaratione of publisher at the time of publica" 
bon adm1:s:sible as purt of the res gestae); Westem Union Telegraph Co. v. 
Vickers. 71 Ga. App. 204, :30 S. E. 2d 440 (1944) (all relevant Pvidence 
admis::;ible, including direct. evidence of stute of mind and surrounding cir-
cumstance,;); Cook v. East 8hore Neu•spapers, 327111. App. 559, 64 N. E. 2d 
751 (1945) (all relevant evidmce concerning circumstances of publications 
admis::;ible, including te::;timony by reporters and employee::; of defendant); 
Berger v. Freeman Tribune Co., 132 Iowa 290, 109 N. W. 784 (1906) (all 
relevant evidence); Thompson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Mass. 176, 181 
N. E. 249 (1932) (only 'evidence on &iatc of mind of tho::;e agents of defend-
ant entrusted with determining what shall be published is admi8sible and 
material) ; Conroy v. Fall Rive?' Herald News Co., 306 Mass. 488,28 N. E. 
2d 729 (1940) (any relevant evidence on defendant's malice); Cyrowski v. 
Polish American Pub. Co., 196 Mich. 648, 163 N . W. 58 (1917) (testimony 
of inchviduah; who advised reporter to question plaintiff before publishing 
defamatory article wa::; ndmissible on the i::;sue of malicl'); F1'iedell v. 
Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974 (1925) (any relevant 
evidence admissible) ; Cook v. Globe Printing Co .. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W. 
3:32 (1910) (evidence showing that defendant's editorial manager knew an 
importnnt fact to be false udmi~iblc on queHtion of malice); B·utler v. 
GarZ.ettP ru., 119 App. Div. 767, 104 N .. Y .. S. 6:-~7 (1907) (any evidencGl' 
I ' 
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In the face of this history, old and new, the Court of 
Appeals nevertheless declared that two of this Court's cases 
had announced unequivocal protection for the editorial proc-
admis:sible to prove artual malice of defendant); Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N. C. 
377 (1851) (expre;;;.; malice may be proved either uy direct evidence or 
surrounding circumstances); MrBurney v. Times Publishing Co., 93 R. I. 
331, 175 A. 2d 170 (1961) (rPlevant evidPnce admissible to rebut testimony 
by reporters and editor::; tha.t thPy publi:shed without malice); Lancour v. 
Hemld & Globe Ass11., 112 Vt. 471,28 A. 2d 396 (1942) (any relevant evi-
dence on malice); Pan·ar v. Tribune Pub. Co .. 358 P. 2d 792 (Wash. 
1961) (all circumstances surroundmg publication relevant and admissible). 
Similarly, the courts have uniformly admitted ;,:urh evidence on behalf of 
the defrndant. Sre, e. g., Bohan v. Record Pub. Co., 1 Cal. App. 429, 82 P. 
634 (1905) (testimon~· on good faith); Hearne v. De Youny, 119 Cal. 670, 
52 P. 150 (1898) (tr:;timony on sources, precautions taken, and good 
faith); Ballinger v. Democrat Co., 203 Iowa 1095, 212 N. W. 557 (1927) 
(te:;timony of reporter and editor on good faith admissible); Snyder v. 
Tribune Co., 161 Iowa 671, 14a N. W. 519 (1913) (testimony as to :source 
of information and good faith of reporter admissible); Courier Joumal 
Co. v. Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446 (1911) (testimony of reporter 
on good faith); Conner v. Standard Pub. Co., 183 Mass. 474, 67 N. E. 596 
(1903) (testimony as to source of information); Davis v. Marxhausen, 103 
1\llch. 315, 61 N . W. 504 (1894) (testimony on good faith and proper 
precautions taken before publishing); Julian v. K. C. Star Co .. 209 Mo. 35, 
l07 S. W. 496 (1907) (testimony on thoughts and intention:; at the time 
of publication admi:s:sible); Paxton v. Woodward, 31 Mont. 195, 78 P. 215 
(1904) (testimony as to motive, good faith, and sourct>s); Las Vegas Sun, 
Inc . v. Franklin, 74 Nev. 282, 329 P . 2d 867 (1958) (testimony of pub-
li:sher on good fmth); Lindsey v. Evening Journal Assn., 10 N. J. Misc. 
1275, 163 A. 245 (1935) (te:;timony on good faith); Kahn v. P&D Co., 169 
App. Div. 580, 155 N. Y. S. 455 (1915) (source); Hains v. New York 
Eveniug Journal, 204 N. Y. S. 734 (1930) (source); Goodro·w v. Malou.e 
Telegram, 235 App. Div. 3, 255 N. Y. S. 812 (1932) (reporter's testimony 
as to source); Goodrow v. Press Co .. 233 App. Div. 41, 251 N.Y. S. 364 
(1931) (defendant can testify and introduce evidence on his good faith at 
time of publication); Kehoe v. New York Tribune, 229 App. Div. 220, 241 
N. Y. S. 676 (1930) (testimony on good fmth admis:;ible to prevent im-
po:;Jtwn of punitive damage::;); Varvaro v. American Agricu!turist, 222 App. 
D1v. 213, 225 N. Y. S. 564 (1927) (defendant may te;;tify and introduce 
ev1dencr on lack of malice) ; Van Arsdale v. T11ne, /rt{)., 35 N . Y. 8. 2d 
!;)51,. aff 'ci, 265 App. Dtv. 919, 39 N. Y S. 2d 41:3 (1942); Weirhbrodt v. 
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ess. In each of these cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting 
System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94 
( 1973), we invalidated state efforts to pre-empt editorial 
decision by requiring the publication of specified material. 
In Columbia Broadcasting System, it was the requirement 
that a television network air paid political advertisements and 
in Tornillo, a newspaper's obligation to print a political 
candidate's reply to press criticism. Insofar as the laws at 
issue in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting System, sought 
to control in advance the content of the publication. they 
were deemed as invalid as were prior efforts to enjoin publica-
tion of specified materials.10 But holdings that neither the 
tate nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or 
must not be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest 
that the editorial process is immune from any mqmry 
whatsoever. 
It is incredible to believe that the Court in Columbia 
Broadcasting System or in TornilLo silently effected a substan-
tial contraction of the rights preserved to defamation plain-
tiffs in Sullivan, Butts, and like cases. Tornillo and Gertz v. 
New York Evening Joumal , 11 " . Y. S. 2d 112 (Sup. 1939) (defendant 
may te::;tify as to good faith and probable cause); Cleveland Leader 
Printing Co. v. Nethersole. 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N. E. 735 (1911) (tes-
timony on good faith); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P. 
1079 (1914) (defendant's testimony as to lack of malice and source of 
information); Times Pub. Co . v. Ray, 1 S. W. 2d 471, aff'd, 12 S. W. 2d 
165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (te::;timony as to lack of malice); Pfister v. 
Milwaukee Free Press Co., 139 Wis . 627, 121 N. W. 938 (1909) (testimony 
as to absence of malice) . 
None of these case;; as much as suggested that there were special limits 
applicable to tlw press on the d!::;coverability of ::;uch evidence, either 
before or during tnal. 
16 A::; we stated in 'l'ormllo, '' no 'government agency-local, state, or 
federal-can tell a newspa)Jer in advance what it can print and what it 
cannot.'" I d. , at 225-256, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. flurna.n Rela-
:l;ions Comm'n, 413 U.S. 391 (1973) (STHWAI~l', J ., dissenting). 
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Robert Welch, Inc., were announced on the same day; and 
although the Court's opinion in Gertz contained an overview 
of recent developments in the relationship between the First 
Amendment and the law of libel, there was no hint that a 
companion case had narrowed the evidence a.vailable to a 
defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to be 
drawn from the Gertz opinion, since it, like prior First Amend-
ment libel cases, recited without criticism the facts of record 
indicating that the state of mind of the editor had been 
placed at issue. Nor did the Gertz opinion, in requiring proof 
of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant editor 
and in forbidding punitive damages absent at least reckless 
disregard of truth or falsity, suggest that the First Amendment 
also foreclosed direct inquiry into these critical elements.17 
In sum, contra.ry to the views of the Court of Appeals, 
according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a 
media defendant in a libel case is not only not required, 
authorized or presaged by our prior cases, but would tend to 
frustra.te the expectations evidenced by the prior opinions of 
this Court. 
III 
It is nevertheless urged by respondents th8t the balance 
struck in New York Times should now be modified to provide 
further protections for the press when sued for circulating 
erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. It 
is not uncommon or improper, of course, to suggest the aban-
donment, modification, or refinement of existing constitutional 
17 Two yrars later, in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), there 
was likewise no indication that the plaintiff is subject to ~ubstantial e': i-
dcntiary restrictions in proving the defendant's fault. As Mn. JusTICE 
PowELL and Mn. JUS'l'ICE STEWAH'r stated in concurrence, the answer to 
this question of culpability "depends upon a careful consideration of all the 
relevant evidence concerning Time's actions prior to the publication of the 
·milestones' article." They suggested that on remand all the eYidence of 
record should be considered, which included evidence goirg to the beliefs 
Qf Timr's editorial staff. See id, at 467, and n. !i. 
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interpretation, and remarkable developments in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence have evolved from just such submissions. 
But the proponents of innovation bear the burden of per-
suasion, and they have not carried it in this case. 
The Court has recently reiterated its conviction, reflected 
in the law of defamation in all of the States, that the indi-
vidual's interest in his reputa.tion is of basic concern and has 
exhibited its reluctance to interfere with state efforts to 
vindicate that interest. 'Pirne, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 
448, 455-457 (1976). Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U. S., at 
348-349. Here the case for placing beyond reach direct 
evidence of knowing or reckless falsehood, elements critical to 
plaintiffs such as Herbert, is by no means clear and convincing. 
In the first place, it is plain enough that the suggested privi-
lege for the editorial process would constitute a substantial 
interference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff such as 
Herbert to prove his case. As respondents would have it, 
tho defendant 'p, reckless disregard of the truth, a critical 
element, could not be shown by direct evidence through 
Inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and conclus:ons of the 
publisher but could be proved only by objective evidence from 
wh1rh the ultimate fact could be inferred. It may be that 
plaintifi'P will rarely be successful in proving. awareness of 
falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself, but the 
releva11ce of answers to such inquiries, which the District 
Court rC'cognizcd and the Court of Appeals did not deny, can 
hardly be doubted. To erect an impenetrable barrier to the 
plaintiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is a 
matter of some substance, particularly when defendallts them-
selves are prone to assert their good-faith belief in the truth 
of their publications,18 and libel plaintifi's are required to prove 
1' ~ee, e. g., thr ra;;es collected m n. 15, supra, in which m edia defend-
ant::; ns:s'rted, and court::; uphrld, the right to pre::;ent th1s type of evidence 
Ht tnalm order to e::;tablish good fa1th and lack of :nalice. 
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knowing or reckless falsehood with "convincing cla:rity." New· 
York Ti'Jnes v. Sullivan, 37611. S., at 285-286. 
Furthermore, the outer bom1daries of the editorial privilege 
now urged are difficult to perceive. The opinions below did 
not state, and respondents do not explain, precisely when the 
editorial process begins ami when it ends. Moreover. although 
we are told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as 
to what he "knew" and what he had "learned" from his 
interviews. as opposed to what he "believed,'' it is not at all 
clear why the suggested editorial privilege would not cover 
knowledge as well as belief about the veracity of published 
reports. 1 " It is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted 
by respondents \Vould immunize from inquiry the internal 
communications occurring during the editorial process and 
thus place beyond reach what the defendant participants 
learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversations 
or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues are to 
be barred from evidence, would a reporter's admissions made 
to third parties not participating in the editorial process also 
be immune fron1 inquiry'? We thus have little doubt that 
Herbert and other defamation plaintiffs have important in-
terests at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted 
privilege. 
Nevertheless, we are urged by respondents to override these 
important interests because requiring disclosure of editorial 
conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the verac-
ity of the material he has gathered will have an intolerable 
10 It was also suggeilted at oral argument that the privilege would cover 
queiltmm; in the ''why" form, but not of the "who," "what," "when," and 
"where" type. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 32-34. But it IS evident from Lando's 
deposition thnt questionH soliciting "why" an~wers rrlating to thr editorial 
prores~; wrre answered, e. g., Tr. of Deposition 21, L. 7; 1892, L. 18, and 
that he refused to an;;wer other:,; that did not fall into this category, e. g., 
Tr. of Deposition 666, L. 20; 774, L. 5 ; 877 L. 12; 880, L. 5; 1488, L .• 3; 
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chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decision-
making. But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of 
damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless false-
hoods, those effects are precisely those that our cases have 
held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Spreading 
false information in and of itself carries no First Amendment 
credentials. 
Realistically, however, some error is inevitable; and the 
difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the Court 
in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit 
liability to instances where some degree of culpability is 
present in order to eliminate the risk of self-censorship and 
the suppression of truthful material. Those who publish 
defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability, how-
ever, are subject to liability, the a.im being not only to com-
pensate for injury but also to deter publication of unprotected 
material threatening injury to individual reputation. Per-
mitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by 
direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the 
balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in 
liability for damages which in turn discourages the publication 
of erroneous infonnation known to be false or probably false, 
this is no more than what our cases contemplate and does not 
abridge either freedom of speech or of the press. 
Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the 
suppression not only of information known or strongly sus-
pected to be unreliable but also of truthful information, the 
issue would be quite different. But as we have said, our cases 
necessarily contemplate examination of the editorial process 
to prove the necessary awareness of probable falsehood, and 
if indirect proof of this element does not stifle truthful pub-
lication and is consistent with the First Amendment, as 
respondents seem to concede. we do not understand how direct 
inquiry with respect to the ultimate issue would be substan-
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tially more suspect.20 Perhaps such examination will lead to 
liability that would not have been found without it, but this 
does not suggest that the determinations in these instances 
will be inaccurate and will lead to the suppression of protected 
information. On the contrary, direct inquiry from the actors, 
which affords the opportunity to refute inferences that might 
otherwise be drawn frorn circumstantial evidence, suggests 
that more accurate results will be obtained by placing al'l, 
rather than part, of the evidence before the decisionmaker. 
Suppose, for example, that a reporter has two contradictory 
reports about the plaintiff, one of which is false and damaging, 
and only the false one is published. In resolving the issue 
whether the publication was known or suspected to be false, 
it 1s only common sense to believe that inquiry from the 
publisher, with an opportunity to explain, will contribute to 
accuracy. If the publication is false but there is an exoner-
ating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this 
effect.t1 Why should not the plaintiff be permitted to inquire 
before trial '? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact had 
serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless, no 
forbidden self-censorship will result from permitting the rele-
vant inquiry. Only kr:owing or reckless error will be discour-
aged; and unless there is to be an absolute First Amendment 
privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless conduct, which 
respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be 
threateued. 
1 t is also urged that frank discussion among reporters and 
editors will be dampened and sound editorial judgment en,... 
20 The kind of question respondents 10eek to avoid answering is, by their 
own admi10siou, the ea10iest to an::;wer. S~P Tr. of Orai Arg., at 31: 
'' ·[TJhey are l:iet-up que3hons for our 101de. . . . [TJhese are not dif-
hcult questions to answer. " 
21 Often it il:i the libel defendant who firl:it prel:ients at trial d1rect evidence 
about the editorial proce l:i m order to el:itablil:ih good faith and lack of 
mahce. That wal:i true in New York Times v. Sullivan, l:iee, e. g., Record 
7.!i2, and 111 many of tbe (•ase~:> c1ted i:n n. 15, supra. 
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dangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject to 
inquiry by defamation plaintiffs. 22 We do not doubt the 
direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the 
one hand and sound decisions on the other; but whether or 
not there is liability for the injury, the press has an obvious 
interest in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication 
of false information, and it is not unreasonable to expect 
the media to invoke whatever procedures that may be prac-
ticable and useful to that end. Moreover, given exposure to 
liability when there is knowing or reckless error, there is even 
more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as 
a frank interchange of fact and opinion. Accordingly, we find 
it difficult to believe that error-avoiding procedures will be 
terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for cul-
pable error and because the editorial process will itself be 
examined in the tiny percentage of instances in which error 
is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is there sound reason 
to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial process 
are so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunder-
standing that they should be immune from examination in 
order to avoid erroneous judgments in defamation suits. The 
evidentiary burden Herbert must carry is substantial indeed, 
and we are unconvinced that his cha.uces of winning an 
undeserved verdict are such that an inquiry into what Lando 
learned or said during editorial process must be foreclosed. 
This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges 
have ro constitutional protection from casual inquiry. There 
is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or. 
official examination merely to satisfy curiosity or to serve 
some general end such as the public interest; and if there 
were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First 
22 They invoke our observation in Umted .States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
68:1, 705 (1974) : "Those who expect public dissemination of their remarks 
may well temper candor with a concern for appearance and for their own 
interests to the detriment of the decisionmaking proce::;::;." 
.. 
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Amendment is presently construed. No such problem exists 
here, however, where there is a specific claim of injury arising 
from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or 
recklessly false . 
Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favored/ 3 and 
even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper 
circumstances. The President, for example, does not have an 
absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed 
for a judicial proceeding. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683 (1974). In so holuing, we found that although the 
President has a powerful interest in confidentiality of com-
munications between himself anu his advisers, that interest 
must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence. As 
we stated, in referring to existing limited privileges against 
disclosure, " [ w] hatever their origins, these exceptions to the 
demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor 
expansively construed. for they -are in derogation of the search 
for truth." !d., at 710. 
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the 
present construction of the First Amendment should not be 
modified by creating the evidentiary privilege which the 
respondents now urge. 
IV 
Although defamation litigation. including suits against the 
press, is an ancient phenomenon. it is true that our cases from 
New York Times to Gertz have considerably changed the 
profile of such cases. In years gone by, plaintiffs made out a 
prima facie case by proving the damaging publication. Truth 
~a See Elkins v. United States , :3ti4 F. S. 206, 2:{4 ( 1960) (Frankfurter, 
.J.). '·Limitation8 are properly placed upon the opPrahon of th1s general 
principlr I of no trstimonial privilege] on!~· to thr ver~· limited extrnt that 
perm1ttmg a rcfu;;al to t~tif~· or excluding relevant c•videnre ha~ a public 
good t ran~eending tlw normal!~· prPdominant prineiplr of utilizing all 
ratwual mPan~ for aJScertaining truth. " Ser al~o R .J . Wigmorr, Evidrnre 
§ 2HJ2 (:\-Ir?\aughton reY . 1961) ; 4 The Work~ of JNemy Hrutham 321 
(J, Bowring ed. 1 43) • 
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a.nd privilege were defenses. Intent, motive and malice were 
not necessarily involved except to counter qualified privilege 
or to prove exemplary dama.ges. The plaintiff's burden is 
now considerably expanded. In every or almost every case, 
the plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a 
false publication attended by some degree of culpability on 
the part of the publisher. If plaintiffs in consequence now 
resort to more discovery, it would not be surprising; and it 
would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of 
litigation have escalated and become much more troublesome 
for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is suggested that the 
press needs constitutional protection from these burdens if it 
is to perform its task, 24 which is indispensable in a system 
such as ours. 
Creating a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry 
into the editorial process. however, would not cure this prob-
lem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability 
from defamation would effect this result, and the Court has 
regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the 
First Arpendment. Furthermore, ( mushrooming litigation 
costs, much of it due to pre-trial discovery, are not peculiar 
to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated ex-
pressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, 
and voices from this Court have joined the chorus.25 But 
21 It is urged that the large costs of defending lawsuits will intimidate 
the press and lead to self-censor:ship, particularly where smaller newspapers 
u.nd broadcasters are ·involved . It is no1ed that Lando's deposition alone 
continued intermittently for over a year, filled 26 volumes containing 
nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits. As well as out-of-pocket expenses 
of the deposition, there were substantial legal fees, and Lando and his 
associates were diverted from news gathering and reporting for a significant 
amount of time. 
2b Blue Chip ~tamps v. Manor Dr·ug Stores. 421 U. S. 72:3, 740-741 
(1975); ACF lndu.stries, Inc. 1' . EEOC, - U. S. - (1979) (PowELL, 
S•rEWAR1' and REHNQUIS'f, .JJ ., di:s:senting from denial of certiorari); 
Burger: Agenda. for 2000 A. D.: A Need for Systematic Anticipation, The 
Pound Conference, 70 F . R. D. 76, 95-96 (1976). The Committee on 
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until and unless there are major changes in the present rules 
of civil procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact and 
in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse. 
The Court has more than once declared that the deposition-
discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treat-
ment to effect their purpose of adequately infonning the 
litigants in civil trials. Schlaqenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 
114-115 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 501, 507 
(1947). But the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of Rule 
1 that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." (Emphasis 
added.) To this end, the requirement of Rule 26 (b) (1) that 
the material sought in discovery be "relevant" should be 
firmly applied, and the district courts should not neglect their 
power to restrict discovery where "justice requires [protection 
for] a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres.: 
sion, or undue burden or expense. . . ." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 
26 (c). With this authority at hand, judges should not 
hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery 
process. 
Whether, as a nonconstitutional matter, however, the trial 
judge properly applied the rules of discovery was not within 
the boundaries of the question certified under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1292 (b) and accordingly is not before us.. The judgment of 
the Court of Appeals is reversed .. 
So ordered. 
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Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, ] On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
Barry Lando et al. peals for the Second Circuit. 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
Respondents are representatives of the news media. They 
are defendants in a libe1 action brought by petitioner, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Anthony Herbert (U. S. Army, Ret.) , who is 
concededly a public figure. Respondents asserted in District 
Court an "editorial privilege" to shield from discovery infor-
mation that would reveal decisions involved in their editorial 
processes. The District Court rejected this privilege, holding 
that, because of his difficult burden of proof, "a ·'public figure' 
plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to liberal inter-
pretation of the rules concerning pre-trial discovery." App. 
to Petition , at 62a. 
The Court of Appeals reversed. It grouped the discovery 
inquiries objected to by respondents into five categories: 
"1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investi-
gations regarding people or leads to 'be pursued, or 
not to be pursued, in connection with the '60 Min-
utes' segment and the Atlantic Monthly article; 
"2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by inter-
viewees and his state of mind with respect to the 
veracity of persons interviewed; 
"3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that 
he did reach a conclusion concerning the veracity of 
persons, information or events; 
"4. Conversations between Lando and Walla.ce about 
matter to be included or excluded from the broadcast 
publication; and 
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"5. Lanuo's intentions liS manifested by his decision to 
include or exclude certain material." 568 F. 2d 974, 
983 (CA2 1977) (Kaufman, C. J.). 
The Court of Appeals stateu that "the issue presented by this 
ease is whether. and to what extent, inquiry into the editorial 
process, conducted during discovery in a New York Times v. 
Sullivan type libel action, impermissibly burdens the work 
of reporters and broadcasters." Id., at 979. The Court of 
Appea.Is concluded : 
" If we were to allow selective disclosure of how a journal-
1St formulated his judgments on what to print or not to 
print, we would be condoning judicial review of the 
editor's thought processes. Such an inquiry, which on 
its face would be virtually boundless, endangers a consti-
tutionally protected realm, and unquestionably puts a 
freeze on the free interchange of ideas within the news-
room." !d., at 980. · 
The Court of Appeals held that all five categories of information 
sought by petitioner were shielded by an editorial privilege. 
The holding of the Court of Appeals presents a novel and 
difficult question of ]a w. Rule 26 (b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that "Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action . . . . " (Em-
phasis supplied.) · The instant case is brought under diversity' 
JUrisdiction, 28 U. S. C. "§ 1332 (a), and Rule 501 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence states that "in civil actions and 
proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense 
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the 
privilege of a witness [or] per&on .. . shall be determined in 
accordance with State law." Although New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964), placed constitutional limits 
on state libel claims, it did not itself create a federal cause of 
action for libel. The "rule of decision" in this case, therefore, 
ls defined by state law. There is no contention, however, that 
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applicable state law encompasses an editorial privilege. Thus 
if we were to create and apply such a privilege, it would have 
to be constitutionally grounded, as, for example, is executive 
privilege, see United Stales v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), or 
the privilege against self-incrimination. See McCarthy v. 
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924). 
This case must be approached from the premise that pre-
trial discovery is normally to be "accorded a broad and liberal 
treatment,'' Hickma.n v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 507 (1947), 
and that judicial creation of evidentiary privi.leges is generally 
to be discouraged. We have in the past, however, recognized 
evidentiary privileges in order to protect "interests and rela-
tionships which ... are regarded as of sufficient social im-
portance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts 
needed in the administration of justice." McCormick, Evi-
dence 156 (Clea.rly, ed. 1972). For example, Hickrnan v. 
Taylor, supra, created a qualified privilege for attorneys' work 
products because, without such a privilege, tl[t]he effect on 
the legal profession would be demoralizing." Id., at 511. 
Similarly, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957), 
recognized a· qualified "informer's privilege" for "the further-
ance and protection of the public interest in effective law 
enforcement." !d., at 59. 
The inquiry to be pursued, therefore, is whether the crea-
tion of an editorial privilege would so further the purposes 
and goals of the constitutional scheme as embodied in the 
First Amendment, as to justify "some incidental sacrifice" of 
evidentiary material. This inquiry peed not reach an inflex-
ible result: the justifications for an editorial privilege may 
well support only a qualified privilege which, in appropriate 
instances, must yield to the requirements of "the administra~ 
tion of justice."' 
I 
Justice Brandeis reminded us over a half century ago that 
'Those who won our independence • . . valued liberty botO. 
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as an end and as a means." 1 Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 
357, 375 ( 1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In its instru-
mental aspect, the First Amendment serves to foster -the 
values of democratic self-government. This is true in several 
senses. The First Amendment bars the State from imposing 
upon its citizens an authoritative vision of truth. 2 It "forbids 
1 Freedom of speech is itl>elf an end because the human community is 
in large measure defined through speech; freedom of speech is then•fore 
intrinsic t.o individual dignity. This is particula.rly so in a democracy 
like our own, m which the autonomy of each. individual is accorded equal 
and incommensurate respect . As the Court stated in Cohen v. California, 
403 u.s. 15, 25 (1971) : 
"The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a 
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended -to 
remove governmental re:;tra.ints from the arena. of public discussion, put-
ting the deci~:~;on as t.o what. vit>ws shall be voiced largely into the hands 
of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately pro-
duce a more capable citizt>DI'Y and more perfect polity and in the belief 
t.hat no other approach would comport with the premise of individual 
dignity and choice upon which our political system re;,-ts." 
Re~pondt>nts properly do not rest their argmnents for an editorial pri-
vilege on the value of individual self-expression. So grounded, an ~di­
torial privilege might not. stop short of shielding all speech. 
~As Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr., stated in 1946: 
' 'The F1rst, Amendm!:'nt prot!:'cts . .. a social interest in the attainment 
of truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of 
action but carry it out in the wisest way. . . . Truth can be sifted out 
from falsehood only if the government ii:i vigorou~Sly and constantly cross-
examined . . .. " Z. Chaffee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (19i16). 
Justice Holmes gave thh; social value a broader and more theoretical 
lormuhttion : 
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical. If you l1ave no doubt of your premises or your power a.nd want 
a rertain rrsult with all your heart you naturally express your wi~Shes in 
1a"· and sw<rep away all opposition. . . . But. when men have realized 
t.hat timP bas np~:>-et. many fighting faiths, they ma.y come to believe even 
'll10l't> than they belit>ve the very foundations of th!:'ir own conduct that 
th!:' ultimate good desired is better reaeht>d by free trade in ideas-that 
thr best test of truth it> the power of thought to get itself accepted in the 
l()()mpetition of the market , and that truth is the only ground upon which 
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the State from interfering with the communicative processes 
through which its citizens exercise and prepare to exercise 
their rights of self-government.8 And the Amendment shields 
those who would censure the State or expose its abuses."' 
their wishes safely can be carried out. That a.t any rate is the theory of 
our Constitution. It. is an, experiment, as all life is an experiment .... 
While that exprriment is pan of our system I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant. against attempts to check the expression of opinions 
that we loathe and believe to be fraught with dea.t.h, unless they so immi-
nently t hre1tten immediate interference with the lawful and pres&1ng pur-
pot;es of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." 
.Abm11'!.3 v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J ., 
dissentmg) . 
See Red Lion Broadcl18ting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
8 "Just ~o far as, at. any point, the citizens who are to decide a.n issue 
are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief 
or criticJ,;m which i:s relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be 
ill-con::::idered, ill-balanct'd planning for the general good. It is that mutila-
tiO'fl of the thinking process of the community against which the First 
.Amendment to the rort.Stitution is directed. The principle of the freedom 
of spet•ch springs from the necessities of the program of tit'lf-government. 
It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the abstract. It is a deduc~ 
lion from the ba.:-;ic American agreement tha.t public issues shall be d~ 
cidE>d by universal suffrage." A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The 
Com..tit.uhonaJ Power~ of t.he People 27 (1965). 
See Virginia Pharmacy Board"· Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 
765 (1976) , Brennan, The Supreme Court and tht1 Meiklejohn Interpre-
ta tiOn of t1HI First Ami>ndment, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (196:5) . 
4 See Bla::;i, The Checking Value of the First Amendment, 1977 Am. 
Bar. Fouud. Res. ,J. 521. Lord Erskine, while defending Thomas Paine ·in 
l1is trial for srditious libel, offered a compact and eloquent statement of 
t his pORJtion : 
' 'Gentlemen, I have in::;isted, at great length, upon the origin of govern-
ment~, and detmled the authorities which you have heard upon the sub-
iPct , because I consider it to be not only an essential support, but the 
very Joundat10n of the liberty of the press . If Mr. Burke be right in his 
prmc1pleH of government, I admit that the press, in my sense of its fr~ 
dam, ough1 not to be free , nor free m any sense at all; and that all 
addresses to the people upon the subjects of government, and all specula. 
tions of amendment , of what kind or nature soever, are illegal and crimi· 
.•. 
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These various senses can sometimes weave together, as can be 
seen in the letter of 1774 addressed by the First Continental 
Congress ~o the inhabitants of Quebec, listing the rights "a 
profligate [English] Ministry are now striving, by force of 
arms, to ravish from us": 
"The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom 
of the press. . The importance of this consists, besides 
the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in 
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the ad-
ministration of Government, its ready communication of 
thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promo~ 
tion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers 
nal; since if the people have, without possible re-call, delegated all their 
authorities, they have no jurisdiction to act, and therefore none to think 
or wnte upon such ~ubjects; and it would be a 1ibel to arraign govern-
ment or any of its acts, before those who have no jurisdiction to cor-
rect them . But on the oth~'r hand . . . no legal argument can shake 
the freedom of the press in my sense of it, if I am supported in my doc-
trine:> concerning the great unalienable right of the people to reform or to 
change their governments. It is because the liberty of the press resolves 
itself into this great i:;sue, that it has been in every country the last 
liberty which subject~:~ have been able to wrest from power. Other liber-
ties are held under governments, but the liberty of opinion keeps govern-
ment~ them:;rlves in due ~ubjection to their duties." Speeches of Lord 
Erskine 524-525 (J. High, ed. 1876). 
Thb position i~ often predicated upon a natural adversity between the 
government and the press . See A. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 80--88 
(1975) . In Mills v. Alabama, "384 U. S. 214, 219 (1966), for example, 
we stated : 
" [T]he pre:ss serves and was de:>igned to serve as a. powerful antidote to 
any abuses of power by governmental officials and as a constitutionally 
chosen means for keeping official:; elected by the people responsible to all 
the people whom they were selected to serve. Suppression of the right 
of the pres~ to prmse or critJCize governmental agents and to clamor and 
contend for or against change . . . muzzles one of the very agencies the 
Framer::; of our Constitntion thoughtfully and deliberately selected' t01 
lmpt:ow Ql;lr :societ~: an<:!, E:eep i.t fr.ee· , . 
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are shamed or intimidated, into more honourable and 
just modes of conducting affairs." 5 
Although the various senses in which the First Amendment 
serves democratic values will in different contexts demand 
distinct emphasis and development, they share the common 
characteristic of being instrumental to the attainment of social 
ends. It is a great mistake to understand this aspect of the 
First Amendment solely though the filter of individual rights.0 
This is the meaning of our cases permitting a litigant to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute as overbroad under 
the First Amendment if the statute "prohibits privileged 
exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the record 
discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged con-
duct.'' NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415. 432 (1963). Our 
reasoning is that First Amendment freedoms "are delicate and 
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society," id., 
at 433, and that a litigant should therefore be given standing 
to assert this more general social interest in the "vindication 
of freedom of expression." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 
479, 487 (1965). See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 
97-98 ( 1940). It is also the mea.ning of the "actual malice" 
standard set forth in New York 'Pimes Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 
at 279-280. Even though false information may have no 
intrinsic First Amendment worth, St. Amant v. Thompson, 
390 U. S. 727, 732 (1968), a.nd even. though a particular 
defendant may have published false information, his freedom 
of expression is nevertheless protected in the absence of actual 
5 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774) . 
6 " II)t i~ useless to define free speech by talk about rights . The agita-
lor asserts his constitutional right to speak, the government asserts it;; 
ronstitutional right to wage war. The result is a deadlock. . . . The true 
boundary linf' of the Fir::;t Amf>ndment can be fixed only when Congre;;s 
and the court:-; realize that the principle on which speech is classified as 
lawful or unlawful involwi> the balancing against each other of two very 
'important ;;ocial interf'st:;, in public ~afety and in the search for truth.''~ 
'Chafee, supra, n. 2, at 31, 35. 
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malice because "to insure the ascertainment and publication 
of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that the First 
Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as 
true ones." lbid.1 
In recognition of the social values served by the First 
Amendment, our decisions have referred to "the right of the 
public to receive suitable access to social. political. e·sthetic, 
moral, and other ideas and experience." Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis sup-
plied), and to "the circulation of information to which the 
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutio11al guaranties." 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250 (1936) 
(emphasis supplied). In 'l'irne, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.-s. 374 
(1967), we stated that the guarantees of the First Amendment 
"are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit 
of all of us. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures 
the maintenance of our political system and an open society." 
ld. , at 389. 
The editorial privilege claimed by respondents must be 
carefully analyzed to determine whether its creation would 
significantly further these social values recognized by -our 
prior decisions. In this anaJysis it is relevant to note that 
respondents are representatives of the communications me_dia, 
7 In an analogous mannE>r the Court has, over m~' strong protest, 
analyzed the exclusionar~ · ruiP a!l permitting a defendant to assert social 
interest~ that do not reduce to hi:; personal rights: 
' 'The primary justification for the exclu:;ionary rule then ill the deter-
rencP of police conduct that violates Fourth AmendmPnt right:;. Po~:~t­
Mapp dl'ciNion:; hav(' e::;tablish('d that the rule is not a per~:~onal con:;titu-
tiOnal right. It is not calculat('d to rPdr('~s the injury to th(' privacy of 
the victim of tlJP :;earch or seizure, for any '[r-l('paration comes too late.' 
£mkletter Y. WaU·er, H81 U. S. 618, 637 (1965) . Instead, 
' the rule 1:> a judicially created remedy d('Signt'd to safeguard Fourth 
Amendment nghts generally through its deterrent effect . . . .' Unitea 
~tates v. Calandra, [414 U: S. 338, 348 (1974)].' ' Stone. v Powell, 42iL 
u. s 465, 484 (1976) . 
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and that the ''press and broadcast media," Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 343 (1974),8 have played a domi-
nant and essential role in serving the "information function," 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 705 (1972), protected by 
the First Amendment. "The press cases emphasize the special 
and constitutionally recognized role of that institution in 
informing and educating the public, offering criticism, and 
providing a forum for discussion and debate." First National 
Bank of Bosto·n v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978).~ "The 
newspapers, magazines and other journals of the country, it is 
safe to say, have shed and continue to shed, more light on the 
public and business affairs of the nation than any othe~ in-
strumentality of publicity; and since informed public opinion 
is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the 
suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free 
press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern.'1 
Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, at 250. An editorial 
privilege would thus not be personal to respondents, but would 
shield the press in its function "as an agent of the public at 
large. . . . The press is the necessary representative of the 
public's interest in this context and the instrumentality which 
effects the public's right." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
417 U. 8. 843, 86~864 (1974) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
8 Compare New York Tim es Cu. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (1964): 
'"ln Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564, 575, this Court held the utterances of 
a federal official to be absolutely privileged if made 'within the outer 
perimeter of his duties.' . . . Analogous considerations support the privi-
Jege fo'r the citizerv-critic of government. It is as much his duty to 
rnticize as it is fhe official's duty to administer." (Emphasis supplied.) 
~~' Of course, "the press does not have a monopoly on either the First 
Amendment or fhe ability to enlighten.'' First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti. supra, at 782. "The information function asserted by representa-
tives of the organized press .. . is also performed by lecturers, political 
pollster~:~, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any 
author may quite accurately assert that he i::; contributing to the flow of 
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II 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S: 241 
(1974), struck down as undue interference with the · editorial 
process a Florida statute granting a political candidate a tight 
to equal space to reply to criticisms of his record by a 
newspaper, 
"Even if a newspaper would iace no additional costs. to 
comply with a compulsory access law and would not be 
forced to forgo publication of news or opinion by the 
inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails to clear the 
barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion 
into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than 
a passive Feceptacle or conduit for news, comment, and 
advertising. The choice of material to go into a news-
paper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the 
size and content of the paper, and treatment of public 
issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-consti-
tute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It 
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation 
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with 
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have 
evolved to this time." !d., at 258. 
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,· 413 
U.S. 376, 391 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
Democratic National Committee; 412 U. S. 94, 120, 12~125 
(1973) . · Through the editorial process expression is com-
posed ; to regula.te the process is therefore to regulate the 
expression. ·The autonomy of the speaker is thereby compro-
mised, whether that speaker is a large urban newspaper or 
an individual pamphleteer .. ·The print and broadcast media, 
however, because of their large organizational structure, cannot 
·exist without some form of editorial process. · ·The. protection 
of the editorial process of these institutions thus becorpes a . 
matter of particular First Amendment concerh.10 , ''! 
----- \ 
10 This is not of course to imply that the· editorial ·process of perso~s or· 
\ 
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There is in this case, however, no direct government regula-
tion of respondents' editorial process. But respondents argue 
that disclosure of their editorial process will increase the like-
lihood of large damage judgments in libel actions and will 
thereby discourage participants in that process.11 Respond-
ents' reasoning is at least superficially consonant with that of 
New York 'Pirnes, which stated: "What a State may not 
constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is 
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear 
of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the 
Alabama courts here ma.y be markedly more inhibiting than 
the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." 37~ U. 8., 
at 277. Of course New York Times set forth a substantive 
sta.ndard defining that speech unprotected by the First Amend-
ment, and respondents' editorial process cannot be shielded 
merely so as to block judicial determination of whether re-
spondents have in fact engaged in such speech. Our inquiry, 
therefore, becomes the nature and reach of the editorial 
process sought to be protected, the independent First Amend-
ment values servt>d by that editorial process, and the extent 
to which the exposure of that process would impair these 
First Amendment values. 
im;tltutions other than the communications media does not merit Fi:rst 
Amendment protection. 
11 The editorial process could be inhibited in other ways as well. For 
example, public figures might bring harassment suit~; against tht> media 
In order to use discovery to uncover aspects of the editorial proce~;s which, 
if publicly revealed, would prove embarrassing to the press. In differ-
ent contexts other First Amt>ndment values might be affected. If sued 
by a powerful political figure, for example, journalists might fear reprisals 
for information disclosed during discovery. Cf. Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Pl'ess v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,- U. S. 
App. D . C. -, - F. 2d - (1978). Such a chilling effect might par-
ticularly impact on the press's ability to perform its "checking" function. 
See n. 4, supra. In the instant ca~;e, however, petitioner is not such a 
public official, nor are respondents claiming to be suffering the effert~:~ of 
·~uch a chill. 
{ .. 
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In Tor·nillo we defined the editorial process in a functional 
wanuer. as that process whereby the content and format of 
publishE>d material is selected. The Co~rt of Appeals belo,\· 
identified two aspects of this process. The first concems 
"th<-" mental processes of the press regarding 'choice of ma-
trrial' • • • /~ 568 F . 2d. at 995 (Oakes, J .) . · This aspect 
encompasses a11 editor's subjective "thought processes," his 
" thoughts. opillions and conclusions." ld., at 980, 984 (Kauf-
mau , C. J .). The Court of Appeals concluded that if discovery 
wer·e permitted conceming this ·aspect of the editorial process, 
journalists ''would. be chilled in the very process of thought.'' 
ld , at !184, 
I find this co11clusion implausible. Since a journalist can-
not work without such mternal thought processes, the only 
way this aspect of the editorial process can be chilled is by a 
journalist ceasing to work altogether. Given the exceedingly 
generous standards of J\'eU' York Times, this seems unlikely. 
Moreover, .'\r ew York 'L'·irnes removed First Ameqdment protec-
tion from defamatory falsehood published with actual malice-
in knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.12 Subsequent 
rlecisions have made clear that actual malice turns on a 
journalist's "subjective awareness of probable falsity. " Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc ., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 6 (1974) . ft 
would be anomalous to turn substantive liability on a journal-
ist's subjective attitude and at the same time to shield from 
disclosure the most direct evidence of that attitude. There 
will be, of course, jourualists at the margin-those who have 
some awareness of the probable falsity of their work but not. 
euough to constitute actual malice-who might be discouraged 
from publication. But this chill emanates chiefly from the-
'" Elemem~ of pP1itiorwr'~ complaint appear to ~et forth a claim for 
invasion of privacy See 'l'ime, inc. v. Hill, 3R5 U. S. 374 (1967) . The 
ea:<e ha~ comt• to tht.." Co11rt framed a~ a libel act10n, however, and l;:;hitll 
':iO COili"ldt'r if. 
.. 
J 
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~Substantive standard of New York Times, 11ot from the absence 
of au editorial privilege. 
The second aspect of the editorial privilege identified by 
the Court of Appeals involves "the free interchange of ideas 
within the newsroom,'' 568 F. 2d, at 980 (Kaufman, C. J.), 
"the relationship among editors;'' ld., at 993 (Oakes, J.) . 
The Court concluded that "'[iJdeas expressed in co11versations, 
memoranda, hamlwritten notes a11d the like, if discoverable, 
would in the futme 'likely' lead to a more muted, less vigorous 
and creative give-and-take in the editorial room." ld., at. 
993- 994. "A reporter or editor, aware that his thoughts might 
have to be justified itt a court of law. would often be 
discouraged aJld dissuaded from the creative verbal testing, 
probing, and discussion of hypotheses and alternatives which 
are the sine qua rum of responsiblP joumalism." I d., at 980 
(Kaufman, C J ). 
An editorial privilege pwtecti11g this aspect of the editorial 
IJrocess would essentially be analogous to the executive privi-
lege which shields the "advisory opinions, recommendations 
and deliberations .. . by which governmental decisions and 
policies are formulated.' ' Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V. E'. B. Carl 
Zeiss, lena., 40 F. R. D. 318, 324 (DC 1966). As our cases 
interpreting exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, 
5 H. S. G § 552 (b)( 5), make clear, this privilege would not 
protect merely "factual'' material, but only "deliberative or 
policymaking processes." EPA v. Mink, 410 U. S. 73, 89 
( 1973). The rationale for this privilege was succinctly stated 
ln United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974): "Humau 
experience teaches that those who expect public dissemiuation 
of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for 
appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of 
the decisioumaking process." 
The same rationale applies to respondents' proposed edi-
torial privilege. Just as the possible political consequences 
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within the Executive Branch, see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975), so the possibility of future libel 
judgments might well dampen full and candid discussion 
among editors of proposed publications. Just as impaired 
communication "clearly" affects "the quality" of executive 
decisionmaking, ibid., so too muted discussion during the 
editorial process will affect the quality of result1ng publica-
tions. Those editors who have doubts might remain silent; 
those who would prefer to follow other investigative leads 
might be restrained; those who would otherwise counsel cau-
tion might hold their tongues. In short, in the absence of 
such an editorial privilege the accuracy, thoroughness, pro-
fundity of consequent publica.tions might well be diminished. 
Such a diminution would affect First Amendment values. 
The AmetH.lment embraces the public's iHterest iu "accurate 
and eft'ective reporting by the 'news media." Saxbe v. · W asb.-
inyton Post . Co., 417 U. S. 843, 863 (1974) (PowELL, J., 
dissenting). "Those who won our independence had confidence 
in the power of free and fearless reasoning and communication 
of ideas to discover and spread political and economic truth ....• 
Abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press .. : impairs 
those opportunities for public education that are essential to 
effective exercise of the power of correcting error through the 
processes of popular government." 13 · Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940). Respondent is concededly a public 
figure; " [ o] ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial· inter-
est in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press 
to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in 
public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case oi 
'public officials.' " Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 
130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J .. concurring in result). To the-
extent coverage of such figures· becomes fearful and inhibited,.. 
1~ Were the plaintiff in this cnst• a public official intent upon using dis-
covery to iritimiclate the press, other First Amendment values might welt 
be implieated. See n. 10, supra. 
j : l 
77- 1105-DISSENT 
HERBERT v. LANDO 15 
to the extent the accuracy, effectiveness, and thoroughness of 
such coverage is undermined, the social values protected by 
the First Amendment suffer abridgment. 
I find compelling these justifications for the existence of an 
editorial privilege. The values at issj.le are sufficiently im-
portant to justify some incidental sacrifice of evidentiary 
material. The reasoning supporting this privilege is, of course, 
essentially varadoxical. For the sake of more accurate infor-
mation, the possible inaccuracies of the press are shielded from 
diselosure; in the name of a more responsible press, the legal 
restrai11ts by which it is bound are made more difficult to 
apply. The same paradox, however, inheres in the concept of 
an executive privilege: so as to enable the government more 
effectively to implement the will of the people, the people are 
kept in ignorance of the workings of their government. The 
paradox is unfortunately intrinsic to our social condition. 
Judgment is required to evaluate and balance these competing 
perspectives, 
Judgment is also required to accommodate the tension 
between society's "pervasive and strong interest in preventing 
and redressing attacks upon reputation," Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
383 U. R. 75, 86 (1966). and the First Amendment values that 
would be served by au editorial privilege. In my view this 
tension is too fine to be resolved in the abstract. As is the 
case with executive privilege, there must be a more specific 
balaucing of the particular interests asserted in a given law-
suit. A general claim of executive privilege, for example, will 
not stand against a "demonstrated, specific need for evi-
dence . , .. " United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 713 
(1974). Conversely, a general statement of need will not 
prevail over a concrete demonstration of the necessity for 
executive secrecy. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U. S. 1, 11 
(1953). Other evidentiary privileges are similarly dependent 
upon the particular exigencies demonstrated in a specific 
Tawsu1t. Rovia:ro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53 (1957) , for 
.. 
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example, held that the existence of an informer's privilege 
depends "on thf> particular circumstances of each case, taking 
into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the 
possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other 
relevant factors." ld., at 62. Hickrna:n v. 'Paylor, 329 U. S. 
495 (1947), similarly required ad hoc balancing to determine 
the existence of an attorneys' work product privilege. 
In my judgment the existence of a privilege protecting the 
editorial process must, in an analogous manner, be determined 
with reference to the circumstances of a particular case. In 
the area of libel, the balance struck by New York 1'irne8 
between the values of the ·:First Amendment and society's 
interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation 
must be preserved. This can best be accomplished if the 
privilege functions to shield the editorial process from general 
claims of damaged reputation. If, however, a public figure 
plaintiff is able to establish. to the prima facie satisfaction of 
a trial judge, tha.t the publication at issue constitutes defama-
tory falsehood,14 the claim of damaged reputation becomes 
specific and demonstrable, and the editorial privilege must 
yield .1 r- Requiring a public figure plaintiff to make a prima 
facie showing of defan1a.tory falsehood will not constitute an 
undue burden, since he must eventually demonstrate these 
elements as part of his case-in-chief. 1~ And since editorial 
privilege protects only deliberative and policymaking processes 
14 Sef' 01'Penbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn. v. B1·esler, 398 U. S. 6 
~ W70) . 
J:r. I do not rearh the case in which tt media. defendant has more specific 
xnd <"oncrete · interests at Htake. See nn. 10 and 12, sup?'a. Nor do I 
rrach the ra:se in which a litigant with more weighty interests than a civil 
phunt iff attemptJS to overcome a rlaim of editorial privilege. See, e. g., 
Associated Press v. NLRB. 301 U. S. 103 (1937); Associated Press v. 
United 8ta.tes, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) . 
10 A plaintiff can make hiEt prima facie showing us part of hh; motion 
for an order compelling discovery under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of 
tivil Procedure, or at any other appropriate time. 
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and not factual material, discovery should be adequate to 
acquire the relevant evidence of falsehood. A public figure 
plaintiff will thus be able to redress attacks on his reputation, 
and at the same time the editorial process will be protected in 
all but the most necessary cases. 
III 
Applying these principles to the instant case is most dif-
.ficult, since the five categories of objectionable discovery 
inquiries formulated by the Court of Appeals are general, and 
it 1s impossible to determine what specific questions are 
emcompassed within each category. It would nevertheless 
appear that four of the five categories concern respondents' 
mental processes, and thus would not be covered by an 
editorial privilege. Only the fourth category-"Conversations 
between Lando and Wallace about matter to be included or 
excluded from the broadcast publication"-would seem to be 
protected by a proper editorial privilege. The Court of 
Appeals noted, however, that respondents had already made 
available to petitioner in discovery "the contents of pre-
telecast conversations between Lando and Wallace .. . . "' 
568 F. 2d. at 982. Whether this constitutes waiver of the· 
editorial privilege should be determined in the first instance 
by the District Court. I would therefore, like the Court of 
Appeals, remand this case to the District Court, but would' 
require the District Court to determine (a) whether respond-
ents have waived their editorial privilege; and (b) if not, the 
·two per scope and applicatio.n: qi that privilege • 
) 
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addresses the constitutional privilege issue. 
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scope of discovery on a remand. I appreciate that th~ 
ouestion submitted may be viewed as being limited only to 
the constitutional issue. In any event, I am giving some 
thought to writing a concurring opinion. 
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Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 77- 1105 
Anthony Herbert, PetitiOner, I On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
Barry Lando et al. peals for the Second Circuit. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR .. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
By virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, neither 
the Federal nor a , 'tate Government may make any law 
"abridging the freedom of speech . or of the press .... " The 
question here is whether those Amendments should be con-
strued to provide further protection for the press when sued 
for defamation than has hitherto been recognized. More 
specifically. we are urged to hold for the first time that when 
a member of the press is alleged to have circulated damaging 
falsehoods and is sued for in.i ury to the plaintifl"s reputation, 
the plaintiff is barred from inquiring into the e~roc. 
esses of those responsible for the publication, even though 
the i nquiry would produce eviuence material to the proof of a 
critical c1ement of his cause of action . 
I 
Petitioner, Anthony Herbert. is a retired Army officer who 
l1ad extended war-time service in Vietnam and who received 
widespread media attention in 1969-1970 when he accused his 
superior officers of covering up reports of atrocities and other 
war crimes. Three years later. on February 4. 1973, respond-
eJlt Columbia Broadcasting • ystem. Inc. (CBR). broadcast a 
report on petitioner and his accusations. The program was 
}Jroduced and edited by respondent Barry Lando and was 
rmrrated by respondent Mike Wallace. Lando later published 
2 8 FEB 1979 
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f) related article in Atlantic Monthly magazine. Herbert then 
sued La.ndo, Wallace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly for defam&.-
tion in Federal District Court, basing jurisdiction on diversity 
of citizenship. In his complaint, Herbert alleged that the 
program and article falsely and maliciously portrayed him as 
I a liar and a person who had made war-crimes charges to explain his relief from command. ancl requested substantial damages for injury to his reputation and to the literary value 
of a book he had just published recounting his experiences. 
Although his cause of action arose under New York State 
defamatiou law, Herbert conceded that because he was a 
"public figure" the First and Fourteenth Amendments pre-
cluded recovery absent proof that respondents had published 
damaging falsehoods "with 'actual malice'-that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not." This was the holding of New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280 (1964), with 
respect to alleged libels of public officials, and extended to 
"public figures" by Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, '388 U. S. 
130 (1967). 1 Under this rule, absent knowing falsehood, lia-
bility requires proof of reckless disregard for truth, that · is, 
that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of his publicatio11.'' St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 
U. S. 727, 731 ( 1968). Such "subjective awareness of probable 
falsity,'' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 334 n. 6 
(1974), may be found if "there are obvious reasons to doubt 
the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports." 
St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, at 732. 
In preparing to prove his case in light of these require-
ments. Herbert deposed Lando at length and sought an order 
to compel answers to a variety of questions to which response 
was refused on tlw ground that the First Amendment pro-
tected against inquiry into the state of mind of those who 
1 Criminal libel pro;:;<>ruhon~ :~rr ~ubjrct to tlw :samr con;:;titutJOnal lirni~ 
tation,.:, Garrison \ Louzsiana, ;{(5 F. R. 64 (1964) . 
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edit, produce or publish, and into the editorial process.2 
Applying the standard of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.16 (b 2, which 
permits discovery of any matter "relevant tOtlie subject 
matter involved in the pending action'' if it would either be 
admissible in evidence or "appears reasonably calculated to lead 
to the discovery of admissible evidence." the District Court 
ruled that because the defendant's state of mind was of "central 
importance" to the issue of malice in the case, it was obvious ~ 
that the questions were relevant and "entirely appropriate to 
Herbrrt's efforts to discover whether Lando had any reason to 
doubt the veracity of certain of his sources. or. equally signifi-
cant, to prefer the veracity of on<' source over another.'' 73 
F . R. D. 387, 3!J5. 396 (SDXY 1977). The District Court re-
jected the claim of constitutional privilege because it found 
nothing in the First Amendment or the relevant cases to permit 
or require it to increase thr weight of the injured plaintiff's 
already heavy burden of proof by in effect creating barriers 
"behind which malicious publication may go undetected and 
unpublished." !d., at 394. The case was then certified for 
an interlocutory appeal under 28 F. S. C. § 1292 (b), and the 
Court of Appeals agreed to hear the case.8 
~ . The Cu·cmt Court summanzed thr inqumes to which Lando objected l 
as tollow:,; . 
" 1. Lando't> conclusion~ dunng his research and inve,;tigation regarding 
peoi1lc or lrad~ to be pur~ued, or not to be pur::med, in connection with 
thr 60 Mmutrs sPgmcnt and the Atlantic Monthly article; 
"2. Lando's conclu::;ion~ about fact,; impar!Pd by intervit>wees and his 
st a tP of mind with rt>spect to t ht> veracity of per~>ons interviewed; 
"3. The baHis for conclusions wherP Lando trstifird that hr did rPaeh n 
conclu,;ion with rPSJ)t>Ct to prr;;onH, in formation or event~; 
"4. Conver~ation;; between Lando and Wallace about matter:; to br in-
eluded or excluded from the hroadca~t publicatiou; and, 
"5. Lnndu'~ intPntions a,; manifPstpd by thP clPcision to include or ex-
cludC' material." Herbert Y. Lando, 5()8 F. 2d 974, 983 (CA2 1977). 
n Rr::;pondrnts' l'etttion for Leave t AppPHI from an Int rlocutory 
Ord('f , which wa~ grantPd, ,;tated thr i"::;ur on appPH us follows : - -----------" What f'(frrt should he giVPn to the Fir;;t Am<'nd.tnPnt protrction of the 
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A divided panel reversed the District Court. 568 F. 2d 974 
(CA2 1977). Two judges, writing separate but overlapping 
opinions, concluded that the First Amendment lent sufficient 
protection to the editorial processes to protect Lando from 
inquiry about his thoughts, opinions, and conclusions with 
respect to the material gathered by him and about his conver-
sations with his editorial colleagues. The privilege not to 
answer was held to be absolute. We granted certiorari because 
of the importance of the issue involved. 435 U.S. 922 (1978). 
We have concluded that the Court of Appeals misconstrued 
the First and Fourteenth Atnendments and accordingly re-
verse its judgnwnt. 
IT 
Civil and criminal liability for defamation was well estab-
lished iu the common law when the First Amendment was 
adopted, and there is no indication that the Framers intended 
to abolish such liability. Until New York 1'irnes the prevail-
ing jurisprudence was that "libelous utterances [are not] 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech .... " 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U. S. 250, 266 ( 1952); see also 
Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 482-483 (1957); 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-572 (1942); 
iVear v. Minnesota, 283 U ..... 697, 707-708 (1931). The 
accepted view was that ueither civil nor criminal liability for 
defamatory publications abridge freedom of speech or freedom 
of the press, and a majority of jurisdictions made publishers 
liable civilly for their defamatory publications regardless of 
theit· intent. 1 New York 1'irnes and Butts effected major 
prr,.;~ w1th re~pPcl to it:; <'xrrcJSP of ~chtorial judgmmt in pretrial ch~covery 
m a librl ra,.;r govrrnrd by New 'fork Times Co. v. S'Ulliva'll, 376 U. S. 
25-J. ( 19()4) ?" 
1 See, e. y .. He~tatrm<'nt of Torti:l § 580 ( 1939); Pednck, Frrrdom of 
tlw Pre"" and the Law of Librl: Thr Moclrrn HrviH!'cl Tran~lation, 49 
Corn. L. Hrv. 581, 5X:3-5H4 (1964) : ~otr, D!'velopmcnts in the Law-
Di'famat~on·, (i9 Hat,·. L. H<'v 875, 902-910 (J95fi) . In Perk v . Chirago 
. ' 
,y_''~ r .{""t• 
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changes in the standards applicable to civil libel actions. 
Under these cases public officials and public figures who sue for 
defamation must prove knowing and reckless falsehood in order 
to establish liability. Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
the Court held that nonpublic figures must demonstrate some 
fault on the defendant's part and, at least where knowing or 
reckless untruth is not shown, some proof of actual injury to 
the plaintiff before liability may be imposed and damages 
awarded. 
These cases rested primarily on the conviction that the 
commo11 law of libel gave insufficient protection to the First 
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of 
press and that to avoid self-censorship it was essential that 
liability for damages be conditioned on the specified showing 
of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood. 
Given the required proof, however, damages liability for 
defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom 
of the press. 
Nor did these cases suggest any First Amendment restric-
tion on the sources from which the plaintiff could obtain the 
necessary evidence to prove the critical elements of his cause 
of action. On the contrary, New York Times and its progeny 
made it essential to proving liability that plaintiffs focus on 
7'ribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, 189 (1909), Mr. Ju:stice Holmes :summarized 
the prevailing view of strict liability in the cour:se of reviewing a libel 
Judgment rendered in a federal diversity of citizenship action : 
" Thl'I'C was some suggestion that the defendant published the portrait by 
mistnkr, and without knowledge that it was the plaintiff's portrait or was 
not what it purported to be. But the fact, if it was one, wa:s no excu:se. 
If tlw publication was libellous thr defendant took the risk. As was said 
of ::mrh matters by Lord :\1ansfield, 'Whatever a man publi:shes lw pub-
lishes at his peril.' The King v. Woodfall, LotH 776, 781. . . . The rea-
S~)n i~ plain . A libl'l i~S harmful on it~ facf'. If a man sees fit to punish 
manif<'stl~· hurtful statemf'nt:s concerning an individual, without other 
ju,;tifiC'ation than exi8ts for an advertisement or a piece of news, the 
usual principles of tort will make him liable, if the statements are false 
•or -ll re 1 n{e of someone else," 
;. 
.. 
. ,, ' 
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the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. "'£Q_!le 
liable, the. alleged d.efamcr of public officials or of public 
figures must know or suspect that his publica.tion is false. In 
other cases- proof of some kind of fanlt. ne~~;ligenre perh~tps.~ 
is csscu!ial to rceorcry. Tum·.italJly, u11le::;::; liaLil.ity i::; (,o be 
completely foreclosed. the thoughts and editorial processes of 
the alleged defamer would be open to examination. 
It is also untenable to conclude from our cases that although 
proof of the necessary state of mind could be in the form of 
objective circumstances from which the ultimate fact could be 
inferred. plaintiffs may not inquire directly from the defend-
ants whether they knew or suspected that their damaging 
publication was in error. In Butts, for· example, it is evident 
from the record that tl)e editorial process had been subjected 
to close examiHatiOll and that direct as Well as indirect evi-
dence was relied on to prove that the defendant magazine 
had acted with actual malice. The damages verdict was 
sustained without any suggestion that plaintiff's proof had 
trenched upon forbidden areas.6 
~ Th(;' defimtion of fault wa~ to bl' the re,;poll'~ibility of state law~. Gertz 
\'.Robert Welch, Inc .. 41R P. S. :32:3, :347 (1974) . 
u Sre 388 U. S., at 156-159. whrrP l\T r .. Justice Harlan, writing for the 
Court, revirwrd the record under thr standard lw prefrrrPd to apply to 
public figun•s, and npheld the vPrdict for thr plaint iff. Chief .Justice 
Warren mdepend£>ntly rcvww£>d the record undrr thr "actual malice" 
shwdard of New York 'l'irnes and also concluded · i1i his roncmring opinion 
that the verdict should be upheld. !d., at 168-170. The evidenee relied 
on and summarized in both opinions included ~ub;;tantial amounts of te:;ti-
mony that would fall within the rditorial proces,.; privilegr as defined b' 
respondPnts. The record before ' the ourt me u eel depo;;JtiOns ~· the 
author 'Of thr defarnator~· artJC!t', an individual paid to as~ist the author 
In preparation, the Sport~ Editor of The Satmday Evenmg Po"t, and both 
1ts Managmg Editor and Editor-in-Clue!'. The;;e deposition~ revealed The 
aturday Evenmg Po,.;t 's motive~ Ill puhli:>hing the story (Record 70(i:... 
717), source" (Hecord 3(\4, li62-664, 719-720, 729), ronv<>rsation~ among 
the ed1ton; and author conrerning the research and dPvelopment of the 
;utirll:' ('Record ~6:~-;36i , 721-7:37), decisions nnd ren><ons relating to wh() 
77-1105-0PINION 
HERBERT v. LANDO 1 
Reliance upon such state-of-mind evidence is by no means 
a recent development arising from New York Times and 
similar cases. Rather. it is deeply rooted in the common-law 
rule. predating the First Amendment, that a showing of 
malice on the part of the defendant permitted plai11tiffs to 
recover punitive or enhanced damages.' In Butts, the Court 
:;hould be interviewed and what :;hould be inve;;tigated (1~ecord 666-
667, 699-700, 7:34-736, 772-774), conclu;;ions as to the importance and 
veracity of sources and information pre;;Pnted in thr articlr (Rrcord 720, 
7:32-735 , 7:37, 771-772. 77()), and conclusions about tlw impact that pub-
li,-hmg thr articlP would have on thr ;;uhjt'ct (Record 714-716, 770) . 
• JusTICE BHENNAN, writmg for lnm;:;elf and MH . .JusTlCJ> WHI'I'E, al::;o 
thought thr rvidencr of rt>cord ;;uflici(>nt to ;:;ati;;fy the Netc York Times 
malice l'tandard. Tt i:s qmte twllkei~· that the Court would have arrived 
at the rP:sult it did had 11 lwliPv('d that inquiry into the editorial proces;:;es 
was ronNt itut ionall~· forbidden . 
The Court engagrd in ;;nnilar arwly:si~ of thr record in rever::;ing the 
judgment.~ rnter('d in a companion case to Butts, Associated Press v. 
Walker, :388 U. S., at 158-159: id .. at 165 (Warren, C. J., concurring); 
and in Time Y. l/i/1 , 385 ll. S. 374, :391-394 (19!-)7). In Hill, thr record 
included thr ed1ted draft:; of tlw allegedl~· hbelou;; article and a examina-
tion and cros,;-examination of thr author. During that exnmination, the 
\ writer explained in detail tlw pn•paration of tlw articlr, his thoughtH, con-
\ 
clu:;ion~. and brlid~ r<•gardmg t hr matrrial, and a line-l::iy-luw analy~is of 
the articlr with explanation~ of how and why addition:,; and deletions were 
made to the v;triou~ draft~ . A~ in Butt~. thr editorial procrs;; was the 
focu~ of much of ihr evJdencP, and direct inquiry was made into the state 
of mind of thP medm ddend1mts . Yet the Court raised no que;;tion as to 
tlw proprirty of the proof. 
7 A. Hanson. LibPI and Helated Tort::;,[ 163 (1969) ; Note, Developments-
ill thr Law-Defamation, supra, at 938 ; 50 Am . .fur. 2d Libel and Slander 
§ :352 (1970) ; 50 C. J. S. Libel and Shmder § 260 (1955). 
Tlw Hr~tatrnwnt originally providPd in a separatP section for the award 
of pumt ivc damagP~ for maliriou,; defamation~>. Rr:statement of Torts 
§ lOGS (Tf·nt. Draft 1:~, 1936) · 
''One who i:; hnblP for harm to anotlwr's rPputation cau:sed by the pub-
licatiOn of a libel or· ;;lander rs al:so liablr for punitive damages if the 
defamatory matter wa,: publbhrd wrth knowlrdgP of it:,; fabity or if it was 
1mblr~hcd i,n rrcklc~s i.ndJffe~:eneP to it::- tntth or fal-;it · or solely for th£:. 
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affirmed the substantial award of punitive damages which in 
Georgia were conditioned upon a showing of "wanton or reck-
less indifference of culpable negligence" or "ill will, spite, 
hatred and an intent to injure." 388 U. S., at 165-166. 
Neither Mr. Justice Harlan, id., at 156-l62,8 nor Chief Justice 
Warren, concurring. id., at 165-168, raised any question as to 
the propriety of having the award turn on such a showing or 
as to the propriety of the underlying evidence, which plainly 
included direct evidence going to the state of mind of the 
publisher and its responsible agents.9 
Furthermore, long before Sullivan was decidecl, certain 
qualified privileges had developed to protect a publisher from 
liability for libel unless the publication was made with 
malice.10 Malice was defined in numerous ways, but in gen-
purpo~e of rausing harm to the plaintiff's reputation or other legally pro-
tertrd mtrrest ." 
The provtsion wai'i latPr omtttrcl with thr explanation that recovPry ·of 
pun it tvr damagr~ would be detrrmmed by the rule~ in the Re~tatement 
with respect to damages in gent'J'al. Reo;tatement of Torts § 1068 (~ro­
po~ed Final Draft a, 19:37) . 
Gertz \'. Robert Welch, Inc ., suprcr, at 350, limited the entitlE>ment to 
1mnitive damag<•:; but ~uch damagE'i'i arc HtiU awardable upon a sh<;>wing of 
knowing or reckle8~ faiHE'hood. 
8 A. Mr. Justicr Harlan noted, thr jury had bE>en instructrd in con-
sidering punitive damage~ to ai<8l'!:l>' '·the reliability, the naturr of the 
sources of thr plaintiff's mformation, its acceptance or rejection of the 
sources, tts care in chrcking upon as,;ertion:s." :388 U. S., at 156 (emphasis 
addE-d) . The Jutitice found nothing ami~s either with the ino;truction or 
the reHttlt the jury reachrd undE-r it. MR. Jm;TICE BHENNAN, di;;senting 
in thr Butts case, icl., at 172:._174, analyzed the in;;truction;; diff~'rE'ntly but 
ratsed no question a~ to the com;titutionality of turning the award of either 
compen~atory or punitivE' damage:; upon direct as wrll a;; cirrumo;tantJal 
evtdence going to the nwntal statr of the defendtml. 
'1 St•r 11. 6, supra. 
HJ ~~·e Nalle v. Oyster. 230 U. S. 165, 179- 180 (191:3) ; White v. Nicholls, 
:3 How. 266, 286- 292 (1845); T . Plucknrtt, A Conci8e Htstory of the 
Common Law 502 (5th eel. 195G) ; Hallt•n, Charactrr of Behef Neer:;sary 
for tlw ('Qnd1t10nal Pnvilege m Defamatlou, 25 IlL L Rev. 865 (1931) . 
77-1105-0PINION 
HERBERT v. LANDO 9 
eral depended upon a showing that the defendant acted with 
improper motive." This showing in turn hinged upon the 
intent or purpose with which the publication was made, the 
In White v. N!cholls, supra. at 290-291, tlw Court surveyed thP common 
law and summarized thf' privilPgP as follows: 
"We have thu:; taken a view of the authoritif':l which treat of the doc-
trines of slandPr and libPI, and have con~idPred tho~e authorities particu-
larly with rPferencP to the distinctiou they establish, between ordinary 
in:;tance~ of slander, written and unwntten, aud those which have bceu 
~tyled, privileged commumcations; the peculiar character of which is said 
to exempt thc·m from infPrence;; which the law ha:,; crrated wtth respect 
to tho:;e cal'e:; that do not partake of that character. Our exammatwn, 
extendrd as it may ;;c•rm to hnve bt•eu, ha:; been called for by the Im-
portance of a <>Ub.Ject most intimately connected with thr rights and happi-
ne:;,.; of mdividuals, as it IS with thr qutet and good order of soc1ety. The 
inve:;tigation ha;; conductrd u;: to tllC' following conclusion:;, which we 
propound as the law applicable tlwreto. 1. That every publicatwn, e1ther 
by wnting, printm~, or picture,.;, whic·h charges upon or nnputes to any 
prrson that whtrh renders him liable to punishment, or which is calcu-
lated to makr him infamous, or odious, or ridiCulous, b prima facie a libel, 
and implies malice in tlw author and pubh~her towards the person con-
cerning whom such publication is made. Proof of malice, therefore, in 
the ca~t>s ju,.;t cle:;crihPd, can never be required of the party complaining 
bPyond the proof of thr publicatiOn it;;elf: JUstification, excuse, or extenu-
ation, If eitll('r c•an he ~hown, mu~t JH"OCPf'd from the defendant. 2. That 
the descriptiOn of ca~es rPcognised as pnvtleged commumcation~, must be 
\tndrr:-;tood H~< rxcept10n~ to thi;; rulr, and m; being founded upon some 
apparPntl~· rrcogmsed obligation or motiw, legal, moral, or social, which 
may fair!~· hr pn'sumeu to have· leu to the publication, and therefore p1irna 
facie rf'l!rvr~ it from that ju~t implication from which the general ruiP of 
thr lnw t~ dc•duerd. The rulP of eviclt•llce, at; to ;;uch easrs, is accordingly 
as far changPd as to impo~e it on thr plnntiff to remove those presumptions 
flowtng from tlw speming obligationH and situations of the parties, and to 
rrqutrc• of him to brin~ home to tlw dPfrndant the existence of malice as 
thr tnH• mot in· of his conduct. Beyond thit; c•xtent no presumption can 
lJ<' p<'l'll1lttecl to operate, much lel't; br made to sanctify the indulgence of 
maher, howc•vpr wicked. howev<'r rxpre;;s, under tl)(' protpctJon of legal 
form:-;. We coneludt• then thai malit•t• may ur proved, though allegPd to 
havr C;\i;;tc•d Ill tlw procePdmg;; brforr a eourt, or !e~tslattve body, or anr 
[Footnote 11 13 011 p 10] 
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belief of the defendant ii1 the truth of his statement, or upon 
the ill will which the defendant might have borne towards the 
defendant.12 
Courts have traditionally admitted any direct or indirect 
evidence relevant to the state of mind of the defendant 
and llecessary to defeat a conditional privilege or enhance 
damages.13 The rules are applicable to the press and to other 
defendants alike,1 ' and it is evident that the courts across 
other tribunal or authority, although such court, legislative body, or other 
triuunal, may have bren thr appropriate authority for redre::;sing the 
grievance repm,;rntrd to it; and 1 hat proof of express malice in any 
writtrn publica! ion, petition, or proceeding, addressed to such tribunal, 
will render that publication, petit ion, or proceeding, libellous in its char-
acter, and actionable, and will ~ubject the author and publisher thereof 
to all the consequPnces of libel." 
11 Hall('ll , supra, at 866-867. In some jurisdictions a defendant for-
feited hiR privil<>ge if he published negligently or without probable caut;e 
to believe thP statement was true. lcl ., at 857; see White v. Nic,holls, 
supra, at 291. 
12 Ser, e. g., 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 1!-55 : 
"The exi~tence~ctual malice may be shown in many ways. As a 
general rule, any comrlPtent evidencr, either direct or circumstantial, can 
be reHortrd to, and all thr relevant circumstance~ ~urrounding the trans-
action may be ~hown, provided they art" not too r~'mote, includjng threats, 
prior ur subsequent dPfamation8, o; ub~Pquent statements of the defendant, 
circumstances indicating the existrnrP of rivalry, ill will, or ho::;tiiity between 
the parties, facts lending to ::;how a rrckles:; disregard of the plaintiff'::; 
rights, and , in an action against a newspaper, cu::;t om and usage with 
respect to the treatmrnt of news items of the nature of the one under 
consideration. The plaintiff may show that the defendant had drawn a 
pi::;tol at the time 1ll' uttered tlw word8 complained of; that defendant had 
tried to kis::: and embrace plaintiff just prior to the defamatory publica-
tion ; or that defendant had failed to make a proper investigation before 
publication of the statemrnt in question. On cro::;s-examination the 
defendant may be questJOned as to his intent in making the publication." 
(Footnotrs and citntions omitted.) 
.ta E. g .. Odger 'H Liuel and Slandt'r *271-«·288 (1st Amer. ed. Bigelow 
1884 ; 50 Am: Jur. 2d § 455; 5a C . .T . S. § 21:3. 
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the country have long been accepting evidence gomg to the 
editorial processes of the media without encountering con-
stitutional objections.1 " 
F. Holt, Tlw Lnw of Libel 57 (lHt Amer. rd. 1818); Billet \'. Times-
Democratif' Pub. C'o., 107 LH. 75,32 So. 17 (1902). 
1 " In :;corP~ of libel ca::;e:-; courts havl' addre;;sed the general i~sue of thr 
admis,;ibility of evidenct' that would be excluded under the editorial process 
privile~tc as:<erted herP and have affirmed the relevance and admissibility of 
the evidence on behalf of libel plaiutifrs. Sri', e. g., Johrw;ou Pub. Co. v. 
Davis, 271 Ala . 474, 124. So. 2d 441 (19()0) (Editor may be cros,;~examined 
on meaning mtPnded to be convPyrd by pa:;;;age~ in magazine article); 
Freeman v. Mills, 9i Cal. App. 2d 1()1, 217 P. t)fi7 (1950) (malicP may b<' 
establt~hed by dm'el proof of tlw ;;tate of mind of a pn~on, or by evidence 
from which its exJstence may be inferred); Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 
Cal. 345, 1.. 4 1'. (i72 (1919) (all rplevant circum::'tanee,; concerning publica-
tion admi,;~ibiP); Sandora v. Ttmes C'o .. 11:3 Conn. 574, 155 A. 819 (19:31) 
(all relevant evidencP including direct evidence on state of mind or ,;urround-
ing circumstanc<'~-eity rditor and reporter called to :;land and questiont'd 
exten:;ivcly ns to motive;;, circmn~tancP::> of publication, and general prac-
tices); Rice v. Simmons, 2 Har. :~09, 31 Am. Dec. 766 (Del. 1837) (wh€'re 
que:;tion of malier in il'l'ille, declarationi' of publi,;lwr at the time of pllhlica-
tion admi~:,;ihlr Hl'i part of the res oestae); We stem U niou Telegraph Co. v. 
Vickers. il Ga. App. 204, :JO S. E. 2d -l-10 (1944) (all rel<>vant eviclenct· 
admi,.;:;ihle, in<·ludin~ dirrct rvid<>n('e of ::;tate of mind and surrounding cir-
cumstances); Cook, .. East Shore Newspapers. :~27 Ill. App. 559,64 N. E. 2d 
751 (1945) (all rel<>vant PvidrncP concPrnin~ cin:11mstances of pubhcations 
admi:-;:;ible, incl11ding te,;timony by reportpr:; and employee" of defendant); 
Berger v. Freeman Tribune ('o .. 132 Iowa 2HO, 109 :X. W. 7R4 (1906) (all 
relevant rvidencr); Thompson Y. Globe Newspaper Co., 279 Ma:ss. 176, 181 
N. K 24H (1932) (only '<"vidence on Rtatr of mind of tho~e agrnt:; of defend-
ant entru,;t <'d with determining what shall br p11blishcd is admi~ible and 
material); Conroy v. Pall River Iferald News Co .. 306 Mass. 488,28 N. E. 
2cl 729 (1940) (an~· relevant evidence• on defendant's malice); Cyrowski v. 
Polish American Pub . Co., 196 Mich. 648, 16:3 K. W. 58 (1917) (te,;timony 
of mdividuab who advised rPportrr to que:stion plaintiff before publi:shing 
defamatory artielc wa~< admi,;:sible on the i~,;u€' of malice); Priedell v. 
Blakely Printing Cu., 163 -:\finn. 226, 20:3 N. W. 974 (1925) (anr relevant 
evidenc<> admissiblP) ; Cook v. Globe Printtng Co .. 227 Mo. 471, 127 S. W. 
:332 (1910) (evJcl€'JWe ,.;bowing that df'fendant 's ed1torml manager knew :m 
important fad to he falsE' admJ:<:SJble on que,.;tiou of malice); Butler v. 
'Gautte Co ., 119 App. Dn· 7117 , 104 N .. Y. S. H:ri (1907) (any Pvidenre· 
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In the face of this history, old and new, the Court of 
Appeals nevertheless declared that two of this Court's cases 
had announced unequivocal protection for the editorial proc-
admissible to provr ncttml malice of clefrndant); Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N.C. 
377 (1851) (expre~H malice may br proved either by direct evidencr or 
surrounding circumstance::; ); McBumey v. Times Publishing Co., 93 R . I. 
331, 175 A. 2d 170 (1961) (rclrvant rvidence admissible to rebut trstimony 
by reportrrs and rditors that the~· publishrd without malice) ; Lancour v. 
Herald<~ Globe As~u., 112 Vt . 471,21\ A. 2d 396 (1942) (any relevant evi-
dence on malice) ; Farrar v. Tribune Pub. Co., 358 P. 2d 792 (Wash. 
1961) (all circum:st ances stu-rouuding publication relevant and admis~ible). 
Simila rly, tlw comb haw uniformly admitted ;.:uth evidence on behalf of 
tho ddrndant. See, e. g .. Bohan v. Record Pub . ro .. 1 Cal. App. 429, 82 P. 
634 (1905) (t(',;timony on good faith) ; Hearne\'. De Young. 119 Cal. 670, 
52 P . 150 (1898) (trstimony on source::; , precautwm; taken, and good 
faith) ; Ballinger v. Democrat Co., 203 Iowa 1095, 212 K. W. 557 (1927) 
(testimony of reporter and Pditor on good faith admi~::;ible) ; Sn!Jder \'. 
Tribune Co .. lfl1 Iowa 671 , 143 ~ . W. 519 (1913) (testimony as to source 
of information and good faith of n'porter admissible); Courier Joumal 
Co . v. Phillips, 142 Ky. 372, 134 S. W. 446 (1911) (te:stimon~· of reporter 
on good faith) ; Conner v. Standard Pub . Co. , 183 Mass. 474, 67 N. E. 596 
(1903) (t<'"timouy HS to source of information) ; Davis v. Mm·xhausen, 103 
:Vlich. 315 , 61 K. W. 504 (1894) (testimony on good faith and proper 
precautions taken before publishing) ; Julian v. K. C. Star Co .. 209 Mo. 35, 
107 S. W. 49(i (1907) (te~timony on thought8 and intentions at the time 
of publicatiOn admi~~ible) ; Paxton \' . Woofltl'ard. :n :Vlont. 195, 78 P. 215 
(1904) (te::;timony as to motive, good faith, and sourceil ) ; Las Vegas Sun, 
luc. v. Franklin . 74 Nev. 282, 329 P . 2d &"i7 (1958) (testimony of pub-
li:shrr on good faith) ; Lindsey v. Evening Journal Assn., 10 N .. J. Misc. 
1275, 163 A. 2-l5 (1935) (tc•stimony on good faith); Kohn v. PcPcD Co .. 169 
App. Div. 5RO, 155 N. Y. S. 455 (1915) (sourrr) ; Hains v. New York 
Bvening Journal. 204 N. Y. S. 734 (1930) (source); Goodrow v. Malone 
Telegram, 2:35 App. Div. 3, 255 N . Y. S. 812 (1932) (reporter's testimon)' 
as to sourre) ; Goodrow v. Press Co ., 233 App . Div. 41 , 251 N . Y . S . 364 
(1931) (defrndant ran testify and introduce evidence on hi:s good faith at 
time of publication) ; Kehoe v. Ne u• York Tribune, 229 App. Div. 220, 241 
~. Y . S. ()76 (1930) (t estimon~· on good fmth admi~::;ible to prevrnt im-
position of pumtivf' damagr:>) ; Varvaro v. American Agriculturist , 222 A)li1 . 
Div. 213, 225 -:-\ . Y . S. 564 (1927) (deft>ndant may te:-;tJfy and mtroduce 
evidence on lark of malice) ; Vau Ar~dale v. 'J'ime, Inc., 35 N . Y. S. 2d 
95I,.:tff'<l, 265 App. D 1v. 919, 39 .1. Y S. 2<1 413 (1942) ; Weirhbrodt v, 
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ess. In each of these cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
1'ornillo, 418 l!. S. 241 (1974), and Columbia Broadcasting 
System V. Democratic !Vational Cmnrnittee, 412 r. S. 94 ( 1973)' I 
we in validated govern men tal efforts to pre-empt editorial 
decision by requiring the publication of specified material. 
In Columbia Broadcasting System, it was the requirement 
that a television network air paid political advertisements and 
in Tornillo, a newspaper's obligation to print a political 
candidate's reply to press criticism. Insofar as the laws at 
issue in Tornillo and Columbia Broadcasting System sought 
to control in advance the content of the publication. they 
were deemed as in valid as were prior efforts to enjoin publica-
tion of specified materials.u; But holdings that neither the 
State nor the Federal Government may dictate what must or 
must not be printed neither expressly nor impliedly suggest 
that the editorial process is immune from any inquiry 
whatsoever. 
It is incredible to believe that the Court in Columbia 
Broadcasting System or in Tornillo silently effected a substan-
tial contraction of the rights preserved to defamation plain-
tiffs in Sullivan, Butts, and like cases. Tornillo and Gertz v .. 
New York Evenirt(J Journal. 11 N. Y. S. 2d 112 (Sup. 1939) (defendant 
may te:stify a~ to good faith and probable cause); Cleveland Leader· 
P1·inting Co. v. Nether~ole, 84- Ohio St. 118, 95 N. E. 735 (1911) (tcs-
tinwny on good faith); Cobb v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 42 Okla. 314, 140 P. 
1079 (1914) (defendant's tP:stimony as to lnck of malice and :source of 
information) ; 'l'imes Pub. Co. v. Ray. 1 S. W. 2d 471, aff'd, 12 S. W. 2d 
165 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (teHtimony a::; to lack of malice); Pfister v. 
Milwaukee Free Pre8S Co., 1a9 Wi~'<. ()27 , 121 N. W. 938 (1909) (testimony 
a~ to absencr of malice) 
None of tlws!' rase~ as mnch as suggested that there were special limit::; 
applicable to the pres~ on the discoverability of such evidence, either 
lwfore or during t rwl. 
10 As we statPd in 'l'omillo. "no 'govPrnmPnt agency-local, state, or 
fcdrral-can tPII a newspaper in advancr what it can print and what it 
cannot:'" !d., at 225-256, quot1ng Pittsburgh Ptess Co. v. Ht~:man Rela.-· 
ti.ons Comm'n, 413 C. S. :m1 {!973) ~S'l'EWARI •• J., dis~~ntingJ. 
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Robert Welch, Inc., were announced on the same day; and 
although the Court's opinion in Gertz contained an overview 
of recent developments in the relationship between the First 
Amendment and the law of libel, there was no hint that a 
companion case had narrowed the evidence available to a 
defamation plaintiff. Quite the opposite inference is to be 
drawn from the Gertz opinion, since it, like prior First Amend-
ment libel cases, recited without criticism the facts of record 
indicating that the state of mind of the editor had been 
placed at issue. Nor did the Gertz opinion, in requiring proof 
of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant editor 
and in forbidding punitive damages absent at least reckless 
disregard of truth or falsity, suggest that the First Amendment 
also foreclosed direct inquiry into these critical elements. 17 
In sum, contra.ry to the views of the Court of Appeals, 
according an absolute privilege to the editorial process of a 
medi2, defendant in a libel case is not required, authorized or l 
presaged by our prior cases, and would substantially enhance 
the burden of proving actual malice, contrary to the expecta-
tions of .Yew Y ark Times, Butts and similar cases. 
III 
It is nevertheless urged by respondents that the balance 
struck in New Y ark Times should now be modified to provide 
further protections for the press when sued for circulating 
erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. It 
is not uncommon or improper, of course, to suggest the aban-
17 Two yrar~ lat(•r, in 'l'ime, Inc. v. Fir-estone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), therr 
wa~ likew1~e no indication that the plaintiff is subject to ~ub~tantial eYi-
d~ntiary re~triction~ in praYing; the defendant'~ fault. A~ Mn. Jus'l'ICE 
PowELL and :MH. JusTICE STEWAH'l' ~tated in concurrence, the answer to 
thi~ qur~tion of culpability "deprnds upon a carrful ronsidrration of all thr 
rclrvant evidencr concerning Time'~ net ions prior to the publication of the 
' milestonr~ ' articlr." The~· suggrstrd that on rrmand all thr eYidence of 
reeord should bP ron~idHed. which included evidrnce going to thr belief~ 
of Timr'~ editorial ::;taff. SeP 1d, at 4()7. anclt1 .• 1. 
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clomnent, modification or refinement of existing constitutional 
interpretation, and notable developments in First Amendment 
jurisprudence have evolved from just such submissions. But 
in the 15 years since .Yew Y ark Times, the doctrine announced 
by that, case, which represented a major developmed and 
which was widely perceived as essentially protective of press 
freedoms, has been repeatedly affirmed as the appropriate 
First Amendment standard applicable in libel actions brought 
by public officials and public figures. Curt-is Publishing Co. 
v. Butts. supra; St. Amant v. Thompson, supra; Gertz v. 
Robert Welch. supra; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U. S. 448 
( 1076). At the same time, however, the Court has reiterated 
its COJiviction-refiected in the laws of defamatiou of all of 
the States-that the individual's interest in his reputation is 
also a basic concem. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 l'. S., at 
455-457; Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U. S .. at 348-349. 
\Ve are thus being asked to modify firmly est1blished con-
stitutional doctrine by placing beyo])(] the plaintiff's reach a 
rauge of direct evitleuce relevant to provi11g knowing or reck-
less falsehood by the publisher of au alleged libel. elements 
that are critical to plaintiffs such as Herbert. The case for 
making this modification is by no means clear anu convincing. 
and we decline to accept tt. 
In t.he first place, it is plain enough that the suggested privi-
lrge for the editorial process would constitute a substantial 
mterference with the ability of a defamation plaintiff to estab-
lish the ingredients of maher as required by New York Times . 
• \.s respondents would have it, the defendant's reckless disregard 
of the truth, a critical element, coulcl not be shown by direct 
evidence through inquiry into the thoughts, opinions and cou-
cltJs:Ol1S of the publ isher but could be proved only by objective 
evidence from which the ultimate fact could be inferred. It 
may be that plaintiffs will rarely be successful in proving aware-
nc>~'S of falsehood from the mouth of the defendant himself. but 
thr relevance of answers to such i11quiries, which the District 
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Court rrcognizrd and tlw Court of Appeals did not (]eny. can 
hardly be doubted. To erect an · impenetrable barrier to the 
plaintiff's use of such evidence on his side of the case is a 
mattN of somr substance. particularly when defendants them-
selves arr pronr to assf'rt their good-faith bf'lief in the truth 
of thrir publications.1 < and libel plaintiffs arc required to prove 
knowing_ o~k~ss falsehood ~lUi ''co~ncing clarity." New 
York Times ilUlJivan, 376 LT. S .. at 285-286. 
Furthermore. the outer boundaries of the· editorial privilege 
now urgrd are clifficult to pf'rceive. Thf' opinions below did 
not stat<>, and rf'spolHlf'nts do not explain. precisely when thr 
editorial process begins allCI whe11 it ends. Moreover. although 
we an' told that respondent Lando was willing to testify as 
to what hf' "kne·w" and what he had "learned" from his 
interviews. as opposed to what hP "hPlievPd.'' it is not at all 
cl<•ar \\'hy thr suggested editorial privilege would not cover 
knowlPdgP as well as bP1ief about thP veracity of published 
I reportS. 111 Tt is worth noting here that the privilege as asserted by respondPllts would also immuni;,c from inquiry thP intemal communications occurring during the editorial process and 
thus place beyond reach what the defendaut participants 
learned or knew as the result of such collegiate conversations 
or exchanges. If damaging admissions to colleagues are to 
he barred from Pvidence, would a reporter's admissious made 
to third parties not participating in tlJe editorial process also 
be immune from inquiry'? We thus have little doubt that 
1' Rl-'1', 1'. g., tlw l'nsrs collrcfrd in n. 15, supra. in wluch media defend-
ant~ Hii>'Prl<•d, and rourh; upheld, fiH' right fo prrl:'ent this typr of rvidetH'e 
nt trial in ordn to C'HtahliHh good fa1th and lack of •nalice. 
to It waR also suggeHted at oral argumrnt that the privilege would covrr 
qur:-<tJOn~ in thC' '·why' ' form. hut not of thC' ''who," "what," ''when ," and 
"where" !~ ·pr . Tr. of Oral Arg., a! 32-:34. Hut i1 is rvident from Lando'~ 
tlepo~ifion !haf qurstiOnH ,.oJicitin!!: ''why" au,;wrr,.: relatmg to the ed1torial 
proces;: werr aniiWf'r('(], e. g .. Tr. of Depos1t10n 21, L: 7 ; 1892, L. 18, nnd 
that hr rrfUii<·d to an:;wrr o!hPr::> thaf did not fnll mto th1s cntegory, e. g., 
Tr. of Drpoiiitwn fl(1o, L. 20; 774, L. 5 ; 877 L. 12 ; 880, L. 5 ; 1488, L. 3 ; 
189:;1 , L, 11 ; see Tr of Oral Aq~ ., af 46. 
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Herbert and other defamation plaintiffs have important in-
terests at stake in opposing the creation of the asserted 
privilege. 
Nevertheless, we are urged by respondents to override these 
important interests because requiring disclosure of editorial 
'---
conversations and of a reporter's conclusions about the verne:. 
Tty-"Of the ma erial w-na;'" gathered will have an intolerable 
chilling effect on the editorial process and editorial decision-
making. But if the claimed inhibition flows from the fear of 
damages liability for publishing knowing or reckless falsehoods, 
those effects are precisely what Sew Y ark Times and other cases 
have held to be consistent with the First Amendment. Spread-
ing false information in and of itself carries 110 First Amend-
ment credentials. "There is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact.' ' Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 F. S., at 340. 
Realistically, however, some error is inevitable; and the 
difficulties of separating fact from fiction convinced the Court 
in New York Times, Butts, Gertz, and similar cases to limit 
liability to instances where some degree of culpability is present 
in order to eliminate the risk of undue self-censorship and 
the suppression of truthful materiaL Those who publish 
defamatory falsehoods with the requisite culpability, how-
ever, are subject to liability, the aim being not only to com-
pensate for in.i ury but also to deter publication of unprotected 
material threatening injury to individual reputatiou. Per-
mitting plaintiffs such as Herbert to prove their cases by 
direct as well as indirect evidence is consistent with the 
balance struck by our prior decisions. If such proof results in 
liability for damages which in turn discourages the publication 
of erroneous information known to be false or probably false, 
this is 110 more than what our cases contemplate and does not 
abridge either freedom of speech or of the press. 
Of course, if inquiry into editorial conclusions threatens the 
suppression not only of informatiou known or strongly sus-
pected to be unreliable but also of truthful informa.tion , the 
- ·- .. ----
.. . - -·~-. 
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issue would be quite different. But as we have said. our cases 
necessarily contemplate examination of the ~r_ial_pL.Qc_ess 
to j )rove the nccessar areness of proba,ble falsehood. and 
if indirect proofof this element does not stifle tru ul j)ub-
lication and is consistent with the First Amendment, as 
respondents seem to concede, we do not understand how direct 
inquiry with respect to the ultimate issue would be substan-
tially more suspect. 20 Perhaps such examination will lead to 
liability that would not have been found · without it, but this 
does not suggest that the determinations in these instances 
will be inaccurate and will lead to the suppression of protected 
information. On the contrary, direct inquiry from the actors, 
which affords the opportunity to refute inferences tha.t might 
otherwise be drawn from circumstantial evidence, suggests 
that more accurate results will be obtained by placing all, 
rather than part, of the evidence before the decisionmaker. 
Suppose, for example, that a reporter has two contradictory 
reports about the plaintiff. one of which is false and damaging, 
and only the false one is published. In resolving the issue 
whether the publication was known or suspected to be false, 
it is only commou sense to believe that inquiry from the 
\ author. with an opJX>~'tUI~ity .to explain, will ~ontribute to 
accuracy. If the publwatwn 1s false but there 1s au exoner-
ating explanation, the defendant will surely testify to this 
effect."' Why should not the plaintift' be permitted to inquire 
before trial? On the other hand, if the publisher in fact hacl 
serious doubts about accuracy, but published nevertheless. 110 
' undue self-censorship will result from permitting the rel<'-
20 The kii1d of question respondrnts seek to avoid answering is, by their 
own admi~sion, the ra><iest to answc•r. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at ;H: 
'' ' [TJhey arr ::;et-up qur3tions for our Hidr. , . . [Tihrse are not dif-
fi cult qii<'J:>tions to an~wrr.' " 
"' Often it is thr libel drfrndant who first J1resrnt,.; at trial direct evidence 
about the editorial pro(' f' ~ in order to e~tablish good faith and lack of 
malice. That was trur m New ro1'k Times v. Sullivan, see, e. g., Hecord 
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vant inquiry. Only knowing or reckless error will be discour-
aged; and unless there is to be an absolute First Amendment 
privilege to inflict injury by knowing or reckless cm1duct, which 
respondents do not suggest, constitutional values will not be 
threatened. 
It is also urged that frank discussion among reporters and 
editors will be dampened and sound editorial judgment en-
dangered if such exchanges, oral or written, are subject to 
inquiry by defamation plaintiffs. 22 We do not doubt the 
direct relationship between consultation and discussion on the 
one hand and sound decisions on the other; but whether or 
not there is liability for the injury, the press has an obvious 
interest in avoiding the infliction of harm by the publication 
of false information, and it is not unreasonable to expect 
the media to invoke whatever procedures that may be prac-
ticable and useful to that end. Moreover. given exposure to 
liability whe11 there is knowing or reckless error, there is even 
more reason to resort to prepublication precautions, such as 
a frank interchange of fact and opinion. Accordingly. we find 
it difficult to believe that error-avoiding procedures will be 
terminated or stifled simply because there is liability for cul-
pable error and because the editorial process will itself be 
examined in the tiny percentage of instances in which error 
is claimed and litigation ensues. Nor is there sound reason 
to believe that editorial exchanges and the editorial process-
are so subject to distortion and to such recurring misunder-
standing that they should be immune from examination in 
order to avoid erroneous judgments in defamation suits. The 
evidentiary burdeu Herbert must carry to prove at least reck- ~ 
)~or t1e truth is ~ubstantial indeed, aed-;e are 
unronvinced t at his chances of winning an undeserved verdict 
22 Tlw~· invoke cur observation in Unit ed States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
6S3, 705 (1974) : "Tho,.;e who expect public di~semination of their remarks 
may wrll tempN candor with a co11cern for appearance and for thrir own: 
iutGre~?Ui to the detriment of the deri:sio111naking proces::;." 
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a.rf' such that an inquiry into what Lando learned or said during 
editorial process must be foreclosed. 
This is not to say that the editorial discussions or exchanges 
have no constitutional protection from casual inquiry. · There 
is no law that subjects the editorial process to private or 
official exami11ation merely to satisfy cmiosity or to serve 
some general end su~h as · the public ii1terest; and if there 
were, it would not survive constitutional scrutiny as the First 
Ameudme11 t is presently construed. · No such problem exists 
here, however. where there is a specific claim of injury arising 
from a publication that is alleged to have been knowing or 
recklessly false. 23 
Evidentiary privileges in litigation are not favorNI.~ 1 and 
even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper 
circumstances. The President. for example, does not have an 
absolute privilege against disclosure of materials subpoenaed 
for a judicial proceeding. United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 
683 (1974). In so holding. we found that although the 
President has a pawerful interest in copfide11tiality of com-
2 '1 ::VIR . .Tu:s•rrc:E BRENNAN' woulcl c•xtc•Hd morr <'Oil~1itu1ioual protrrtion 
to rditorial di,.:cu~~i<~l h.'· rxcu~ing an~wt·r" to rc•I<'VIIIIi ftiH'"tion" about 
in-hou~r <'OilV!'I'>'Hiioth• nntil 11w ll1:~inliff ha" mndc• :1 prim:t fariP !':1:'1' of 
fabit~·. Jf thi~ "ugge,.:tiun t·ontPmpl:tlc•,.: :1 biftll't·atf'd lri:d, fir,.l ou f:~bit~· 
ami tlwn on <"nlpahilit~· nncl in.im~·. Wl' clP<'Iinr to ~uhjpr1 lihd trinl" t(') 
such lmrdt•n:<otn<' c·omplication,.; and inloiNahl!' dPI:t~ · . On lhP otht·r han<l, 
if, a" "<'<'Ill" morf' lik(·l~ · . flw prima fa<'iP showing cloP:< nol eontPmplat<' n 
mini-trial on f:tl~it~· , no rr~olution of eonAieting Pvidl'JH'l' on thi" i~stu·. but 
on I~ · :l rrPdibll' :t;;,.('f'ti<rn h.'· lht· pl:tinl iff, il "maeb of :l rc•quir('lll<'n( that 
ronld hP :<ali.-<fiPd h~· :tn :tffida.,·it or :t :<implt· wrifieation of i'lw pl(•ading8. 
\;\/(• :trr l'f;lnrl:tn'l to imhed illi:< rormali~lll in tlt(' <"on:<titulion. 
tl SPP R/A·ins \', rllitl'r7 Stn.te.~. :11\.J. \' . S. 20fi, 2:~.J. (19(i0) (Frankfnrtpr, 
J.): ''Limitations :tl'l' pr·opPrl~· pl:t!'<'d 11pon thl' oprralion of lhi~ g<'J)('r:tl 
prinripiP rof JlO il'Htirnollial priviiPg(•l 0111~ · to t]H' \'(')'~' limitl'd (•Xif'llt lhnt 
prrmitting a rdui<al to IC'i<tif\ or <'X!'Iudiug rcll'vanl c·,·ickncc ha" n p11blir 
good 1ntnsr·pnding lhl' nonltall~· Jll'l'dominanl prin<'ipiP of utilizing nil 
rational ntP:lll~ for a~<'rrt:tinin~~; truth." Rt'<' :tl:<o ,'I .T. 'Wigmore•, E,·idrncc 
§ 21!:)2 (:\l<'N:tn~~;hton n·,·. 1961): 4 The Works of JcrPmy Brut1tam .a21 
r(J. ]~ow ring cd. 1 4'3), 
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munications between himself and his advisers, that iutet·est 
must yield to a demonstrated specific need for evidence. As 
we stated, in referring to existing limited privileges against 
disclosure, "[w]hatever their origins. these exceptions to the 
demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor 
expansively construed. for they are in derogation of the sea.rch 
for truth." !d., at 710. 
With these considerations in mind. we conclude that the 
preseut construction of the First Amendment should not be 
modified by creating the evidentiary privilege which the 
respondents now urge. 
IV 
Although defamation litigation. including suits against the 
press. is an aucient J)henomenon. it is true that our cases from 
New York Times to Gertz haVE' considerably changed the 
profile of such cases. In years gone by, plaintiffs made out a 
prima facie case by proving the damaging publication. Truth 
and privilege were defenses. Intent, motive and malice were 
not necessarily involved except to counter qualified privilege 
or to prove exemplary damages. The plaintiff's burden is 
now considerably expaQded. In every'-or almost every case, 
the J)laintl 1nt"i""stfocus on the editorial ·process and prove a 
false publication attended by some degree of culpability on 
the part of the publisher. 1f yl~i!)tiff~ in consequence now 
resort to more discovery, it would not · be surprising; and it 
would follow that the costs and other burdens of this kind of 
litigation have escalated and become much more troublesome 
for both plaintiffs and defendants. It is suggested that the 
press needs constitutional protection from these burdens if it 
is to perform its task,"" which is indispensable in a system 
such a. ours. 
2 :; It j,; urg<•d th:d iht• largr co~t~ of dei'Puding lawHuit:< will intimidate• 
·the Jlf<'>'S and lrad to ~p]f-censor:-;hip, particularly whrre smaller newspaperi< 
nud hroadeu"tt•r,; arP 'involvrd. It is noted that Lnndo 's deposition alone 
('Ontinurd intrrmitt rntly for 0\'('r H yrar, fillrd 26 volumrs rontaining; 
.._.......,___ ,......_.,.,. --.. 
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Creating a constitutional privilege foreclosing direct inquiry 
into the editorial process. however. would not cure this prob-
lem for the press. Only complete immunity from liability 
from defamation would effect this result, and the Court has 
regularly found this to be an untenable construction of the 
First Amendment. Furthermore. mushrooming litigation 
costs. much of it due to pre-trial discovery. are not peculiar 
to the libel and slander area. There have been repeated ex- ~ 
pressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery, 
and voices from this Court have joined the chorus.'"' But 
until and unless there are major changes in the present rules 
of civil procedure. reliance must be had on what in fact and 
in law are ample )Owers of th · li trict iudg~ to Jrevent abuse. 
""--" "' ~""--
The Court has more than once declared that the deposition-
discovery rules are to be accol·ded a broad and liberal treat-
ment to effect their purpose of adequately inforrniug the 
litigauts in civil trials. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 
114-115 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 501, 507 
(1947). But the discovery provisions, like all of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. are subject to the iujunction of Rule 
1 that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action." (Emphasis 
added.) To this end. the requirement of Rule 26 (b) (1) that 
the material sought in discovery be "relevant" should be 
nearly ~,000 pagrs and 240 exhibits. As wrll as out-of-pockrt expense~ 
of the dl•po..;ition, there wen· ·substantial legal fees. and Lando and his 
assoeiatP~ were divertrd from news gathering itnrl rf>J)()rting for lll>ignificant 
amount of time. 
26 Blue C'hip Str.tmps "· Mcwo,· Drug Stores. 421 F. S. 72:3, 740-741 ) 
(1915); ACF l11dustries. Inc. \', EEOC. - U. S. - (19i9) (PowJ,LL, Y 
S'l'l>WAHT and HEHNQUJs'l' , .TJ :, di~senting from denial of certiomri); 
Burger: Agenda for 2000 A. D.: A NPed for Systematic Anticipation, The 
'Pound Conferenre, 70 F. R. D. 76, 95-96 (19i6). Thr Committee on 
HuiE:'s of Practice and Procedure of the .Judicial ConfereriCl' of the 1-nited 
Stat<•,; has propo~cd amendments to the Federal HulC's of Civil Procedure 
de,;igned lo ameliorate thi:-; problPm. Preliminary Draft of ·J>ropo;seq 
;\mencl!:q<'nts to the Fe't!cral _a,, I c.~ of Civil Procedure ( 1978) , 
.. 
' 
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firmly nppl it' d. and tlw district eourts should not nq.dect tlwir 
power to rr8triet. discovery when• "jul:'tiec· rc•quir<'S fprotection 
tor J a party or pt~rson fro111 annoyanc·<·. !'tnbarrassnwnt. opprl's-
sioll. or UtH.Itw huniPtl or exp<•nse ... .' ' F<•d. Rulr C'iv. Prot'. 
2fi (e). With thii' authority at hand . judges should not 
h<'~itnt<· to rX<'rci~r appropriatP control ovPr the di s<'on~ry 
])l'OC('S:'i, 
\YIH•tlwr, as a non<·onstitutiot~al mattc·r. howrvPr. t]l(' trinl 
j udgP proprrly appliNI tlw ruks of diRcovt~ry was not with in 
thl' boUll<laJ'iPS of t}w LjlH'Stioll CPI'tifi<•d under 28 1'. ~ . ('. 
~ 1:2~1:..? (h) und 8('<'ordin:zly is 11ot lwfol't-' 111:'. "7 The jud~lll<'llt 
of tlw ( ·ourt of .\ppc·nJ::; i~ rc·wrsc••l. 
So ordered. 
" 7 -:'IIJ L .Jr,-'l'ln: i-:TE\1'. \Ifl 1\'ollld r< 'llland lo h:tl'l' IIH' I rial t·ourt rult • OlJC'(' 
:tgain till tltt • rt ·lt ·,·: tnt ·t· or il1t · cli .-ptttt•d tptt·:' tion.' . !\til t Itt · opinion of tilt ' 
I rial judtrt ' rt 'l't': tl :' th:tl ht• t·orrt·t ·Jl .' · tllldt·r:'Jood th:tf Xt·tr l'ork Tilll (' s ant! 
(; t'l' t z n ·qnirt ·d I Jt.rl~t·rt lo prm·•· t·it IH'r knowin:.r l':tl .-<'houd or n ·t' klt ·~" 
di.•r• ·tr:trcl fo r fnlth. \\' il11 tilt' propt•r •·on ~ tittJtiml : tl t • lt' llll ' lll ~ in mind , tlw 
jtldtr< ' 1\'( •111 1111 111 nil• · 1h:li Ji lt' <JIIt'~tion " at i~ :' llt' 11'1' 1'1 ' (·h ·<~rl .' · n •lt•vanl all(! 
lh:tl 1111 l ' lllt~tiltilifln : tl pri1·ilt '!!t ' I ' Xt · IJ ~t ·d Latulo from :tll:'ll'l'l'ing tlwm . 'Yt• 
hold Jit:tJ. tiH · j1Jtlg• · t'flllllllitll·d no t ' IIJJ ~ fitntifln:tl t' ITflr hnt ~ • ·ontJ ·;u~· to 
-:'111: .• 11 "TJI'I·: ~T1 ·: 11 · 11n , find it in:IJIJiropri:tit· to n ·\·i<'ll' hi" niling~ till 
rt'it ' ' '" ll''Y· 
II 
k 6f ~~- '3 (N) 
~2.(pCY)-- ;-
.,~~~ .. -~ (~~))!;L 





BRAFT · OPINION 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
DATE: March 3, 1979 
Mr; - ~ustice · Powell, concurring. 
Although I join the opinion of the Court, I am not 
entirely convinced that the question presented by this case is 
limited to the existence of the editorial privilege claimed by 
respondents. I agree that with respect to pretrial discovery 
in a civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of 
editorial iudgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the 
protection the First Amendment accords the product of this 
1 
judgment, namely published speech. But althouqh I also aqree 
that this protection does not extend to enforcement of the kind 
of evidentiary privilege respondents assert, I do believe that 
pretrial discovery must be conducted with First Amendment 
concerns in mind. 
As the Court notes, a district court in supervising 
discovery possesses "what in fact and in law are ample powers • 
• . to prevent abuse." Ante, at 22. When demands for 
discovery threaten interests protected by the First Amendment, 
2. 
the exercise of these powers becomes a duty. The burden~ 
excessive and harassing discovery should not be permitted in 
l\' -.. ,'s e.r.~~'¥ "~ 
any litigation)\ ~ t~ese Q89 9S~e~ia~ly intolerable l when added 
• 
to the costs of discovery is a risk of reduction in the flow of 
information necessary to informed public discussion of 
qovernmental affairs. See First · National · Bank ·of · 8oston v. 
Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 781-783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washinqton 
Post · eo;, 417 u.s. 843,862-863 (1974) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
The initial inquiry in enforcem~nt of any discovery 
request is the question of relevance. Too lenient a standard 
allows the parties to saddle each other with excessive, 
redundant, and unnecessary demands. Whatever the standard of 
2 
relevance applicable in other circumstances, when evaluating a 
~~ 
discovery demand that trenches on First Amendment ~Pleeuts a 
district 
~WK~"1 
court should~scertai~the actual need for the 
material souqht in light of the intrusiveness of the request. 
Where the established need for the material does not outweiqh 
the First Amendment costs of meeting the demand, enforcement 
should be denied. Cf. Zurcher v. Stanford · ~aily, 436 U.S. 547, 
3 
570 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
Beyond determining what demands should be honored, a 
district court has considerable discretion to decide when a 
3. 
request for discovery must be complied with. In many cases 
careful management of the order of discovery can eliminate 
~ 
conflicts such as that presented here. Demands wfiiea might 
seem relevant when made may appear less significant in light of 
further discovery or the subsequent elimination of issues to be 
tried. In some cases it may be possible to avoid the conflict 
altogether by disposing of the suit on a ground to which the 
4 
material sought to be discovered would be irrelevant. 
These measures are illustrative of the kind of steps a 
district court may take to safeguard First Amendment inter~ts. 
~ 
Others can be developed by courts and litigants as problems 
arise. The presence of this power to accomodate First 
Amendment concerns where they exist reinforces the Court's 
decision not to create a new evidentiary privilege that would 
add to the already considerable burdens a public-figure libel 
plaintiff must bear without furthering substantially the values 
the First Amendment is designed to protect. 
• 
1. As the Court notes, the issue framed by respondents' motion 
for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 1292 (b) was: 
"What effect should be qiven to the First Amendment protection 
of the press with · respect · to · its · exercise · of · editorial · jndgment 
in pretrial discovery in a libel case governed by New · York 
Times · eo~ v. Snllivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964)?" Ante, at 3-4, n. 3 
(emphasis supplied). 
2. Among the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure are recommendations to restrict the scope of 
discovery generally. See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, March 1978, at 6-11. See 
also Powell, Reforms-- Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 
458, 461-463 (1978); ABA Section of Litigation, Report of the 
Special Comm. for the Study of Discovery Abuse, October 1977. 
3. The District Court held that the matters sought by 
petitioner were "clearly relevant." 73 F.R.D. 387, (SDNY 
1977). Although I agree with the Court that the District Court 
pro?erly understood the constitutional elements in a libel 
suit, and that it would be inappropriate for this Court to 
review the rulings on relevance, ante, at 23 n. 27, I do not 
FN 2 • 
• 
interpret the Court's opinion as barring review of these 
rulings by the District Court in light of the views expressed 
herein. 
4. I cannot agree with Mr. Justice Brennan that discovery into 
the exchange of views among press employees always must be 
postponed until a preliminary determination of the falsity of 
the publication is made. See post, at 16-17. First, I am not 
persuaded that in all circumstances inquiry into these 
exchanges will exert some impact on future publications, and I 
do not believe newsroom conversations, like any other 
conversation, enjoy any First Amendment protection other than 
· what is derived from that accorded published speech. In 
addition, I do not believe the issues of falsity and belief of 
falsity always will be separable. Often a trier of fact will 
have little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of 
a published statement, but rather will have to weigh the 
probative value of conflicting versions of events. In 
assessing the credibility of these versions, the trier of fact 
would be entitled to evidence that, for example, the author of 
one version was warned by a colleague familiar with the 
underlying facts that his conclusions were tenuous, 
inconsistent, or unreasonable. Denying a libel plaintiff this 
evidence would hobble unfairly his attempt to make a prima 
FN 3 • 
• 






SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Paul 
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
November 1, 1978 
I had not responded to the American Newspaper Publishers 
Association brief in my earlier memorandum, as I should have. I 
have gone back to the opinions of the lower courts and the 
appendix, with the contentions of that brief in mind. 
Unfortunately, the appendix does not contain examples of the 
questions Lando and CBS refused to answer. The following 
excerpts from a letter to counsel for Lando contains the most 
detailed summary I can find of the questions Lando refused to 
answer: 
"(1) questions concerning matters which Barry 
Lando proposed or discussed including in, or 
excluding from, the "60 Minutes" segment on Col. 
Herbert: 
"(2) questions concerning Lando's belief or intent 
as a basis for including in, or excluding from, the 
"60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic article 
reference to specific matters, facts and events: 
"(3) questions concerning matters which Lando 
considered, or was interested in, mentioning on the 
"60 Minutes" segment: 
"(6) questions concerning Lando's opinions and 
conclusions concerning the truth and accuracy of 
persons interviewed, appearing on or referred to in 
connection with the "60 Minutes" segment or the 
Atlantic Monthly article: 
"(7) questions concerning conclusions reached by 
Lando about specific events referring or related to 
the "60 Minutes" segment or the Atlantic Monthly 
article: 
"(8) questions concerning the basis for Lando's 
conclusions regarding people or leads to be 
pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with 
the "60 Minutes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly 
article: • • " App. at 130a-131a. 
2. 
As far as I can tell, Lando made no concessions in any of these 
areas, and the above list accurately describes the scope of the 
controversy between these parties. 
I note two things about these questions. First, it 
appears that they included inquiry into Lando's belief as to the 
veracity of matters that were broadcast. See especially category 
(6). Even his counsel conceded at oral argument that such 
matters should not be privileged. Second, all the questions 
except those in category (1) relate to Lando's personal thoughts 
and beliefs, and not to conversations or other interchange with 
fellow journalists. Most of these questions, it would appear, do 
not involve the "free flow of ideas" or "give-and-take in the 
3. 
newsroom." Rather, they pry into Lando's personal beliefs about 
the content of his publications. 
The cases to which the Publishers Association refers are 
not fully apposite here. Those decisions for the most part 
involved discussion or reporting of some sort, communicative 
processes that conceivably might be discouraged by undue 
scrutiny. Here, in contrast, most of the questions appear to 
relate to Lando's own impressions. Lando will continue to have 
thoughts and impressions no matter how much inquiry he is forced 
to endure. As a result, the rationale that supported recognition 
of a limited privilege in those cases (most of which involved a 
variant of executive privilege) does not apply here. 
The one category of questons that inquire into something 
other than Lando's personal thoughts involves discussions between 
Lando and Wallace about matters to be included or excluded in 
their show. Herbert and Lando were involved in the production of 
the program and their conversations presumably related to how it 
was put together. To the extent these conversations covered 
matters of balance and impact, I suppose they would be irrelevant 
to Herbert's case. If one confessed to the other his serious 
doubts about the veracity of something in the program, however, I 
would think that confession should and would be discoverable. I 
suppose the best analogy might be to the attorney-client 
privilege which, as I understand it, may not be used as a cloak 
behind which illegal activity may be carried out. 
For these reasons, and those discussed in my previous 





privilege. To the extent the court below believed the First 
Amendment required journalists to be free not to answer questions 
of the sort posed here, regardless of relevancy to disputed 
issues of fact, I believe it erred. 
the court below should be reversed. 
To this extent, I believe 
That is only the beginning, 
however. The court below, without creating a special privilege 
for the journalistic profession, could haved demanded both a 
substantial showing of relevance as a prerequisite to compelling 
a response to the questions, and efforts to avoid the 
confrontation altogether. To take the latter first, the district 
court, as Justice Brennan seemed to suggest at oral argument, 
coould have entertained summary judgment on the issue of truth, 
thereby precluding inquiry into malice. Of course, some of the 
blame for what may have been an unnecessary constitutional 
adjudication must rest with Lando, who seems to have been eager 
to reach the privilege issue. 
As for relevance, it is impossible to make any firm 
statement without having the exact questions available. If you 
would like me to look into the depositions to see what was 
objected to, I would be happy to do so. If the generic 
descriptions of the questions contained in the appendix and lower 
court opinions are at all accurate, however, it would seem 
Herbert has established substantial relevance as to at least some 
of the questions. If some of the statements in the program were 
false, and if some of the statements Lando excluded were true, 
Herbert is entitled to know why Lando included the former and not 
the latter. Lando might give self-serving or evasive answers, 
; 
. , 
but such responses will have significant impeaching value for 
Herbert. To the extent malice remains in the case, I think 
Lando's thought processes generally would be discoverable even 
under a relevance standard with some backbone. 
If I am correct that at least some of Herbert's 
5. 
questions may not constitute an abuse of discovery, then the 
privilege issue must be reached. To this extent I disagree with 
the Publishers Association, which seems to believe that the 
decision below can be sustained on discovery grounds. Although 
the district court believed it was constrained to apply an 
"almost anythng" standard on discovery, it also stated that, "The 
publisher's opinions and conclusions with respect to veracity, 
reliability, and the preference of one source of information over 
another are clearly relevant." Pet. App. 65a. If this 
observation was correct, I would think the decision of the court 






SECOND DRAFT OPINION 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Paul 
Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
March 9, 1979 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately 
to elaborate on what is said in Part IV of the opinion. I do 
not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's 
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point 
that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public 
figure, a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment 
interests as well as those of the plaintiff. 
I agree with the Court that the explicit 
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case 
of this kind, as articulated by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
u.s. 254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an 
evidentiary privilege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a 
civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of editorial 
judgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the protection the 
First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely 
published speech. This holding requires a reversal of the 
2. 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court notes, however, 
that whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of 
discovery", as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us 
under the question certified pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §1292(b), 
ante, at 23. I assume, therefore, that the litigation will 
----------
continue and the District Court will review the interrogatories 
and questions which respondents declined to answer. In short, 
the case will return to that court for completion of pretrial 
discovery. 
I had occasion earlier this Term, in 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF Industries, 
Inc, et al v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commissio~, No. 78-
453( January 8, 197~, to comment upon the widespread abuse of 
discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in 
civil litigation. Slip op. at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a 
few years after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery 
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment". 
Hic~man v. Taylor, 329 u.s. 495. The bar was not slow in 
heeding th is admonition, and indeed in exceeding - all too often -
the bounds of liberality. The situation has reached the point 
where there is serious "concern about undue and uncontrolled 
discovery". 
1 
Ante, at 22. In view of the evident attention 
3. 
given discovery by the District Judge in this case it cannot be 
said that the process here was "uncontrolled". But it 
certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all 
2 
concerned. 
Under present Rules the initial inquiry in 
enforcement of any discovery request is one of relevance. 
Whatever standard of relevance may be appropriate in other 
types of cases, when a discovery demand arguably impinges on 
First Amendment rights a district court should measure 
( 
relevance in light of both the private interests of the parties 
UY·t~" 
and the important public i__nt.e.r.ests implicated. On the one 
hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the solicitude 
evidenced in our opinions for First Amendment rights reflects 
concern for the public interest in a free flow of news and 
commentary. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 
u.s. 765, 781-783 (1978)~ Saxbe v. Washington Post Co~, 417 
u.s. 843, 862-.863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). On the 
other hand, there also is a significant public interest in 
according to civil litigants discovery of such matters as may 
be genuinely relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process 
of wei~fiiRg or balancing these interests is hardly an exact 
science, it is a function customarily carried out by judges in 
this and other areas of the law. In performing this task trial 
4. 
judges - despite the heavy burdens most of them carry - should 
recognize the "pressing need for judicial supervision." AFC 
3 
Industries, Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op. at 7. 
The Court today also emphasizes that the focus 
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 must be 
heeded, and that "district courts should not neglect their 
power to restrict discovery" in the interest of justice or to 
, > 
protect the partf from undue burden or expense. ~' at 22, 
23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c). I join the Court's 
opinion on my understanding that in heeding these admonitions, 
the values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to 
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, should be 
weighed carefully in striking a proper balance. 
FN l. 
1. See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task 
Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191-192 (1976); W. Erickson, The Pound 
Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System 
in the Twentieth Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. 
Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the 
United States Department of Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320, 329 (1978); 
Powell, Reforms-- Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 458, 
461-463 (1978). 
2. See ~' at 21 n. 25. 
3. In some instances it might be appropriate for the 
district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in hopes 
that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other 
developments in discovery might reduce the need for the 
material demanded. It is pertinent to note that respondents 
here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at the time 
discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery 
should be postponed until other issues on which liability 
depend are resolved. 
PBS-3/5/79 
BRAFT · GPINIGN 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
DATE: March 5, 1979 
Mr; · Justice -Powell, concurring. 
Although I join the opinion of the Court, I am not 
entirely convinced that the question presented by this case is 
limited to the existence of the editorial privilege claimed by 
respondents. I agree that with respect to pretrial discovery 
in a civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of 
editorial iudgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the 
protection the First Amendment accords the product of this 
1 
judgment, namely published speech. But although I also agree 
that this protection does not extend to enforcement of the kind 
of evidentiary privilege respondents assert, I do believe that 
pretrial discovery must be conducted with First Amendment 
concerns in mind. 
As the Court notes, a district court in supervising 
discovery possesses "what in fact and in law are ample powers • 
. . to prevent abuse." Ante, at 22. When demands for 
discovery threaten interests protected by the First Amendment, 
2. 
the exercise of these powers becomes a duty. The burden of 
excessive and harassing discovery should not be permitted in 
any litigation. The burden is especially intolerable, however, 
when added to the costs of discovery is a risk of reduction in 
the flow of information necessary to informed public discussion 
of qovernmental affairs. See First -National -Bank of · Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 781-783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington 
Post · Co~, 417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (1974) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
The initial inquiry in enforcement of any discovery 
request is the question of relevance. Too lenient a standard 
allows the parties to saddle each other with excessive, 
redundant, and unnecessary demands. Whatever the standard of 
2 
relevance applicable in other circumstances, when evaluating a 
discovery demand that trenches on First Amendment interests a 
district court should measure relevance by ascertaining the 
actual need for the material sought in light of the 
intrusiveness of the request. Where the established need for 
the material does not outweigh the First Amendment costs of 
meeting the demand, enforcement should be denied. Cf. Zurcher 
v. Stanford -Daily, 436 u.s. 547, 570 (1978) (Powell, J., 
3 
concurrinq). 
Beyond determining what demands should be honored, a 
3. 
district court has considerable discretion to decide when a 
request for discovery must be complied with. In many cases 
careful management of the order of discovery can eliminate 
conflicts such as that presented here. Demands that might seem 
relevant when made may appear less significant in light of 
further discovery or the subsequent elimination of issues to be 
tried. In some cases it may be possible to avoid the conflict 
altogether by disposing of the suit on a ground to which the 
4 
material sought to be discovered would be irrelevant. 
These measures are illustrative of the kind of steps a 
district court may take to safequard First Amendment interests. 
Others can be developed by courts and litigants as problems 
arise. The presence of this power to accomodate First 
Amendment concerns where they exist reinforces the Court's 
decision not to create a new evidentiary privilege that would 
add to the already considerable burdens a public-figure libel 
plaintiff must bear without furthering substantially the values 
the First Amendment is designed to protect. 
1. As the Court notes, the issue framed by 
respondents' motion for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1292 (b) was: "What effect should be given to the 
First Amendment protection of the press with · respect · to · its 
exercise · of · editorial · iadgment in pretrial discovery in a libel 
case governed by New · York · Times · eo~ v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 
(1964)?" ~, at 3-4, n. 3 (emphasis supplied). 
2. Among the proposed amendments to the Feneral Rules 
of Civil Procedure are recommendations to restrict the scope of 
discovery generally. See Advisory Comm. on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, . Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, March 1978, at 6-11. See 
also Powell, Reforms-- Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 
458, 461-463 (1978); ABA Section of Litigation, Report of the 
Special Comm. for the Study of Discovery Abuse, October 1977. 
3. The District Court held that the matters sought by 
petitioner were "clearly relevant." 73 F.R.D. 387, (SDNY 
1977). Although I agree with the Court that the District Court 
properly understood the constitutional elements in a libel 
suit, and that it would be inappropriate for this Court to 
review the rulings on relevance, ante, at 23 n. 27, I do not 
FN 2. 
interpret the Court's opinion as barring review of these 
rulings by the District Court in light of the views expressed 
herein. 
4. I cannot agree with Mr. Justice Brennan that 
discovery into the exchange of views among press employees 
always must be postponed until a preliminary determination of 
the falsity of the publication is made. See post, at 16-17. 
~
First, I am not persuaded that in all circumstances inquiry 
into these exchanges will exert some impact on future 
publications, and I do not believe newsroom conversations, like 
any other conversation, enjoy any First Amendment protection 
other than what is derived from that accorded published speech. 
In addition, I do not believe the issues of falsity and belief 
of falsity always will be separable. Often a trier of fact 
will have little or no objective evidence to assess the 
accuracy of a published statement, but rather will have to 
weigh the probative value of conflicting versions of events. 
In assessing the credibility of these versions, the trier of 
fact would be entitled to evidence that, for example, the 
author of one version was warned by a colleague familiar with 
the underlying facts that his conclusions were tenuous, 
inconsistent, or unreasonable. Denying a libel Plaintiff this 
evidence would hobble unfairly his attempt to make a prima 
FN 3. 
facie showing of falsity. 
It is pertinent to this case that respondents had not 
sought summary judgment on any issue at the time ~iscovery was 
opposed, and have not argued that discovery should be postponed 
until other issues on which liability depend.r are resolved. 
~ 
lfp/ss 3/7/79 
No. 77-1105 Herbert v. Lando 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
~ltfioc9fi I join the opinion of the Court, A ~J 
write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part 
IV of opinion .,..with respect- ..W.. d-iseov€-ry in 
a First Amendme~t case of this kind} I do not ~ my 
I/ I •,.,.S ,1-<-J_ ~d ~'lv.. 
~~ilona:J- observations as inconsistent with thej court 
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional 
c; 
that, in ex~rcisin§ s~pervisioA of discovery in 
a libel suit by a public figure ~ainst elements of the 
medi~, a district court has a duty to consider First 
""\.·~~ 
Amendment ~ as well as those of the plaintiff. 
I agree with the Court that the explicit 
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in 
a case of this kind, as articulated by New York Times 
v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964), should not be 
expanded to create an evidentiary privilege. /\ This 
holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court notes, however, that 
whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of 
discovery", as a nonconstitUtional matter, is not 
before us under the question certified pursuant to 28 
u.s.c. §1292(b), ante, at 23. I assume, therefore, that 
lt { Cl 
the t~~l, will continue and decision~ wi ll have t e-e 
will rev•C'-'.l 
m~e by the District CourtL~ the interrogatories and 
questions which respondents declined to answer. In 
short, the ~ase will return to that court for 
completion of pretrial discovery. 
I had occasion earlier this Term, in 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF 
Industries, Inc, et al v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, No. 78-453, January ~ , 1979, to comment 
~ 
upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has become 
a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. 
; 
Slip op . at 5. At the 1946 Term, just a few years ,. 
after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery rules 
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment". 
Hickman v~ Taylor, 329 u.s. 495. The bar was not slow 
in heeding his admonition, and indeed in exceeding -
all too often - the bounds of liberality. The 
situation has reached the point where there is serious 
"concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery". 
2. 
Apte, at 22.* 
; 
~P~: Pick up some of the citations that I relied on 
in my dissent from denial of cert in A~~ and also in my 
New York Marden Lecture. Put these in a footnote here 
and also make a cross reference back to Byron White's 
footnote 26 in which he refers to the same citations. 
3. 
In view of the evident attention given discovery by the 
District Judge in this case it cannot be said that the 
process here was "uncontrolled". But it certainly was 
protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all 
concerned.* 
*See ante at 21 n. 25. 
- ) 
4. 
Under present R ules the initial inquiry in 
enforcement of any discovery request is one of 
relevance. Whatever standard of relevance may be 
appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery 
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a 
~ 
district court should measure relevance in light ofl the 
~t-
private interests of the parties , hearing in mine taat 
important public interests al~o are implicated. On the 
one hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the 
solicitude evidenced in our opinions for First 
Amendment rights reflects concern for the public 
( 
( 
interest i n a free flow of news and commentary. A~here 
also is a significant public interest in according to 
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be 
( 
genuinely relevant to theirlawsuit. Although the 
process of weighing or balancing these interests is 
J 
hardly an exact science, ~ is a function customarily 
performed by judges in this and other areas of the law. 
p-t Tl.- k 
In exe'fit isiCng this ..fnnct jon trial judges - despite the 
heavy burdens most of them carry - should recognize the 
"pressing need for judicial supervision." AFC 
\{ ...... ?:__ ) I 
Industries, Inc.,~ supra \ a 
5. 
V\Nil \ 
Wherei First Amendment right ' are aJQan~e 
A \ 
t~~resisting discovery, thej)fourt should make 
1-
by 
sure that the information sought is in fact relevant to 
specific elements of the demanding party's case. The 
Court~ opini~ today also emphasizes that the feetts 
~st be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 
must be heeded, and that "district courts should not 
neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the 
interest of justice or to protect the party from undue 
burden or expense. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c). Ante, 
--'--- --
at 22, 23.~join the Court's opinion on my 
understanding that in heeding these admonitions, 
t .),L., ~~I' ...... ~ 
rv-c~~t:.t.ef.l-~ Ameg(lment l'i~l+i:,~ r though 
entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of 
this kind, should be weighed carefully in striking a 
proper balance. 
Note to Paul: I have reframed your draft of the 
concurrence to place a greater emphasis on abuse of 
general discovery, and also to tie my views into the 
6. 
7. 
majority opinion to the extent possible. I do not want 
to sound like a "stuck record" in light of what I have 
said previously in Brapzb.urg and Zur_sher. I do view 
this as basically a discovery case, once the 
constitutional issue is put aside. 
The above has been dictated even more 
hurriedly than usual. I therefore hold no brief for 
its languageor structure, and will count on you to do 
your customary careful editing and revising. Also, 
there may be meritorious aspects of your first draft 
that I have omitted, and which you can work into a 
consolidation of the best ideas of both. 
Also, you will have to provide appropriate 
footnotes. 
lfp/ss 3/7/79 
No~ 77-1105 -Herbert v~ · Lando 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although I join the opinion of the Court, I 
write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part 
IV of the Court's opinion with respect to discovery in 
a First Amendment case of this kind. I do not view my 
additonal observations as inconsistent with the Court's 
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional 
thought that, in exercising supervision of discovery in 
a libel suit by a public figure against elements of the 
media, a district court has a duty to consider First 
Amendment rights as well as those of the plaintiff. 
I agree with the Court that the explicit 
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in 
a case of this kind, as articulated by New York Times 
v. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 (1964), should not be 
expanded to create an evidentiary privilege. This 
holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court notes, however, that 
whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of 
2. 
discovery", as a nonconstitutional matter, is not 
before us under the question certified pursuant to 28 
u.s.c. §1292(b), ~' at 23. I assume, therefore, that 
the trial will continue and decisions will have to be 
made by the District Court on the interrogatories and 
questions which respondents declined to answer. In 
short, the case will return to that court for 
completion of pretrial discovery. 
I had occasion earlier this Term, in 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF 
Industfies, Inc, et al v. Equa! Employment Qpportugity 
Commission, No. 78-453, January , 1979, to comment 
upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has become 
' 
a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. 
Slip op. at 5. At the 1946 Term, just a few years 
after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery rules 
are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment". 
Hickma~1 v. Taylor, 329 u.s. 495. The bar was not slow 
in heeding his admonition, and indeed in exceeding -
all too often - the bounds of liberality. The 
situation has reached the point where there is serious 
"concern about undue and uncontrolled discovery". 
Ante; at 22.* 
*Paui: Pick up some ·of the citations that I relied on 
in-my dissent from denial of cert in ACF and also in my .______ 
New York Marden Lecture. Put these in a footnote here 
and also make a cross reference back to Byron White's 
footnote 26 in which he refers to the same citations. 
3. 
4. 
In view of the evident attention given discovery by the 
District Judge in this case it cannot be said that the 
process here was "uncontrolled". But it certainly was 
protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for all 
concerned.* 
*see ante at 21, n. 25. 
----------
s. 
Under present Rrules the initial inquiry in 
enforcement of any discovery request is one of 
relevance. Whatever standard of relevance may be 
appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery 
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a 
district court should measure relevance in light of the 
private interests of the parties, bearing in mind that 
important public interests also are implicated. On the 
one hand, as this Court has repeatedly recognized, the 
solicitude evidenced in our opinions for First 
Amendment rights reflects concern for the public 
interestin a free flow of news and commentary. There 
also is a significant public interest in according to 
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be 
genuinely relevant to theirlawsuit. Although the 
process of weighing or balancing these interests is 
hardly an exact science, this is a function customarily 
performed by judges in this and other areas of the law. 
In exercising this function trial judges - despite the 
heavy burdens most of them carry - should recognize the 
"pressing need for judicial supervision." AFC 
Industries, Inc., supra at 
6. 
Where First Amendment rights are advanced by 
the party resisting discovery, the Court should make 
sure that the information sought is in fact relevant to 
specific elements of the demanding party's case. The 
Court's opinion today also emphasizes that the focus 
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 
must be heeded, and that "district courts should not 
neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the 
interest of justice or to protect the party from undue 
burden or expense. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c). Ante, 
at 22, 23. I join the Court's opinion on my 
understanding that in heeding these admonitions, 
properly asserted First Amendment rights, though 
entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of 
this kind, should be weighed carefully in striking a 
proper balance. 
Nqte ~o Pau!: I have reframed your draft of the 
concurrence to place a greater emphasis on abuse of 
general discovery, and also to tie my views into the 
7. 
majority opinion to the extent possible. I do not want 
to sound like a "stuck record" in light of what I have 
said previously in ~ranzbyrg and ZuFcher. I do view 
this as basically a discovery case, once the 
constitutional issue is put aside. 
The above has been dictated even more 
hurriedly than usual. I therefore hold no brief for 
its languageor structure, and will count on you to do 
your customary careful editing and revising. Also, 
there may be meritorious aspects of your first draft 
that I have omitted, and which you can work into a 
consolidation of the best ideas of both. 
Also, you will have to provide appropriate 
footnotes. 
lfp/ss 3/7/79 
No~ 77-1105 Herbert v. Lando 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although I join the opinion of the Court, I 
write separately to elaborate on what is said in Part 
IV of the Court's opinion with respect to discovery in 
a First Amendment case of this kind. I do not view my 
additonal observations as inconsistent with the Court's 
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional 
H.-f; 
thought ~ in exercising supervision of discovery in a 
libel suit by a public figure against elements of the 
media, a district court has a duty toJ b~d tRa~ 
First Amendment rights as well as those of the 
plaintiff, muot be consioeree, 
I agree with the Court that the explicit~~ 
1 
protection of First Amendment rights in a case of this 
kind ~articulated by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
) 1\ 
U.S. 254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an 
evidentiary privilege. This holding requires a 
reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The 
~urt notes, however, that 
judge properly 
applied the rules of us 4:-ft-
~ ~k 
of efis a~Rea~ise ~ the question; certified ~de~ 
~ ~ 
28 u.s.c. §1292(b), ante, at 23. T.Awlii, s~Ree this, is 
--'--
~~~ 
an interlocatery app~ I assume that the trial will 
.( 
continue and decisions will have to be made by the 
).k . 
District Court on Interrogatories and questions which 
J\ 
~ 
respondents decline to answer. 
A 
In short, the case will 
~retrial discovery. 
1\ 
I had occasion earlier this Term, in 
dissenting from the denial of certiorari in ACF 
Industries, Inc, et al v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
2. 
Commission, No. 78-453, January , 1979, f>~ ~ 
~ the widespread abuse of discovery that has 
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil 
litigation. Slip op. at 5. At the 1946 Term ~ tni€ 
) 
re"onr±-, just a few years after adoption of the Federal 
~eu..A-
Rules of Civil Procedure, i.t was stated "that the 
"" deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad 
and liberal treatment". Hickman v. Taylor, 329 u.s. 
495. The bar was not slow in 
~ee~ fhe sit~tion has reached the point where there 
is serious "concern about undue and uncontrolled 
discovery". Ante, at 22.* 
*Paul: Pick up some of the citations that I relied on 
in my dissent from denial of cert in ACF and also in my 
New York Marden Lecture. Put these in-a footnote here 
and also make a cross reference back to Byron White's 
footnote 26 in which he refers to the same citations. 
3. 
4. 
[~~----------~ In view of the evident attention given 
discovery by the District Judge in this case it cannot 
be said that the process here was "uncontrolled". But 
it B certainly#{ protracted 
*see ante at 21, n. 25. 
5. 
Under present ~les the initial inquiry in 
enforcement of any discovery request is~~o~~ 
relevance. Whatever standard of relevance may be 
appropriate in other types of cases, i~ ~ cJea~~~ 
~ 
• Lln:rt wneR BQar;.oe1!ifl§ A a discovery demand ~ arguably 
impinges on First Amendment rights a~istrict ~ourt 
. . , (,~ should measure relevance 1n l1ght of theA coRzxletiHg 
a:,.~ 
interests of the parties~earing in mind that ~ 
1\ 
~ ~/~~~, 
/'"-~ in teres~ ~- ~aolQlll ~-i·.rate in--ml'Ltlre. On the one hand, 
as this Court has repeatedly recognized~the solicitude 
evidenced in our opinions for First Amendment rights 
reflects concern 
~t;&¥i'l ~~~~~~ 
for the public interest11 There also .4~·""'-
. ~ ~~-
public interest in according to civil is a significant 
litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely 
~ 
relevant to ~ 9ive~ lawsuit. Although the process of 
" 
weighing or balancing these interests is hardly an 
exact is a function 
to limitin 
~CZ&Bear:y at incrfginal dj reo~ 
~~ere First Amendment rights are advanced 
tlae;'z ar 
by the party resisting discovery, the ¢ourt should make 
_?4f67? 
sure that the information sought is in fact relevant to 
specific elements of the demanding party's case. The 
Court's opinion today also emphasizes that the focus 
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 
must be heeded, and that "district courts should not 
\\ 
neglect their power to restrict discovery in the 
interest of;fustice or to protect the party from undue 
burden or expense. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c). Ante, 
at 22, 23. I join the Court's opinion on my 
understanding that in heeding these admonitions} 
properly asserted First Amendment rights, though 
entitled to no constitutional privilege in a case of 
eet.~r·~ 
this kind, should be weighed in striking a proper 
\ 
balance. 
Note to Paul: I have reframed your draft of the 
concurrence to place a greater emphasis on abuse of 
6. 
general discovery, and also to tie my views into the 
majority opinion to the extent possible. I do not want 
to sound like a "stuck record" in light of what I have 
said previously in Branzparg and Zurcher. I do view 
this as basically a discovery case, once the 
constitutional issue is put aside. 
The above has been dictated even more 
hurriedly than usual. I therefore hold no brief for 
~~~, 
its language~ and will count on you to do your 
customary careful editing and revising. Also, there 
may be meritorious aspects of your first draft that I 
have omitted, and which you can work into a 
consolidation of the best ideas of both. 




(I l '.).' 
~~FT OPINION 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
DATE: March 9, 1979 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately 
to elaborate on what is said in Part IV of the opinion. I do 
not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's 
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point 
that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
figure ' a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment 
~ ~ ~-;;:,~~.X 
interests .as well asA~e of the plaintiff. 
I agree with the Court that the explicit 
constitutional protection of First Amendment rights in a case 
of this kind, as articulated by New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964), should not be expanded to create an 
evidentiary privilege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a 
civil proceeding, what protection the "exercise of editorial 
judgment" enjoys is entirely a result of the protection the 
First Amendment accords the product of this judgment, namely 
published speech. This holding requires a reversal of the 
2. 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court notes, however, 
that whether "the trial judge properly applied the rules of 
discovery", as a nonconstitutional matter, is not before us 
under the question certified pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §1292(b), 
ante, at 23. I assume, therefore, that the litigation will 
continue and the District Court will review the interrogatories 
and questions which respondents declined to answer. In short, 
the case will return to that court for completion of pretrial 
discovery. 
occasion f arlier this Term, in 
~ 
dissenting from the d nial of certiorari in ACF Industries, 
Inc. Commission, No. 78-
453 (Jan~ 8, 1979), to comment upon the widespread abuse of 
discovery that has become a prime cause of delay and expense in 
civil litigation. Slip op. 1 at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a 
few years after adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this Court stated "that the deposition-discovery 
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment". 
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495. The bar was not slow in 
heeding this admonition, and indeed in exceeding - all too , 
~ac...~~~~ 
often- the bounds of~liberality. AThe situation has reached 
the point where there is serious "concern about undue and 
uncontrolled discovery". Ante, at 22. 1 In view of the evident 
attention given discovery by the District Judge in this case it 
cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled". But 
it certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expensive for 
2 
all concerned. 
Under present Rules the initial inquiry in 
enforcement of any discovery request is one of relevance. 
Whatever standard e£ 1!elev~lic;ymay be appropriate in other 
types of cases, when a discovery demand arguably impinges on 
First Amendment rights a district court should measure 
relevance in light of both the private needs of the parties and 
the ~ott~ public concerns implicated. On the one hand, as 
this Court has repeatedly recognized, the solicitude evidenced 
in our opinions for First Amendment rights reflects concern for 
"'~,;:;:] 
the Apublic interest i n a free flow of news and commentary. See 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 u.s. 765, 781-
783 (1978): Saxbe v. washington Post Co., 417 u.s. 843, 862-
863 ( 1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). On the other hand, there 
also is a significant public interest in according to civil 
litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely 
relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of balancing 
these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function 
customarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of 
the law. In performing this task trial judges - despite the 
4. 
heavy burdens most of them carry - should recognize the 
"pressing need for judicial supervision." AFC Industries, Inc. 
3 
v. EEOC, supra, slip op. 1 at 7. 
The Court today also emphasizes that the focus 
must be on relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 must be 
heeded, and that "district courts should not neglect their 
power to restrict discovery" in the interest of justice or to 
protect the parties from undue burden or expense. ~' at 22, 
23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c). I join the Court's 
opinion on my understanding that in heeding these admonitions, 
the district court must ensure that the values protected by the 
First Amendment, though entitled to no constitutional privilege 
in a case of this kind, are weighed carefully in striking a 
proper balance. 
FN 1. 
1. See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task 
Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191-192 (1976); W. Erickson, The Pound 
Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System 
in the Twentieth Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. 
Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response from the 
United States Department of Justice, 76 F.R.D. 320, 329 (1978); 
Powell, Reforms-- Long Overdue, 33 Record of N.Y.C.B.A. 458, 
461-463 (1978). 
2. See ante, at 21 n. 25. 
3. In some instances it might be appropriate for the 
f.4 
district court to delay enforcing a discovery demand, in~hope; 
that the resolution of issues through summary judgment or other 
developments in discovery might reduce the need for the 
material demanded. It is pertinent to note that respondents 
here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at the time 
discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery 
should be postponed until other issues on which liability 
depend are resolved. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
MEMORANDUM 
RE: Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 
DATE: March 13, 1979 
As you can see, I have suggested that you add to page 1 
a bit of the First Amendment discussion I had in my first draft. 
All of my co-clerks felt it desirable to expand somewhat your 
analysis of the First Amendment issue, in order to aid the 
treatment of relevance on pages 2-3. Briefly stated, the concern 
was that lower courts be given guidance in identifying the First 
Amendment interests to be weighed in assessing relevance. I have 
offered up some of my original language, as edited by my 
colleagues. If this meets with your approval, we can take this 
to the print shop forthwith. 
1. 
~r~-
I eaRAnotA ~ with Mr. Justice Brennan that the 
First Amendment requires that discovery into the exchange of 
views among press employees ~ must be postponed until a 
preliminary determination of the falsity of the publication is 
made. See post, at 16-17. ~rst , 
into these 
conversations are like any other conversations, as they enjoy 
no special First Amendment protection other than what they 
~4~~~~~~ 




~ do not believe the issues of falsity and belief of falsity 
always will be separable. Often a trier of fact will have 
little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of a 
published statement, but rather will have to weigh the 
probative value of conflicting versions of events. In 
assessing the credibility of these versions, the trier of fact 
would be entitled to evidence that, for example, the author of 
one version was warned by a colleague familiar with the 
~ 
underlying facts that his conclusions were tenuous, 
~ 
inconsistent, or unreasonable. Denying a libel plaintiff this 
+at~~ ~~-~-~ 11 evidence would~&o~sl~fa ir~ h1s attempt 
~~~4,~~~ ..,.,~, 
~sh;;;;w:;i;:;ry-ef falsie¥ . () 
~~/'tt..c...~. 
~o: The Chief Just1oe 
Mr. Justice ar~nnan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Juat l ae ib1te 
Mr. Just 1 oa l!a rshall 
Mr. Just 1 ee Bla/kmun 
Mr. Jus t1 a H~hnquist. 
Mr. Justi~e Stevens 
From: Mr. Just ice Powell 
2nd DRAFT Circulated: ______________ _ 
No. 77-1105 
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, 
v. 
Barry Lando et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit.' 
[March -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to 
elaborate on what is said in Part IVf.\oWhe. opini~ I do 
not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's 
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point 
that, in supervising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, 
a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment inter-
ests as well as the private interests of the plaintiffs. 
28MAR1C': 1 r_l 
I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional pro-
tection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as 
articulated by New York Times ·,r. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
(1964), should not be expanded to create an evidentiary privi-
lege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding, 
whatever protection the "exercise of editorial judgment" enjoys 
depends entirely on the protectiou the First Amendment 
accords the product of this judgment, namely published 
speech. As the Court makes clear, the privilege respondents r;..~  / .. ~ 
claim is unnecessary to safeguard publis~d speech.1 This m ..,. ;r--
-- -- l ? """- p u.l.rt...e _ ~~ "'~ <:.. w-4\.- f\At., , 
1 I am not in agrt'ement with Mn. JUHTICB B ENNAN that the Fir~t , :\ \.J}.,_ 
Amcndnwnt. require:; that discovery into the ex ange of views among J..,.., .'v- )\\M' J. • 
prr~s employee,; must br postponrd until a preli inary det rrmina ·n ~-- -t\-...l S "'J,... t.d>' lit."'1 II'> :.l 
~b(• .J:abJt' 9f. tilt' flUb!iration i~ made. _RPt' J!O~, at 16-17. - J"\."'-'>T. ~ ..... ~ t~a.\d 
( ~I'\£\ I o.Nw\ t\ot JH:'r>'uac!Pd that court-suprrvisrd inquiry into exchang::; I::> likely t~ '1'\" '- "•\..tev--c}, \)o.A, ~ 
~ ('Xert a sicrnificant t'ffrct on futurE' publirntiofV:i. ewsroom conversations I 
;ire-rrG ;tny other~. o1vrr::;a wn::;, inasm1rch as thPy ·E'njoy no srwcial Fir::;t 7-2 · 
AmPndment prot<•cti u other than what thry derive from that accorded to 
nh!i,hrd »pPt'ch 1 foreover , 1 do not believe the i":;ues of falsity and 
o""~ cN.c'!.' 
1\J\ """"'"' ~vW-r.\ \)vJ.:\. !.'"'-·vu 6o. , . \ crr" \\o ) '-\ 1 't u. ~. "\ , ( 111 '"') ) ~J. (...~ o-. ~-rvo.~ «o.~r. "'"0 <)"\ ~ v- • l11 , 
v 'De ~001J; , 1.. ~~ .~ .S,., C.... .. .... > '+l ..l U • ~ CJ ~1 C1c17-,), {lnn/, r..U. 'V\.o !."1~"''\ \ QY -\-\'-(.. -\\'-.I..<N 1\-..GJ\ 
\- {\ o\ +- I , ..... f'..r: t AV\.u-c\. .... ~) v 
C;Jo.. M ~ '(c.;LL~ ... Q.,. )<''\') 0. 10~{."~ Sl~ .I.M ~ ' 
f ...... ,J.~ J._ ~, ;VI..._, ~J! t\ ci 1"\ (b'(.N'(.~G\ ~~c.e-l•M <:>~ ~c...,\,'ul""' V1 \MI\ l c.. r ~u'c..\., ""~ 
-\ \'-.~..,'( s"'-\> "'" .. ,,.., ) .;, , "ti\.s.. \-ru.J..~ .,f ~ p.t.~ . 
-t \ Y(.. ' ~ <'t. - -r' .J.:.L. 
-t\4 '( u' Q\'\. -\ '"" 
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holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether "the trial 
judge properly applied the rules of discovery," as a nonconsti-
tutional matter, is not before us under the question certified 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), ante, at 23. I assume, 
therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District 
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which 
respondents declined to answer. 
Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari 
in ACF Industries, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, No. 78-453 (Jan. 8, 1979), I had occasion to 
comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has 
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. 
Slip op., at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court 
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded 
a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 
/ 495. 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably 
responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery 
techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litiga-
tion art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage 
of justice. As the Court now recognizes, the situation has 
reached the point where there is serious "concern about undue 
and uncontrolled discovery." Ante, at 22.2 In view of the 
belief of falsity always will be separable. Often a trier of fact wiii have 
little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of a published state-
ment, but rather will have to weigh the probative value of conflicting 
versions of events. In asse;:;sing the eredibility of the,;e versions, the trier 
I ol' fact would br c•utitled to cou~ider evidence that, for example, the author 
of onr version wa~ warned by a colleague familiar with the underlying fact:; 
tlwt hi~ conclusion:; wrre dubiouo, incousistrnt, or unverified. Denying a 
librl plaintiff the beurfit of thi::; typr of Pvidence would restrict unduly hi,; 
uttPmpt to mc•et the ;dread~, high ~tandard of proof that New York Times 
Co. nfford~ thr prPH>'. 
2 See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 
F. H. D. 159, 191-192 (1976); W. Erickson, The Pound Conference Rec-
ommendat ions: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twentieth Cen-
·. 
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evident attention given discovery by the District Judge in this 
case it cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled." 
But it C<'rtainly was l)rotracted and undoubtedly was expen-
sive for all concerned.~ 
Under present Rules the initial inquiry in enforcement of 
any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard 
may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery 
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a 
district court should measure the degree of relevance required 
in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public 
concerns implicated. On the one hand, as this Court has 
repeatedly recognized. the solicitude for First Amendment 
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the 
important public interest in a free flow of news and commen-
tary. See F'irst National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765. 781-783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 
843, 862-863 (1974) (PowELL, J .. dissenting). On the other 
hand. there also is a significant public interest in according to 
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely 
relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing 
these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function cus-
tomarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of the 
law. In performing this task trial judges-despite the heavy 
burdens most of them carry-are now increasingly recognizing 
the "pressing need for judicial supervision:" AFC Industries, 
Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op., at·7.1 
tury, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. Bell, The Pound Conference 
Follow-Up: A Respon~e from the United States Department of Justice, 
76 F. R. D. 320, 329 (1978); Powell, Reforms-Long Overdue, 33 .Record 
of N. Y. C. B. A. 458, 461-463 (1978). 
3 See ante, at 21 n. 25. 
~ In some in~tarJCes it might be appropriate for the · district court to 
delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of 
issues through summary ji.1dgment or other developments in ·discovery 
might reduce the need for the material dematlded. It is pertinent to note 
that respondents here had not sought summary judgment on any "jssue at 
77-1105-CONCUR 
HERBERT v. LANDO 
The Court today emphasizes that the focus must be on 
relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure must be heeded, and that "district courts 
should not neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the 
interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden 
or expense. Ante, at 22, 23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c). 
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed~ 
ing these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the 
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to 
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed 
carefully in striking .a proper ba1ance. 
t he time discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should 
be postponed unt il other issues on which liability depend are resolved. 
T-o: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Jtl.atioe Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justioe White 
Mr. Just1oe Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blaokmun 
Mr. Justice Rshnquiat. 
Mr. JuBtioe Stevens 
1st DRAFT 
From: Mr. Justice Powell 
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Anthony Herbf'rt, Petitioner. On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. U nitf'rl States Court of Ap-
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[March -, H'J79] 
MR . .1t":'iTICE PowELL, eoncul'ring. 
T jom the op1nion of t lw Court, and write separately to 
elaborate on what is said in Part TV of the opinion. I do 
not see my obsPrvations as being inconsiste-nt with the Court's 
opinion; ratiH'r. I write to emphasizf' the additional point 
that, in superv1sing discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, 
a district court has a du ty to eonsider First Ameudment inter-
ests as well as the privat<' interests of the plaintiffs. 
I agrPe with the Court that the explicit constitutional pro-
tectwn of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as 
articulated by X e w 1· ork Times -.r. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
(1964) , '5hould JJot be Pxpanded to create an evidentiary privi-
leg<'. With reRpect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding, 
what<>ver protcctwu th t' "exNcisP of editorial judgment" ('njoys 
d('JlPnds cntm,ly on the protection tlw :First Amendment 
accords tlw product of this judgment, namely published 
sp<'('Ch. As the Court makes clear. the privilege respondents 
claim 1 · unnecessary to ::;afeguard published speeeh.' This 
1 I am not 111 :~grt'<'llH:'lll with ·:\fn .. Jtrt''l' It'E BHEKXAX th:~l the Fir~t 
.\nwndnH•nt n•qtlln·~ that di~t·ov<·r~· uno t h<• <'X<'hangc• of \'if'w:< :tlllOil![ 
JliW~ PlllJll0.\'1'(':-< lllll:.:t I)(' postpmwd tiiJtil a prPliminar~· dPt<·nninntion ol' 
ilw l'ai"Ity of ill!' publif'atiOn i,.. madl'. Sc•t• Jlu,~ l. at l(i-li . :\or am T 
JH'r:<uadPd 1 ha I c·otll't -:.:IIJWI'V I"t'd mqt11ry into t lw:.:p I'X<'hang;t•:< i" likd~· i o 
l'XI'rl :1 :.:Igmfll':tll! pffpc•l on fu t nrc• pubhea I ion~. :\ t·w~room t·onn·r"a tion~ 
an· llkt• an.' ol ht•r c·onn·r"a t ion~, ina~nJttch "" tJi p~· Pnju~ · no >'JH'<'ial Fir~t 
.-\mc•IHlnwni proiPc·iwn oihc·r thau what th<'~ · clPrivt• from lhni II<'<'Ofdl'd 10 
puloli:.:lwd ~l'<'<'<'h \lot<·m·c·I. I do not br lie\'(' llw i:.:~ut •:.: of fal:<it~· nnd 
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HERBERT v. LAKDO 
holding rt>quin'S a reversal of the judgnwnt of the Court of 
Appt>als. ThP ( 'ourt notes. however. that whether "the trial 
judge prop<•rly applied the rules of discovery.'' as a uonconsti-
tutional mattN. is not before us under th!:' questi011 certified 
pursuant to ~8 l'. S.C.~ 1:292(b), ante, at 23. r assume. 
tlH'rc·fore, that the litigatiott will coutinuP and the District 
Court will reviE-w tlw Interrogatories and questions which 
respondents declitH'cl to answr1·. 
Earli<'r this Term. in dissPnting from the denial of certiorari 
in A CP Industries, l11c. v. Eq-ual b' rnployment Opportunity 
Commission, ).io. 78-453 (Jan. 8. 197H). I had occasion to 
cumnwnt upon th!:' widespread abuse of discovery that has 
beconw a prillt<' cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. 
Slip op .. at 5-7. At the 1H46 Term. just a few years after 
adoption of the Federal H ules of Civil Procedure. this Court 
stated "that tlw deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded 
a broad and liberal treatment." H·ickman Y. Taylor, 32g U.S. 
405. Tlw bar and trial courts understandably responded 
affirmatively. . \s tlw years have passed. discovery tech niq U<'S 
aud tactiCS have h<'conw a highly developed litigation art-one 
not infrequpntly <'xploited to the disadvantage of justice. As 
the Court now JW•ognizt'S. tlw situation has reached the poiut 
wherP tlwr<• IS ~enous "concerti about undue and uncontrollPd 
rhscovery. · .-l11te, at 2:2." ln viP'v\' of tlw evident attention 
hdu•l of f: d~tl~· alwa~·s will ])(' ,pparablP. Oft<'ll a tri<'l' of fatl will han· 
11111(' or no ohJt>ttiv<· <'Vtd<' llt<' to """<'H~ lh<' a<·eura<·~· of :1 published statt·-
lll<'lll, hnl rallwr 1\'lll hav<' lo weigh t.lw probativr valur of eonflicting 
I '('J'"lOll~ of ('\'Pill,., ln :L1<1<('""ing th1• ( ' I'PdibiJit~ · of t]H':-i(' V<'l'1<101lH, 1]1(' lrit•J' 
of la<'l would IH' <'ntitiPd to <·vtdPIW<' that , for PxampiP, tlw author of otu· 
1'(' 1'"1011 wa:.; warnpd IJ,I' a l'oill':tglt<' familiar with tlw umlPrlying fact~ thai 
]u,- <·ouciu"JOII" ll'(' fP duhwu,, ineon;o<t,.;(pnt, or unv<•rifiPd. Drn~·ing a lil)('l 
plamttff t]u, t~·p<· ol <'VtdPIH'<' would n•,.;l net undul~· hi,; attPmpt 10 mP<'t 
th<· a lrPad~· !ugh ,.tandanl of woof th:il .\'ew fork Times C'o . :d'l'ord, 
lht Jll'<'"" 
" :-iP<' ABA, H<•porl of Pound C'onfpn•ne<· Follow-Fp Ta;-;k Fore<·, 7-! 
r H D. 159, 191-1!:12 (HI7uJ, W. Enrk~on, Tlw Pound Confprenc<' He<'-
oJmueiHiatwu" ,\ Bhwpnnt for tlw .Jn"ti<'r R~Al'm Ill tlw TwPntieth C'en-
i7 - 1 l 0.')-C'O:\CUit 
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f!_J\'£'11 dJf-;('0\'C'I'Y hy thE' District .Jud~!;C' in this <·as<· it c·nrtrrol br 
:-;nirl thnt thr proec•ss hPrc• 11·ns "tiiH'ontroll<·d... Hut it <·<·r-
tn i nly 11·as prot raetC'd and undouhkd l.v was <'.'\ p<'nsi ,.<. for ali 
con CC' r n C'< 1. 
rndC'r pn•sent Rul<·s thC' initial inquiry ir1 rnfor<·<·nwnt of 
any discoVPry n•quest is one• of rC'kvaJtC<'. \\ 'hat<'VN standard 
may I)(' appropriate in othPr typ<'S of case'S. wh<·n a discovC'ry 
drmand arguably impinges ou First . \uwrHI IIH'n t rights a 
distrirt <'OIIrt should nl('aSIII'<' th<' degn'<' of relC'vanc<• requirc'd 
in light of both tlw prinltc• JIPC'ds of tlw partiPf' and thE' public 
corw<'I'IIS 11nphratC'd. Or1 tlw OJH' hand. as this Court has 
l'C'])('at<•dly J'<'eogrtiz('d, tlH' solieitudt' for First Amen<lm<•rt t 
rights r\·idPJIC<'d in our opinions rl'fi<'cts conC<'I'Il for the 
important public in t<'r<·st in a fret' flow of lll'WS and eolnnwn-
tary. :-I<•<• First Yational Ua11k of Boston \'.Bellotti, 43;) r. S. 
7(),), 7~1-7H3 I l!J7H); 8a.rue , .. Washinuton Post Co., 417 F. ~. 
R4~. g()2-I·W:~ (1!174) (Pow ~:LL, J.. dissentin11;). On tbe other 
hand. thc•rc· also is a significant public intt>n'st in aeconling to 
civil litigants di:-.l·ovc·ry of such Jllatt~:·rs as may lw g<'JJUinely 
rC'IPvant to tlwir la\Ysuit. \lthuu~!;h tlw procf'ss of weighing 
tiH·se lllt<'n•sts is hardly :111 <·xact sci('llC<'. it is a fur1ction cus-
tomarily carrie>d out by Jlld_g<·::> in this and other an'as of th(' 
law. In p<'rfonning this task trial judges-despite the heavy 
burd('JIS most of tlwm carry-an• now increasingly r<>cognizinl!-
the "pressing nPed for Judicial supPrvision." A Ji'C Industries, 
l11c. , .. h'EOC, supra, sli p op .. at 7. 1 
tur~· , 'iti F H. D. '277, '2HR-::WO (197R): C:. H<'ll, Tlw Pound Confl'r<:'ll<'<' 
FollO\\-l 'p: .-\ H<'SjlOI\~(' fmm th<• l'llltl'd Stat!':; .l)ppartnwnt or .Ju~tll'C, 
iii F H. D. :t!O, :{'2!) (l!J'i.'·\): J'owl'll, Hl'fonn,.-Long (h-crdtt<', ;{;3 Hreord 
of~ . Y. C. B. A. 45~">, .J,til--lti;{ (107~) . 
'' :-It·<· aute. :tl :..!J 11 25 
' Itt :<onw ut~t:ttH·c·~ tt mtght lw :tppmpri:ti<' for the• di~triC'f roll!'( to 
dt•lay <'llfor·emg :t dt,c·m·<·r~ · d<·mand, Ill th<• hop<' that t hl' rl'>'oluttort of 
'~·' llr" through :<umnw r~· ,JIId!!;llH'ttt or otlwr d<'Yl'lopmrnt" 111 di~<·on•ry 
ll•l~?;ht n•dtH'l' th<· tH·l'd for illl' m:ttPI'l:tl dl'maJHkd. It t~ JH•rtuH'nt to note 
that l'l'~pondPtth hPJ'<' h:td not -<onght Rumm:tr~· judgm<'ttt on a ttY i~~ll<' ;tt 
17-1105-COXCUR 
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The C'ourt today emphasizes that th<' focus must Of' on 
relevancf', that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure must be heeded. a11d that "district courts 
should not neglect thf'il' power to restrict discovPry'' in the 
interest of justice or to protect the parties from uudue burden 
or expense. Ante, at 2:2. :2:3; see Fed. Rule C'iv. Proc. 26 (c). 
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed~ 
ing these admonitions, tlw district court must ensurf' that the 
values protected by the First Amendnwnt. though Pntitlf'd to 
no collstitutional privileg<' in a case of this kind, are wt-ighed 
carefully in striking a proper balance, 
tlH• i IIIH' di~cov<'r~· wa~ oppo~NI , and havt> not argu<'d that di~rowr~· ~hould 
Le po~tpoued until ot lwr i~~u<·~ on which liability dcpc·nd are l'<"~olv<'d. 
"ro: !he Chief Justice l! Justice Brennan 
V~· Justice Stewart 
Mr~ Juat\oe Wbite 
J . t 1'' ~ \E.a:rsh:lll ltr Ul! · ' 
. Just1 <'"' l.na.~lcmun 
Mr. :Just 1 ( · ' R ,hnquist 
Mr. Justlrt· stevens 
Mr. 
"- Justice Powell 
From: JiL1. • 
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL, concurring, 
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to 
I 8 M~'R 1979 
elaborate on what is said in Part IV. M-the 9pinial\: I do / 
not see my observations as being inconsistent with the Court's 'Y 
opinion; rather, I write to emphasize the additional point 
that, in supPrvising discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, 
a district court has a duty to consider First Amendment inter-
ests as well as the private interests of the plaintiffs. 
I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional pro-
tection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as 
articulated by New York Times ·,r. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
( 1964), should not be expanded to create au evidentiary privi-
lege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding, 
whatever protection the "exercise of editorial judgment" enjoys 
depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment 
accords the product of this judgment, namely pubtished 
speech. As the Court makes clear, the privilege respondents 
claim is unnecessary to safeguard published speech. 1 This 
1 I am not in agreement with MH. JusTICE BHENNAN that the First 
Amendment requires that discovery into the exchange of views among 
pres~ c-mployee:s mnHt br postponed until a preliminary determination of 
thr fabity of t.hr· publication iH made. See po8t, at 16--17. Nor am I 
per~uaded that court-supervi::;ecl inquiry into these exchang('ti is likely to 
Pxert a Hignificant effect on futurE' publicationl:i. New~room conver:>a tions 
arc like any othc·r ronvPr,;ation:;, ina ::nnuch as they <>njoy no special Fir::;t 
AmP11dmcnt protrction other than what they derive from that accorded to 
publi~hed ~prech . :\lorcover, I do not. believe the j:;;;ueH of fal::;ity and 
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holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether "the trial 
judge properly applied the rules of discovery," as a nonconsti-
tutional matter, is not before us under the question certified 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), ante, at 23. I assume, 
therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District 
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which 
respondents declined to answer. 
Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari 
in ACF Industries, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, No. 78-453 (Jan. 8, 1979), I had occasion to 
comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has 
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. 
Slip op., at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court 
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded 
a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman v. 'Taylor, 329 U. S. 
r 495. 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably 
responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery 
techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litiga-
tion art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage 
of justice. As the Court now recognizes, the situation has 
reached the point where there is serious "concern about undue 
and uuco11trolled discovery." Ante, at 22.~ In view of the 
belief of falsity always will be separable. Often a trier of fact will have 
little or no objective evidence to assess the accuracy of a published state-
ment, but. mth<>r will have to weigh the probative value of conflicting 
versions of ev<>nts. In asses~ing the eredibility of these versions, the trier 
/of fad would bt> rntitled to con;,;idt>r evidenct• that, for example, the author 
of onr vNsion waH warned by a colleague familiar with the underlying fact::; 
that hi~ conclusion~ were dubiou:s, inconsistent, or unverified. Denying a 
( libel plaint iff the bPnefit of this type of Pvidence would re:;trict unduly his 
attempt to mPet the alrPad~· high ~tandard of proof that New York 'l'imes 
Co . afford~ the pre,.;~. 
2 See ABA, R<:>port of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 
F . R. D. 159, 191-192 (1976) ; W. Erickson, The Pound Conference Rec-
ommendations : A Blueprint for the .Tustice Sy~:;tem in the Twentieth Cen-
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cvi(lcnt attention given discovery by the District Judge in this 
case it cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled." 
But it crrtainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expen-
sive for all concerned. ~ 
Under present Rules the initial inquiry · in enforcement of 
any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard 
may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery 
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a 
district court should measure the degt·ee of relevance required 
in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public 
concerns implicated. On the one hand, as this Court has 
repeatedly recognized. the solicitude for First Amendment 
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the 
important public interest ill a free flow of news and commen-
tary. See First National Bank nf Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765. 781- 783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 
843. 862- 863 (1974) (PowELL. J .. dissenting). On the other 
hand, there also is a significant public interest in according to 
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely 
relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing 
these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function cus-
tomarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of the 
law. In performing this task trial judges-despite the heavy 
burdens most of them carry-are now increasingly recognizing 
the "pressing need for .i udicial supervision:" AFC!ndustties, 
Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op., at·7.1 
lury, 76 F . R D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. Bi>Il, The Pound Conference 
Follow-Up: A Respon~e from the United States Department of Justice, 
76 F . R D . 320, 329 (1978); Powell, Reforms-Long Overdue, 33 Record 
of N. Y. C. B. A. 458,461-463 (1978). 
3 See ante, a.t 21 n. 25. 
4 In some instances it might be appropriate for the · district court, to 
delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of 
issurs through summary ji.1dgment or other developments in ·discovery 
might reduce the need for the material demailded. It is pertinent to note 
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The Court today emphasizes tha.t the focus must be on 
relevance, that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure must be heeded, and that "district courts 
should not neglect their power to restrict discovery" in the 
interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden 
or expense. Ante, a.t 22, 23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c). 
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed~ 
ing these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the 
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to 
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed 
carefully in striking a proper balance. 
the t ime discovery was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should 
be postponed until other issnes on which liability depend. are resolved. 
'r• ' 
&J 1st DRAFT r~-
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-~ 
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-~~ 
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v. 
Barry Lando et al. 
[March -, 1979] ~ ~~. 
MR. JrwrJCE PowELL, concurring. 'P~ 
1 ,10111 tlw opmion of tlw Court, and write separately to 
elaborat<' on what is said in Part IV of the opinion. I do 
not see my obs<>rvations as being inconsistent with the Court's 
opinion; ratht'r. I write to emphasi~e the additional point 
that, in su]wrv1sin~ discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, 
a district court ha::; a duty to consider First Amendment inter-
Psts as v,:ell as tlw privatl' ;nterests of the plaintiffs. 
I agrPe '1\ith the Court that the explicit constitutional pro-
tection of First Amendnwnt rights in a case of this kind, as 
articulated by Sew )'ork Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
( 1964). should not be expanded to create au evidentiary privi-
legr. \Yith respect to prPtrial discovery in a civil proceeding. 
whatever protection thr "exercisP of editorial judgment'' rnjoys 
clepPIHis ent1rrly on thr protection the Ji..,irst Amendment 
accords tlw prod uet of this judgment, namely published 
sp<'t>Ch. As the Court mak<'s clear. thP privilege respoll(leuts 
C'laim u; unnecessary to safeguard published speeeh.' This 
~t?Ju..5 ~ 
~~w-: 
1 [ am not Ill a~l'<'Pilll-'lll w1t h .\Tn .. J t ' ><'I'H't; BHt:Xx AX that the Fir~t 
\mt'ndnH'Ill l't'(!111f('~ that rh:'('OV<'I'~· Ill tO tlw ('X('hangP of viPW>' alliOII!! a, f). - L ~ ~ . 0 
pn·~, Plllplo~ · ~·p,.. lllll:'t ])(' postponPd 11111!1 a pn•liminary dl't1•rmination of tf ....,... ~
tlw lal~<lt~· of th<' pubiH'atwn ~~ mud1•. :::;e<· post. at ll)-.17 . :\or am I _ 1 .. . • . ~- ~ 
p<'r~uad!'d that r·ourt-~<ll]l!'fV I"('d inqulr~ · into th<'"l' I'X<'hHIII!I'" i" likt'l~ · fo -r 
l'X!'I't a "l!l;lllhl'alll p[fr'l'l on fntlll'<' publH'ation~. :'\pw,.room I'OilV<'I'>'atlon~ 
an· lib· :111~ oth1•r r·onVI'I'"atioll", ina>' lllll<'h HH tb1·~· l'lljo,\' 110 "JX•eial Fir"t 
.\!lii'IHinwnl prolt•l'tiOII oth1·r than what thp~· dPriv1• from that H('f'ordPd to 
])llhiJ,.]H'cf ")'!'''''" \lon•owt , l do not hrJi('\'1' tlw i""ll('" of fal"ify and 
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holding requires a rc•versal of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. The Court notes. however. that whether "tlw trial 
judge properly applied the rules of discovery.'' as a uonconsti-
tutional mattPr. is not before us under the q uestio11 certified 
pursuant to 28 l'. ~. C. ~ 1:2!12 (b). ante, at 23. I assume. 
therefore, that the litigatioii will con tiu ue and the District 
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which 
respondents declined to answer. 
Earlier this Terlll, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari 
iu A CF lnd-ustrws, Inc. v. E' qual E mploymeu t Opportunity 
Cunumssion, ~o . 78-45:3 (Jan. 8, 1979). I had occasion to 
comment upon tht' widespread abuse of discovery that has 
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. 
;jlip op., at f)-7. At the 1D4ti Term. just a few years after 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court 
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded 
a broad and libPral treatment. ' ' Hickman Y. 'l'aylor, 329 U.S. 
<::: ----~4'i"i~"J5..,Z ThP bar and trial courts uudcrstandably respond<><! 
~lftirmatiwly. As th0 ypars have passed. discovery techuiqm·s 
aud tactics have lwconw a highly developed litigation art-oJJe 
not wfrequently exploited to tht> disadvantage of justice. As 
the ( 'ourt now recognizes. the situation has reached the poiJlt 
wherP there IS s0rious "concerll about uudue aud uncontrolled 
discovery.'' Ante, at 22.~ ln viPw of t he <•vidcnt attentio11 
lwlwt of fabtly alw11ys wtll bt· ·'~'JlHrablP. Often a trier of fact will hal'!' 
!Jtllt• or no ohJeetJV<' t•vJdPntP to a~~<'s~ tlw a<·eurae~· of a publisbrd sta tt ·-
lll<'ll t, but mtlwr will ha vt• 1 o \n•igb t.ht> proba 1 ive value of !'OIJHicting 
Y!'l'~JOn,; of !'VP!ll~ . ln a,.;~('~>'lllO' tlw <·rPdibility of th!'~<· wr,-iou,.; the tri1·r 
ol tad would lw PHtiiiPd to r·vidPne!' that, or t-xamp <'. t w author of oJH· 
\'Pr,: ion wa~ wamPd IJ_,. ;1 eoll!•Hg;IIP familwr wit.h thP undrrlyiug facts that 
lu" t·oJJelu,.;iou~ wPr!' dubwu", lli!'On~t~tC'nt, or unv!'l'tfird. DC'n~·ing a libd 
p amttfl tht~ t~·pp of PvtdPIIr!' would r!',.;tnet unduly ~a o met• 
th! alrPad~ · htgh "taudard of proof thai i\'eu· rork Times ('u . afford,· 
llw pn'"" 
" :-i<'<' AHA , BPporl of Pound Confen•Jte<· Follow-lip Ta::;k Fore<·, ~~ 
F H. D 159, Hll- l!J:l ( 1\)71)) ; W. Em· bon, Tlw Pound Conferenee RPe-
flJlllll!'JJdatton" A Bht ~'Jil'lltl for tlw .Ju,.;til'r :-:;y~t!'lll lll tlw Twt•Jttieth C'en-
rt "',-. 
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~h·r11 rlu.;(•overy hy tlw District .Judp;C' in this <·asP it ('llllllol lH' 
snirl ilHtt tiH' }H'O<'<'SS lwn• \\'HS "urH·orJtroll<"d." Bnt Jt <·c•r-
tniJdy \\'as protradC'd and urHioubtc•dl.v \\'as PXiH' JisiYc' for all 
C011C<'I'll<'d. 
"C'ndPr prN;t•nt Ru1Ps th<' initial inquiry in Pnfon•pnwnt of 
nny discovf'ry r<'q u<•st u; onr of r<•lPvall<'<'. \Yhal<'V<'r standard 
may be appropriate in otlwr typ<'S of easPs. wiH•n a discovery 
d<•mand arguably imping<•s 011 First AllH'IHinl('nt rights a 
district eonrt f'lhould nwasurc t iH' degrP<' of relrvanc<' required 
in light of both tlw pnvat<' rre<'ds of tlw partiPs and th<' public 
cOIH'<'l'llS 1mplicat<•d. On tiH• OlH' hand. as this Court has 
n•lwatPdly n•cogniz<•d. tlw sol.ieituck for J;"irst Amendnwnt 
rip;h ti'l f'\·idPnC('(l in om opinions rdkcts concPrJl for the 
i111 portant public in t<•rt>st i 11 a fr<:><' flo\\' of m•ws and comnwn-
tary. 8<'<' fi'll'sl .\.at ional Hank of Boston \',Bellotti, 435 r. R. 
7(i,). 7H1-7R:~ t 1\178); 8a.rln' \', Wash.inuton Post Co., 417 r.,. 
84:~. 862-~(i:~ (1!J74) (Pow~:LL .. J.. diss<•ntinp;). On the other 
hand. th<•n• alRo iR a signifiean t public in ten•st in according to 
civil litigants dir-c()wry of such 1natters as may lw gPnuin<'ly 
r·<>lcvant to tlwir lawsuit. .\ltl10ugh tlw process of weighing 
thPSP Jllt<'r<'f'lts iR hardly 1111 t''\act scieneP. it is a function cus-
tomarily carriPd out by Jltdg,t·::> in this and other areas of the 
law. l11 p<'rforllling this task trial judges-despite the hea\'Y 
burden~ most of tlwm earry-an· 110w increasingly recognizing 
the "prrssing nePd for ,1udicial SUJ>Prvision." AF() Industries, 
Inc.\'. EEOC', su1n·a. slip op .. at i.' 
lm~· , 7(i F . H. D. '277 , 2i'o:I'-2\:JO (197~): <:. Bl.'ll, Thr Pound Confrrenl'r 
Follow-! ' p. .\ H p,.;poll,.;t• from t lw l 'mt t•rl ~~at P~ Dt>pa rtnwnt of .J n,.;fJee, 
IIi F H. D . :~:.!0, :tm ( HJ71,): l'owl'll. H<'form~-Lon~ (herdnt•, 3:3 Hc•eord 
of X. Y. C. B. A. 451'\, -tfil - -tfi;{ ( l\J71-) 
~ S<'<' antt·. at :.!1 n '21) 
'In 'onw lll~talH't'~ If might ht• appropri;tf(' for ilw <h~triC't ronrt to 
delay en forc·mg a dJ~c·oYPr~ d<•ma nd, 111 tht• hop<• that t lw t'l'~olntion of 
,,.,.;up,. thron!!;h ~llllllll<!l'~ ' ,ltl(lgm<•nt or othl'r dt•vt•lopmrllt~ Ill dt~I'OY\'1')' 
llllf);ht rPdtt<'<' the• n<·l'd for 1 hP mat<'l'l<ti dt•mandt>d. lt "' JWrtin<•nt to notP 
lh:tt l'~'"'pond<•nt" hPn· had not "<lltght summary ,1udgment on any b,;ut• ;It 
71-1105-CO::\CUR 
4 HEHHEHT v. LA~DO 
The Court today emphasilles that the focus must be on 
relevancf'. that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure must br heeded. and that "district courts 
should not neglect their power to restrict discovPry'' in the 
interest of justice or to protect the parties from u11due burden 
or expense. Ante, at 22. 2:3; seP Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c). 
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that i11 heed~ 
ing these admonitions. the district court must ensure that th~' 
values protected by tlw First Amendment. though entitled to 
no constitutional privilegP in a case of this kind, are w~ighed 
carefully in striking a proper balance, 
tlw I inw di~l·ov<·r~· wa,; O]l[)(l~Pd , and havt> not argut>d tlwt diHrovt>r~· ~<houlcl 
be po~tpoued until otlwr i~~'llt'~' on which Jiabilily depend are re~olved. 
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v. United States Court of Ap-~ ~ 
Barry Lando et al. peals for the Second Circuit.  
~u-,6..c 
.a;4~. 
[February -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in part. 
R espondents are representatives of the news media. They 
are defendants in a libel action brought by petitioner, Lieu .. 
tenant Colonel Anthony Herbert (U. S. Army, Ret.) , who is .t 
concededly a public figure. The Court today rejects respond- . 
ents' claim that an "editorial privilege" shields from discovery 
information that would reveal respondents' editorial processes. 
I agree with the Court that no such privilege insulates factual 
matters that may be sought during discovery, and that such a 
privilege should not shield respondents' "mental processes." 
568 F. 2d 974, 995 (CA2 1977) (Oakes, j.). I would hold , 
however, that the First Amendment requires predecisional 
communication among editors to be protected by an editorial 
privilege, but that this privilege must yield if a public figure 
plaintiff is able to demonstrate to the prima facie satisfaction 
of a trial judge that the libel in question constitutes defama;. 
tory falsehood . 
I 
The Court of Appeals below stated that "the issue presented 
by this case is whether, and to what extent, inquiry into the 
editorial process, conducted during discovery in a New York 
Times v. Sullivan type libel action, impermissibly burdens the 
work of reporters and broadcast€rs." 568 F. 2d , at 979 
(Kaufman , C. J .). The Court grouped the discovery inquiries 
·objected to by respondents into five categories: 
" 1. Lando 's conclusions during his research and investi· 
gations regarding people or ·leads to be pursued, or 
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310 U. S. 88, 95 (1940). Respondent is concededly a public 
figure; "[o]ur citizenry has a legitimate and substantial inter-
est in the conduct of such persons, and freedom of the press 
to engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in 
public issues and events is as crucial as it is in the case of 
'public officials.'" Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U. S. 
130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring in result). To the 
extent coverage of such figures becomes fearful and inhibited, 
to the extent the accuracy, effectiveness, and thoroughness of 
such coverage is undermined, the social values protected by 
the First Amendment suffer abridgment. 
I find compelling these justifications for the existence o{ an 
editorial privilege. The values at issue are sufficiently im-
portant to justify some incidental sacrifice of evidentiary 
material.'' The Court today concedes the accuracy of the 
underlying rationale for such a privilege, stating that " [ w] e 
do not doubt the direct relationship between consultation and 
discussion on the one hand and sound decisions on the J 
1 ' )Jy Brother PowELL writ('~ ,.;eparlliely to Pmpha,;izP th111 di~tri<"i 
<:omt~ must c·nrefully WPigh ""th r valuP~ protertrd by thr Fir~t Amr•JHI-
nwnt ,. in dc' t rrminilll!; t he• relrv:llll'l' uf di~ro\·rr~· n•<.jur~t s. A 11t e. at -t . 
\-. At the· ~anw timr. how<>vrr, he· conr·ludr·~ that tlwn• ~hould 110t lw nn l'\'i-
~ '('f-1\~r dc·utiar~· priYilegP which protrc·t~ the rditorial procr><~ lH"c::au><r lw i~ 
I unpc•r><uadPd ""t hat C'Ourt-~uprn·i~rd iuquir~· into I Pditmiall c->xrh:mgt'::< i~ 
vfC. ~~ · like]~· tu rxc·n a ><lgnific::ant pffrrt on fHTmr public:il!Oil::',· ' nnd bec·au;,;e 
- 0 " rnlrwsroom ronve•r,.;ation:; ... r•njoy uo sprcial Fin,;t Anwndnwnt pro-·,; ,·s ~. -- L~ l<, J trrtion other •t,!.an what thry dc·rivr from thn1 ar('urded to publi~bed 
} "'r .,... ~wrch.'' I d .. :11 1 n. 1. But if the Pxpo ·ure of pn·c.IPci~ionaJ f'dit urial di~-
'. oJtl ~ f1IIV'II t·n~~ion,; will not atft>ct tlw nature· of ><lllJ~e<.juent publicntion,:, I havt' diJti-
UJ- ~ -ts.ulty 1!lldt>nnnnding rxaetl~· what Fir"t Amf'nchnrnt YaluP~ m~· Brothrr· 
~~ ~POWELL expect~ district tourt~ to piHce in thr balance. He may be <>Ug-
Vf ....... 1... ~~lA' ge~t i.ng that Fir,;t Amrndnwnt value~ arr impain·d. mrrrl~· h~· re~1.1iring 
~ r•v\\ J,,, .A.. lll!'dla df'frndan1 S to re:;pond to dJ>iCO\'f'r~· n•qur:;t" hkr ~m~· other htJg:ant. 
tp ~ ··. !- But rven if di,;trict conrt<' wrrr to nppl~· l'tricter ><tandanl>< of rf'lt>vaiH'f' in 
-J~ or-- ~ ca:;P~ invoh·ing mrdia defr·ndants. thr hurdt•n of pretrial di><cover~· would 
,.... ~ , lw on]~· marginall~· dec·rrased, nnd it dors not HPem ju~tifird to a~~ume~ 
~ "6~~ s ih<1t thi,.; J:P>illlt \\'Ollld. "e.WI't a ::;ignificant effect Qll future• l)U.lJJicatiilllS .. ". y 
-t~.l ~ ' ' ''. ")..,. <IlK . 
~0.. (\ \)-v\.~~ l .-\ _ 0,., A jL,. 
•• , •. ~~~ \ .-, 1 /\~ ~· ~ J . 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Herbert v. Lando, No. 77-1105 --
DATE: April 11, 1979 
I am not sure anything in note 1 is necessary anymore. 
I think the point that objective falsity and awareness of falsity 
are intertwined should be obvious, and Justice Marshall at 6 n.5 
does indicate the relevancy of the kind of information requested. 
At the same time, I am not sure than some elaboration on the 
point that the First Amendment affords no special protection for 
unpublished conversation would be unwarranted. If nothing else, 
I think you should go on record in an attempt to clarify the 
meaning of Tornillo. 
I propose deleting note 1 as it exists and substituting 
a new note 1, attached to the previous sentence (ending "namely 
published speech.") The note would read: "Our decisions in 
Miami~Herald·~oblishing~eo; v. Tornillo, 418 u.s. 241 (1974), and 
eolombia~Broadcasting·System;·Inc; v. ~emocratic·National 
eommittee;·Inc:, 412 u.s. 94 (1973), provide no support for the 
theory that the pre-publication editorial process enjoys a 
special status under the First Amendment. Rather, these 
decisions rest on the fundamental principle that the coerced 
. 
•, 
publication of particular views, as much as their suppression, 
violates the freedom of speech." 
If this or some variant is not satisfactory, I would 
propose deleting the note altogether. 
2. 
.. 
'to: !~e Ch1af Just1~ 
b4r. Ju.st1oe Bra~Wi&8 
ijr; Justice Ste~ 
~r. Juat1oe Wbite 
t.lr. JUI:ltioe '!5,a·rsb:all 
Mr. Justice Bl~o~ 
Ur. Justice Rebnqu~st 
Mr. Justioe Stevena 
From : Ur. Justioe Powl\ 
3rrJ DRAFT C1roula.tad: ------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST~ulated : t 2" Al?-R 1979 
No. 77-1105 
Anthony Herbert, Petitioner, 
v. 
Barry Lando ~t al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Ap-
peals for the ·Second Circuit. 
[March -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court, and write separately to · ssi
6
,v 
elaborate on what is said in Part IV. I do not see my obser- 1 otrl 
1 
vations as being inconsistent with the Court's opinion; rather, 
I write to emphasize the additional point that, in supervising 
discovery in a libel suit by a public figure, a district court 
has a duty to consider First Amendment interests as well as 
the private interests of the plaintiffs. 
I agree with the Court that the explicit constitutional pro-
tection of First Amendment rights in a case of this kind, as 
articulated by New York Times -;. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 
( 1964), should not be expanded to create an evidentiary privi-
lege. With respect to pretrial discovery in a civil proceeding, 
whatever protection the "exercise of editorial judgment" enjoys 
depends entirely on the protection the First Amendment 
accords the product of this judgment, namely published 
speech.1 As the Court makes clear. the privilege respondents 
claim is mmecessary to safeguard published speech. This 
holding requires a reversal of the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. The Court notes, however, that whether '·'the trial 
1 Our deci sion~ in Miami Herald P'Ublishiug Co. v. Tornillo, 41R U. S. 
241 (1974), and Col'Utnbia Broadcasting System, Inc . v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee. Inc. , 412 U.S. 94 (1973) , provide no JSUp]Jort for the 
i heory that the prepublication editorial prorPHs rnjoy~ a special Htatu~· 
under the FirHt Amendmf•nt. Rathe~deci ::;ion ::; re:st on the fundament·al 
principle that the coerced publication of 11artirular view:>, as murh a;; their 
::~uppre"'sion, violates the freedom of speech . 
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judge properly applied the rules of discovery," as a nonconsti-
tutional matter, is not before us under the question certified 
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b), ante, at 23. I assume, 
therefore, that the litigation will continue and the District 
Court will review the interrogatories and questions which 
respondents declined to answer. 
Earlier this Term, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari 
in ACF Industries, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, No. 78-453 (Jan. 8, 1979), I had occasion to 
comment upon the widespread abuse of discovery that has 
become a prime cause of delay and expense in civil litigation. 
Slip op., at 5-7. At the 1946 Term, just a few years after 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court 
stated "that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded 
a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 
495. 507 (1947). The bar and trial courts understandably 
responded affirmatively. As the years have passed, discovery 
techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litiga-
tion art--one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage 
of justice. As the Court now recognizes. the situation has 
reached the point where there is serious "concern about undue 
and uncontrolled discovery." Ante, at 22." In view of the 
evident attention given discovery by the District Judge in this 
case it cannot be said that the process here was "uncontrolled." 
But it certainly was protracted and undoubtedly was expen-
sive for all concerned.3 
Under present Rules the initial inquiry in enforcement of 
2 See ABA, Report of Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force, 74 
F. R. D. 159, 191-192 (1976); W. Erickson, The Pound Conference Rec-
ommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, 76 F. R. D. 277, 288-290 (1978); G. Bell, The Pound Conference 
Follow-Up: A Response from the United States Department of Justice, 
76 F. R. D. 320, 329 (1978); Powell, Reforms-Long Overdue, 33 ~ecorq 
()f N.Y. C. B. A. 458,461-463 (1978). 
3 See ante, at 21 n. 25. 
'· 
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any discovery request is one of relevance. Whatever standard 
may be appropriate in other types of cases, when a discovery 
demand arguably impinges on First Amendment rights a 
district court should measure the degree of relevance required 
in light of both the private needs of the parties and the public 
concerns implicated. On the one ha.nd. as this Court has 
repeatedly recognized, the solicitude for First Amendment 
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects concern for the 
important public interest in a free flow of news and commen-
tary. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
165, 781-783 (1978); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 
843, 862-863 (1974) (PowELL, J .. dissenting). On the other 
hand, there also is a significant public interest in according to 
civil litigants discovery of such matters as may be genuinely 
relevant to their lawsuit. Although the process of weighing· 
these interests is hardly an exact science, it is a function cus-
tomarily carried out by judges in this and other areas of .the 
law. In performing this task trial judges-despite the heavy 
burdens most of them carry-are now increasingly recognizing 
the "pressing need for judicial supervision." AFC. Industries, 
Inc. v. EEOC, supra, slip op .. at 7,4 
The Court today emphasizes that the focus must. be on 
relevance. that the injunction of Rule 1 of the Federal,Rule of 
Civil Procedure must be heeded, and that ~'district courts 
should not neglect their power to restrict . discovery" in the 
interest of justice or to protect the parties from undue burden 
or expense. Ante, a.t 22, 23; see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26 (c). 
I join the Court's opinion on my understanding that in heed-
4 In some instances it might be appropriate for the district court to 
delay enforcing a discovery demand, in the hope that the resolution of 
issues through summary_ judgment or other developments in discovery 
might reduce the need for the material demanded. It is pertinent to note 
that respondents here had not sought summary judgment on any issue at 
the time discovei:y was opposed, and have not argued that discovery should 
be postponed until other issues on which liability depend are resolved.. 
77-1105-CONCUR 
HERBERT v. LANDO 
ing these admonitions, the district court must ensure that the 
values protected by the First Amendment, though entitled to 
no constitutional privilege in a case of this kind, are weighed 
carefully in striking a proper balance. 
; 
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WASHINGTON, April 19 - Tb~ ·:·:: ~w~per~blishedanwtrue~rge · · • · · . ·. .. WASHINGTON1 · ·subpoena anybody. They have to fiy to place the press and the 
courtsandthepresslnthiscountryare~ against a publlc·officialihat damaged ·••..: t.:· .:·~ ·· · -~ ': · . · , . ' · · · · . , . ·. much of the time by limited lnforma- ·• contention and dividing 
. fussing with one another again a~yt '~ hischaracterorflnanciallnterests,his ,f. :,· c . ..  ·.. d. th p · ·· ~. tlon, rumor and intuition. Otherwise, commonnaturalpursuitof 
;~· the confiict in the Constitution be.~ ... . suit for damages had to prove not only .. , ·>• .''(. . , · they would probably never have pub- Though the Supreme Court 
- tween )he right to a-fair trial and the~a falsebood'but '.'actua~ malice" on the ,-t.:_.··--'- · ourts an . e. : ress · lished the Pentagon Papers or the dis- · 6-3 on this latest case on the rights 
freedom of the press. This will ~ve to ~. 'rJ. part of the publisher~ that the news- . · .,·· <. · • ·• . · · · • • · . . , as~ers of Vietnam, or exposed the · public official in a libel case, it is 
be settled in the courts and the eon-.H~ paper or radio or television s~tion had ' .. . . . . ~ , , . . .. . . • . . • cnminal acts and constitutional viola- nificant that only one member of 
· gress, but maybe something should be', .:--;·made ~ the charge · public ·· with' the - -- ~ ...,.\.~ J v · ,·,· By James Reston . ~ :· tions of Watergate. ... Supreme Court, Justice M~ball~~OCI 
said for~.a little more understanding ¥:~knowledge that it was false or with ":' · • . Even so, the press has a lot to ~- 4 • . fended the unlimited fight of the 
, ·, between >judges >and· edi~rs on theirl:!J;~recklesa disregard whether · it ·was '·Ui.'. · 1 · • . aider in this dilemma about doing its to avoid questioning undu the 
~ different~ibilities . and common I,.,J, false or not: •. · · ·: V~-..~:~,..n k•:. ' · ;;_.., led to the decision to publish or broad- · that in a libel suit a defendant must ;. job within the sensible limits ofthela~ Amendment . . 
• purposes.e'iorn ?-1 t h.orl;; f)'fi syqH~< Gf'lf ;_.: ; Thls:was b~led at the time as a tri- ifl cast . . l . :· 1: . ·' ,, ' ·' prove "actual mali~e" unless he has r. and the rights of individuals to a fair The result of this probably does 
They don!t talk' ~gether .very p~~umph f<n; the freedom'of the press, but ' (,;:.; The press of this country is more .: the right to question our procedures .. f..c. trial. Some of us, for example, think justify the outcries of the presa. 
abouphe<practical' ~roblema :of:~eir~was e9ndemned bY, many jurists and f!!:!l di~ded than it appears. The spokes- -~,. and even the thoughts that led to our : , our colleagues have been goi~g too. far • ., Supreme Court's support of the 
work.!·'IbeJjudges tend to thlnk,~wtthf.lipoliticians and many in ,the universi-<'f men for the media were predictably . publishedchargesagainsthim? ~;; lnpublisbingthepreliminary,private, : to invade newspaper offices for 
some,.reason; that the press is demand.tn~~ ties as: a hunting license for the press~;;. l outraged. But if I h~r the younger re- " It is interesting that in the courts we " unsubs ~. in .- 4 dence in the Stanford Dally case 
· 'ing too much freedom.at;the~ expense.1f\; gainstpubllc officials. i.t, •:<! •. :1 •·· " ,• porters and ·editors accurately, they hear very little dissent from the young ·· jury p~~:.. • .. _ .. ..:::i' . an outrage. But its latest declsloaa; 
' of individual-freedom. And th~ ; press;~t~ The reaction has now set in. The Su;. ,.. are aQc>ut as divided as the Supreme '\ on the other side. Unlike the young re- ' .. Even more important, the broad· while hard on the expectatioas of 
· with c equal ~anxiecy,:l feels that' the 1it,~ preme Court, in the case of Herbert v. t~• Court -two-thirds for the majority · .. porters, the young lawyers do not casting by ABC of the Supreme Court's ' press, have made reporters and 
courts are. interfering more and more .K\>-Lando, has said a very simple but very :• ~f. decision to question bow editorial deCi- ·' ~ seem to be challenging the assump. decisions . in this latest case - before ' 1 tors think about their responaibWtlel 
: with the dutj 'of the press to·publlsh the t,~fr different thing:· If a public official has ! ''fltj sions were made under the circum- · " tions of the judges. Newspapers, radio . the Court made it public - obviously f as well as their rights. 
, ne~ and expose corruption:· (\' •: ,~o • <!i) • .f. to prove !'actual malice" in a libel sutt'~V stances, and one-third against. · and TV also have a problem. It is not sen:es .no public interest and is a drop against the old assumption 
.. · Unf~rtunately:·· these >1 bonest ! cOh.~.-_2 against a newspaper or radio or televi~ ' __ Yn How; these younger members . of the '.· quite fair to insist that they be judged of poison in the whole democratic pro-/ First Amendment guarantee 
h. fllcts come•doWn to the point of deci·~~'l sion station, as command~ by the Su-'1p:·f reporting profession ask, couldwepoS:. · by whether or not they printed ''the cess. · , L : domofthepress was beyondchallena-
sion in the SUp~me.Court.in>very hardif'!:,:Preme Court, .then he . must have the )t1• sibly a,rgue in the press for protection · truth." They are not courts of justice. t is this sort of thing, which in- ~ .and had the support of the people ~ 
cases. In• ~964, the ,COurt ruled (New ~N right to question the thoughts, the mo-··~~i- against "a .reckfess disregard for the They have no power to command evi- ourt more the courts; but this is obviousl_nea 
l:. York~•~<J~~~~l!"t?~ ~~'~ .~~~t~~~~es -~~ ~r ~to~~,.P~ t!!&t' ~ . truth'?,,:.,H~W." can w~ . possibl; ~ist C.' ~ence f~m :"1tnesses. They cannot than they dare admit, that is tending longer true. . . 
1 
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GEORGE F. WILL 
~ Last week's controversy boiled like 
...,. surf around the Supreme Court, 
~ which did something contrary to the 
~ wishes of the nation's most articulate 
t:n interest group. The Court affirmed a 
~ limitation on the privileges of the most 
~ privileged profession. Ruling 6 to 3, it 
...,. held that a plaintiff in a libel suit can 
Z compel journalists to answer ques-
tions about what their "state of mind" was 
when preparing the story at issue. Some of 
the press's tartest critics will say that to 
explore a journalist's mind is to trespass on 
a wilderness area, and there are, indeed, 
logicatlbraroples and tangles in the minds of 
some journalistS who are denouncing the 
Court. They cannot abide a four-word 
phrase that appears in Justice Lewis 
Powell's concurring opinion: 
" ... The solicitude for First Amendment 
rights evidenced in our opinions reflects 
concern for the important public intere.st in 
a free flow of news and commentary. On the 
other hand ... " 
On the other hand, Powell says, there is a 
"significant public interest" in the right of 
litigants, such as plaintiffs in libel actions, 
to seek important evidence, even from 
journalists. Journalists enjoy reading about 
the "important public interest" in their 
rights; they do not enjoy then reading, "on 
the other hand ... " 
VICTORY: In 1969, Anthony Herbert, a 
Vietnam veteran, accused the Army of 
suppressing evidence of war crimes. He has 
sued CBS, claiming that in 1973 "60 Min-
utes" falsely and maliciously portrayed him 
as a liar. He concedes he was then a "public 
figure." He knows that in 1964 the Court 
ruled that comment about public figures is 
protected, except falsehood disseminated 
with "malice," meaning "with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not." 
Journalists rightly regarded that ruling as 
a sweeping victory. It erected a wall of 
protection around a vast field of privilege. 
But a wall protecting a pasture, however 
vast the pasture, defines the limits of that 
pasture. And any definition of a right, how-
ever sweeping, sets limits to that right. The 
ruling in the Herbert case only makes explic-
it a limit inherent in the Warren Court ruling 
of fifteen years ago: the right to penalize 
malicious journalism implies the right di-
rectly to seek from journalists evidence of a 
malicious "state of mind." To grant journal-
ists a privilege not to ·mswer questions about 
motives, intentions and similar relevant as-
pects of the editorial process would place 
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important evidence beyond the reach of a 
plaintiff; it would undermine the narrow but 
vital right of public figures to act against 
malicious defamation. Hearing journalists 
complain about even this denial of a privi-
lege recalls Lincoln's story of the farmer 
who said, "I'm not greedy about land-I 
only want what joins mine." 
Critics of the decision will quote, approv-
ingly, Elizabeth I: "I will not make windows 
into men's souls." (She did, of course, have 
men pulled apart on racks to encourage 
them to volunteer what was in their minds.) 
But there is nothing inherently wrong with 
the law requiring testimony about a "state of 
mind." Justice could not be done without 
testimony about premeditation in homicide 
cases; or motives in some fraud cases; or 
intentions in civil-rights suits about alleged-
ly discriminatory actions. 
The Constitution 




It is said that the right oflibel plaintiffs to 
require testimony about "states of mind" 
will have a "chilling effect" on certain kinds 
of editorial processes. Quite right: it is 
supposed to induce self-censorship of mali-
cious and injurious falsehood, which (in the 
words of Justice Byron White's opinion for 
the Court's majority) "carries no First 
Amendment credentials." 
Some journalists are accusing the Court 
of "judicial Agnewism" and of• chopping 
"ruinous swaths through the First Amend-
ment." But the burden of proof on Herbert 
in his suit against CBS is still heavy; the 
construction of the First Amendment has 
not been changed, and no injury has been 
done to any constitutional value by not 
pushing beyond the horizon the boundaries 
of editorial privilege. Why, then, the alarm? 
One explanation is the remarkable resilience 
of a wrong idea, the theory of "absolute" 
First Amendment rights. 
Physiology requires mankind to sleep 
about a third of the time, and psychology 
inclines mankind to dogmatic slumbers the 
rest of the time. The "absolute" construc-
tion of the First Amendment is an excuse 
not to think. It "answers" all questions 
about journalists' rights, and about much 
more: the sweep of First Amendment rights 
cannot be limited by any of the many 
conflicting values enshrined in the Consti-
tution. But the Constitution is not a mere 
appendage to the First Amendment. As 
Powell writes, that amendment's values do 
not always enjoy "constitutional privilege," 
and must be "weighed" for proper "bal-
ance" with other values. As Edmund Burke 
wrote, "Political reason is a computing 
principle: adding, subtracting, multiplying, 
and dividing . . . true moral denomina-
tions." As Alexander Bickel of Yale taught, 
"There are no absolutes that a complex 
society can live with in its law. There is 
only the computing principle that Burke 
spoke of ... 
"A very broad freedom to print, and a 
very considerable freedom to ferret out 
information by all manner of means ought 
to be, and substantially has been, one of the 
chief denominations computed in our cal-
culus as constitutional policy. But there are 
other denominations as well. It is the most 
enduring instinct of our legal order ... to 
resist the assertion of absolute claims and, 
therefore, a waste of breath to make them 
... Better to recognize from the first that 
the computing principle is all there is, ought 
to be, or can be." 
Journalists are well-remunerated, espe-
cially in the coin of prestige. They derive 
psychic income from the fact that the Re-
public's fundamental law accords their pro-
fession special privileges and immunities. 
But the public is becoming less deferential 
toward the elites on which it is, resentfulJy, 
dependent. Elites include lawyers, doctors, 
scientists, politicians. And journalists. 
Journalists are doubly resented because 
people feel they must depend on them to 
watch all the other distrusted elites. It is not 
prudent for journalists to provoke the pub-
lic by waxing indignant whenever, out near 
the horizon, one of the sweeping extensions 
of their privileges is limited to accommo-
date another of the public's interests. 
DANGER: The public's confidence in jour-
nalists is jeopardized by their overwrought 
reactions to every small limit on their ex-
pansive privileges. The danger is not that 
the press by crying "Wolf!" when there are 
no wolves in sight will be ignored should 
wolves appear. Rather, the danger is that by 
crying "Wolf!" whenever the law nibbles 
like a hamster at the edge of privileges the 
press claims, the press seems immoderate, 
irrational, self-regarding and antisocial. 
And the public may come to think that 
perhaps the press should be gnawe~ into 
shape by a wolf or two. 
APRIL 30, 1979 
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U. S. SUPREME COURT DISPELS MYTH OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
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J 
[Text] Washington, April 19, TASS--The u.s. Supreme Court has passed a decision , under 
which the judicial authorities have been given the right to search editorial boards and 
look through notebooks of reporters, and request from telephone companies information 
about the telephone conversations of journalists . The investigating bodies can now 
demand from a journalist an answer to the question why he adheres to some or other view-
point. 
The reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has declared against the arbitrary rule 
of ·the U. S. authorities. The committee evaluated the decision of the Supreme Court as a 
crying violation of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This decision has 
finally dispelled the myth of the freedom of speech in the United States . 
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~i§dlb§'o/~s:r~_trfit!iin~~tf:>re~s .rRelations ¢lt Supreme ·court :,.---
~ ' jj·+. I ... ~~~ ~-xiJDA:GR;~oJ:'.d r'~).; .. : actually Joined uie &:.~ ~~jority. Aiid with reporters bB.fred 'from th~ entire NBC News, both la'Wyers; as is ·Mr. o·-1 ( ger Y?L 
).;; · • !: 1.':f SpecialtotbeNewYOik~ ~"1~··~~. . Mr. O'Brien .reported that the Justices' building a«er hours and on weekends. Brien, do no~ ·agree with their chief com-I · p1e11 
• ., 1 . • ·. , 
1 closed-session debate on the case was so Reporters who cover the Court were petitor. · , '! !' wherE 
WASHINGTON, May 28 .... Recen un- heated that Supreme Court police came concerned beca\lSe the Supreme Court's "It's of questionable value," Mr. · 
authorized disclosures of Supreme Court rwming' to the. conference room to see press room Is the only place where they Graham said in discussing premature ~ 
. decisi':'th and hi~· fu~ CourtseQ.lrity rest~ what the trouble was, · an account that can read the briefs and petitions that disclosure of Court decisions\ "You're not i 
tlons w e respon those in a position to know dismissed as make up much of their weekly workload. telling the public much they're not going 1 
have further strained an already tense fanciful. ·, , ' \· , . · Reporters are almost always in the press· to find out soon enough, and there's such 1 
relationship between the Court and the Mr; Q'Brien subsequently reported• room after4:30 P.M. and frequently work a great chance that you'll tum out to be 
reporters w~ cover It and have provoked that the' Court would reverse a lower on weekends · '/' · . wrong." 
something of a press room debate about ourt · decisi that ted ri . ft • · d ed th · 
th Court . th 1 t lbl f c 1 on . gran va ous A er two reporters lscuss e Issue . . . , Reports Termed 'Valueless' • bow e • e eas access e o "'" procedural safeguards to inmates facing with the Chief Justice, the Court decided . 
, tionallnstitutions,should~covered. • parole•boards. And last weekend; he~ last week to give reporters access to the Mr. Stern expressed his opinion on the 
Wbile poll tiel~ apd the reporters who ported that -the Justices would affirm a press room area from 8 A.M. to 10 p.M. s~bject in a letter to Broadcasting Maga-
chronicle their activities trade in prema- New York- ruling that allows judges to seven days a week, with additional hours zme, which had published ~ gene;ally_ 
ture disclosures the way commodity deal- close pretrial hearings to the press at the to be arranged on Individual request. laudatory article about Mr. 0 Brien s re;-. 
ers swap potato futures, that bas never request of any of the parties Neither of · . . . porting. 
been the case at the· Supreme ,Court. those decisions has yet come down While this schedule 1s unlikely to !neon- Mr. stern termed the · reports "value-
Breaches in Court security do' ~ pn _ • > • • 1 venlence anyone, It does represent at less and degrading" and said that he and 
occasion,• but they invariably infuriate · ,.~ '· BuildblgCioses.at4:30 P.M.' ;,··, least a symbo!lc change from the 24-hour other reporters at the Court did not, as 
the Justlcee, .- wbo believe that confiden- t 1 · open-door pol!cy of the past. And the Su- the article stated, "heartily approve" of 
tialltyis essential t9theirwork·.• .. _ Chief Justice Warren, E. Burger has re- preme Court library, where Mr. O'Brien what Mr. Stern called "the journallstl-
Wben Tim O'Brien, a 35-year-old con-&. sponded to' the disclosures by ordering a ~as seen after closmg hours on one occa- cally unprincipled use of unverified, pe-
·spondent for til!' ABC television network printer, a $23,000-a-year Government s1on, has been declared off-limits to re- ripheral sources to claim knowledge of 
reported last month on two pending decl: Printing Office employee named John porters for the first time. Reporters will the Court's deliberations." 
&ions the event ~k on an importance far Tucci, transferred out of the Court's print now have to ask permission to use the li- Promotional efforts undertaken in Mr. 
out oi proportion to the S!Jbstance of what shop. He also ordered that a police offlcei\ brary llfld will be "escorted" there by O'Brien's behalf by his network and by 
Mr. O'Brien disclosed. 1 .. ,., ' · be stationed in ~e ground Door lobby of Court employees. Lee Landes berg, a 30-year-old Washing-, · J\i· . ~ . the Supreme Court Building, with a direct Mr. O'Brien has refused to say whether ton lawyer, have added to the general at-
ErredAboutJustk:e~t~~ •. - r.':~·- _viewofthepress~mdownthehall. . · ~e printer who was transferred was his mosphere of Ill will. Both ABC officials 
, He reported; correctly,- that tlle Court 1be officer assum~ his post when the source. He is vigorous, however, In de- and Mr. Landesberg have ~lied other 
. Was about to reverse a lower court dec!- building closes to the public at 4:30P.M. fenseofhls reporting. , news ?rg~tlons urging art1cles about 
,· sion and rule that jQUI'Jlali.Jts wbo are de- Until the change wu made, officers pa- "There are only. three questions to Mr. 0 Bnen. 
fendants in libel suits may be req~ to troled the halls after closing time, but the ask," he said recently. "First, . 'Is It Mr. O'B.rien said Mr. Landes berg was 
answer pretrial questions . about their only fixed stations were at the building's right?' It was. Second, 'Is It news?' It not authorized to make such calls, adding 
, "stateofiillnd." ' . ·'·, ···~ · ~. entrances. , . , I was. And third, 'Is there any compelling ~at he and Mr. Landesberg had simply 
But be b,.d Associate Justice John Paul Some days later, word spread that the reason not to \lSe It?' There wasn't." discussed efforts to line up some lecture 
St~ dissenting .w~ Juatice Steyens press room itself 'Was to. be closed at 4:30, Fred Grah~~ .O.f. CBS ~d C_ar~~t~l'!lof a~pearances. 
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